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Abstract
The Beirut Central District was destroyed during the Lebanese Civil War which extended
from 1975 to 1990. Unable to reconstruct the center itself, the Lebanese government turned
to a private Real Estate Holding Company (REHCO), known by the acronym Solidere, to
take over the task of rebuilding. In 1991 Solidere was granted expropriation rights over
the Beirut Central District area, a space of approximately 150 hectares. The government's
decision to mandate such a large private-to-private transfer was a controversial one that
was unprecedented in Lebanese development history.
Solidere has been characterized by two very different views. The company's proponents
attributed the reconstruction of the city center solely to Solidere. The opposition denounced
the firm as an illegal assault on property rights.
This thesis traces the company's history. Its survival strategies, in terms of securing
government endorsement and gaining public approval, are discussed. Solidere is examined
through the lens of secular property rights, evaluating the firm in terms of the two conditions
of contribution to the "public benefit," and the compensation provided to the original
property owners. Solidere's case is also explored in the context of Islamic property rights,
focusing on the concept of waqf. The thesis concludes by abstracting from Solidere to
the broader concept of a REHCO, and begins to ask the necessary questions to develop a
framework for the successful implementation of this development model.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Fogelson
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning & History
Thesis Reader: Ralph A. Gakenheimer
Title: Professor of Urban Planning
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A Levantine Home
On what seemed an ordinary Wednesday morning, on the 4 th of May 1994, Ovadis Hemilian
settled down to read his daily newspaper Al-Nahhar. From his third floor window, Hemilian
had an unobstructed view of Beirut's Central District. Before the war, Hemilian, his wife,
and their three children had loved the center's nightlife, its bustle, and its architectural
splendor. During the fighting his family had been forced to watch helplessly as building
after building collapsed as the sixteen year Civil War destroyed the very heart of Lebanon's
capital city.
The Armenian-Lebanese Hemilian had lived on the edge of the Central District, in Zoqaq
al-Balat, facing the Serail, for his entire life. He was the third generation of his family to
reside in his grandparents' Levantine three-story house that had astonishingly escaped the
war almost undamaged. During the war, unable to find fulfilling opportunities in Lebanon,
his two sons had migrated to the United States and his daughter to Australia. But Hemilian
was sure that they would one day return to inherit their beautiful ancestral home - the only
real source of wealth for the Hemilian household.
In Hemilian's backyard was a white marble fountain, almost two hundred years old,
surrounded by thirty trees that had been planted by Hemilian's parents. The top two
floors were the living quarters and were decorated with an impressive collection of paintings
and furniture accumulated by Hemilian's parents and grandparents. The ground floor was
Hemilian's workplace. As a prospering clothier he had commissions from half the pub-
lic schools in Beirut to make uniforms, and was a well-known supplier of clothing to the
wealthier residents of the city.
On that Wednesday morning, as Hemilian paged through the paper, he found himself
staring at an unsettling advertisement. The half-page announcement described the recon-
figuration of the property boundaries around the Beirut Central District. Hemilian's house,
on 122 Maurice-Fares Street, not traditionally considered to be located in the city center
proper, was now part of what the advertisement defined as the new Beirut Central Dis-
trict. Naturally, upon receiving such news, Hemilian's first concern was about what such a
measure would do to land value and property taxes owed.
As Hemilian read on however, he realized that this change did not affect either of those
factors. The redefinition of the boundaries, instead, simply placed his property under
the jurisdiction of the advertisement's originator- Solidere. Hemilian was familiar with
Solidere, the French acronym for the privately owned Real Estate Holding Company -the
Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of the Beirut City Center. In
fact, the company was the talk of the town, everybody was familiar with Solidere. While
redevelopment is not generally a new and trendy topic (nor does it frequent the front pages
of newspapers of an entire region for well over three years) Solidere had somehow managed
to capture the attention of the Beiruti population, from teenagers to retirees alike.
After the Civil War, unable to reconstruct the destroyed city center itself, the post-war
Lebanese government had charged the privately owned Solidere, with assembling the neces-
sary finances and leading the redevelopment process. Had the governments commission to
Solidere stopped here, the project would have remained just another boring redevelopment
plan, one among hundreds all across post-war Lebanon. What made Solidere so infamous
and exciting was that, as part of its charge, Solidere was granted the right to appropri-
ate whichever public or private lands it deemed necessary to ensure the completion of its
projects.
As Hemilian read through the advertisement, he realized that his property was at that
very moment no longer his, but was considered part of the holdings of Solidere. The title
of his land, with no active participation on his part, had been transferred to a private
company.
Immediately upon consulting his wife, both the Hemilians went down to Solidere Head-
quarters to contest the decision, still in disbelief at the ease with which their ownership had
been converted.
By an incredible stroke of luck, the Hemilian property had not been destroyed or even
damaged during the war. There needed to be no reconstruction on the premises, and since
Solidere was a redevelopment firm it seemed illogical to the Hemilians that the title be
transferred for purposes of rebuilding.
The visit to Solidere Headquarters served no purpose but to register the Hemilians'
complaint. It left the couple in a state of confusion and worry as they were given absolutely
no advice on how to contest the matter. The Hemilians did contact a lawyer, but as the
complaint had already been registered with Solidere, there was no court that would hear
the matter before a final decision had been taken by the company.
On the 6 th of January 1995, the Hemilians received a letter from Solidere advising them
on the "Conditions of Recuperation" that they were obliged to fulfill if they wished to retain
ownership. The letter left the couple shaken; the Hemilians were ordered to pay the sum of
$250,0001 to the Solidere Corporation if they wished to preserve ownership rights over their
home. Though the Hemilian property was in need of no repairs, the sum demanded was the
required toll for recuperating Beirut Central District properties that had been appropriated
by the firm.
Hemilian was shocked at the figure. His business had been relatively successful, though
stunted by the long years of war, but his liquid assets could in no way cover the entire
amount. The Armenian couple discussed the figure and realized they had no alternative
but to request the help of their expatriate children and ask them to transfer the necessary
funds. The tightly knit family managed to put together the required sum, and pay the
company for retention of their title.
Hemilian relaxed after the payment was completed. He resolved to work hard at further-
ing his business and repay his children for their kindness. However, on the 2 0 th of March
1995, the short period of calm experienced in the Hemilian household ended when a red
warning notice from Solidere was delivered to their front door.
The company had given Hemilian a two-week notice based on the complaint that the
Hemilian property was preventing the installation of a traffic light on the street adjacent to
the home- a matter which Hemilian and the city had already settled in court twenty years
earlier. Ten days later, and after consultation with his lawyer, Dr. Mohammed Moghrabi,
'After the Civil War Lebanon reverted to using U.S. Dollars as a medium of exchange as its own currency,
the Lebanese pound, was plagued by inflation and inherently unstable
Hemilian replied to the letter and advised Solidere that the matter was out of their jurisdic-
tion since the case had previously been settled with the city. Indeed, Moghrabi, a renowned
Lebanese lawyer and graduate of the Columbia Law School in New York, assured him that
the law was on his side and the company was powerless, especially since the Hemilians had
paid the required fee and the company had resigned the property under their name.
In response to this letter, the couple received hostile notices almost daily, and Solidere
representatives frequently visited their home and threatened them with imminent eviction.
This aggressive campaign lasted almost three years until early August 1998.
On the 8 th of August 1998, a lazy Beirut Saturday, the traditional day off for government
employees, the Hemilians sat in their dining room enjoying a light lunch. A little earlier
they had noticed that their telephone line was dead, but did not pay too much attention to
the matter, after all this was Beirut, and power outages were not uncommon.
As the Hemilians dined, without any warning, a group of forty men barged through
their front door. In the group were twenty police officers, and twenty Solidere "strongmen".
The pair, both in their late sixties, were grabbed dragged down two flights of stairs to be
thrown into the street. The couple then watched helplessly as their belongings, the antique
furniture, the sewing machines and cloth, their paintings and their clothing were removed
by the force and carted away, as they later discovered, to be stored in a Solidere depot.
Their main entrance was sealed with rocks, and a "Solidere" notice was placed in front of
the property.
The couple contacted their lawyer immediately. Mrs. Hemilian's left leg had been
injured during the ordeal, and the couple was in need of shelter and medical attention.
Under Moghrabi's advisement, the pair carefully preserved documentation from the doctor's
visit and kept receipts and photos of their appropriated belongings.
The Hemilian children returned to help settle their parents into a new home in East
Beirut. After adjusting to his new surroundings, Hemilian sought out, and joined forces
with, other property owners in the Beirut Central District only to discover that their expe-
riences with Solidere were, in some cases, even less agreeable than his own.
Hemilian and his lawyer immediately filed a complaint in civil court claiming personal
injury by the firm and demanding the return of the property that was luckily still in prime
condition. However, many of the other property right holders had already had their build-
ings destroyed by Solidere bulldozers, so there was very little to recover. Some, due to
financial restrictions, found it necessary to accept the minimal compensation offered by the
company for the property and in exchange were forced to sign away all of their old owner-
ship rights. Others could not afford to pay the recuperation fee as the Hemilians did, and
so lost their holdings to Solidere as a result.
These injured property right holders banded together to form a coalition named the
"Beirut Commercial District Property Right-Owners Association" initially headed by the
Daouk family, prominent land-owners in the city center. Along with many religious and
financial institutes in the city center area, the "Beirut Commercial District Property Right-
Owners Association," prepared to fight what they viewed as an illegal assault on private
property assured by the Lebanese constitution. The group felt betrayed by the legal system
that allowed for the transfer of their lands from their own private possession to another
private entity, which as far as they could tell, was working towards no more public interest
beyond profit-making than themselves. Moreover, under Solidere's Articles of Incorporation
the property right holders would receive compensation in the form of shares in the firm, a
method of payment that the group complained was wholly inadequate.
In total, the government's charge, ratified by Law No. 117, passed on the 7 th of December
1991, included granting Solidere the right of expropriating 160 hectares of land from the
Central District, and the right to reclaim 46 hectares of land on the sea front. Indeed by
1994, Solidere had acquired land from well over 40,000 landowners in the city center, and
continued to do so well into 1999. The city center that had historically covered close to
80% of the municipal area of Beirut was now under the jurisdiction of one private firm.
In fact, by the end of 1999, and certainly still today, the traditional names of Bab Idriss,
Souk Ayyass, Khatayan and Khan Antoun Bey, historically associated with Beirut's Central
District began to disappear from popular vernacular. The area that older generations of
Beirutis referred to simply as "the city," younger generations now commonly call "Solidere."
Hemilian now lives in a small apartment in East Beirut, on Talat Gemayil. Since his
machinery and material were destroyed, he has been unable to restart his business. His wife
rarely leaves the new apartment, both as a consequence of her injury, and her fear of the
"new Beirut" she lives in. She timidly points out to anyone who will listen that the sixteen
years of Civil War and constant fighting had not injured her family as much as the first few
months of peace and reconstruction did.
Visiting his old home, for which he has not yet received compensation, nor been refunded
the $250,000, Hemilian is hurt to see the crass red lettering of "Tagmosh," a new car-
dealership, on the front of his house. The fountain and trees have disappeared from the
backyard, and there looks to be the start of new foundations being dug there.
Hemilian often wonders how this happened. How in Lebanon, thought to be a beacon
of democracy in the Middle East, and a role model for countries in the region, a private
corporation was allowed to appropriate lands that traditionally only the eminent domain
powers of the government could acquire. His last comment on the situation, as he shook his
head sadly last August was, "Not even under military rule in the eighties would the citizens
of Turkey have expected treatment like this."
To this day, Hemilian's case has not been heard before a Lebanese court, and no ruling
has as yet been handed down to resolve the case and return either his property, possessions,
or the $250,000 he initially paid to Solidere to retain ownership.
1.2 The Implications
When Ayman Trawi, a renowned Lebanese photographer, described the city center recon-
struction project undertaken by Solidere, he did so with pride. He extolled Solidere's motto
"Beirut: An Ancient City for the Future" and exclaimed, "the doors of Beirut are flung
open once again, and the city is getting back all the signs of modern culture and civilization
that were missing for so long" 2 .
Local and foreign media also gave an unusual amount of attention to the Solidere project.
From The New York Times, to The Economist, to The Washington Post, international news-
papers described the BCD reconstruction initiative. These publications regularly featured
Beirut's building efforts in "more or less sensational stories" 3 . The Lebanese government
was pleased with the progress made on the development of the city center, and other Middle
Eastern governments sat up and paid attention to the new construction model being used
in Lebanon.
To this end, the effects of the Solidere story reached far beyond the immediate loss
of property by the original title holders in the Beirut Central District. After the Solidere
project began, and in the midst of its seeming success, another project was proposed and
2Ayman Trawi. Beiruts Memory. Anis Commercial Printing, Beirut, 2003.
3Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
approved by the government to reconstruct Southern Beirut, under the name "The Elyssar
Project," also through the mechanism of a private Real Estate Holding Company.
The "success" of Solidere, in terms of its revenue-generating component established a
new understanding of land tenure throughout the Middle East. "Construction capability"
was soon labeled one of Lebanon's most valued commodities. In fact, a recent report on
the state of the Lebanese economy claimed, "total management companies" had become a
substantial Lebanese export 4 . The idea of a private Real Estate Holding Company (RE-
HCO) 5 with the right of expropriating land was employed in Arriyadh, Mecca and Medina
in Saudi Arabia; Aqaba and Al-Abdali in Jordan.
While the impact of REHCOs is still unclear throughout the entire Middle East, in
Lebanon it is fair to say that Solidere affected two separate sets of property rights. The
first set were the rights defined by Islamic property law. These rights are comprehensive
when it comes to dealing with the holdings of Muslim individuals and institutions. The
shari'a or, Islamic law, dictates certain rules of use, sale and inheritance. The Lebanese
government was, some of these institutions claimed, violating a sacred law by agreeing to
grant expropriation rights to a private firm. By agreeing to the Solidere project, the govern-
ment threatened to alienate the more traditional Muslim residents and Islamic institutions
in the Central District.
The second set of rights stemmed from secular law. The idea of granting the right of
eminent domain to a private firm was unprecedented in the Middle East. The precedent
that came out of the legal battle between property owners and the firm is crucial to study
not only because it established a development model empowering large private real estate
companies throughout the region, but, it also created a precedent for the balance of Islamic
and Secular law in Middle Eastern courts and governments.
Within the realm of secular property rights the case of Solidere is especially impor-
tant to examine because appropriation rights granted to a private investor are independent
and analytically distinct from eminent domain exercised by the government. The regular
stakeholders of landowners and entrepreneurs are present, but their rights and obligations
are different. Landowners in the Real Estate Holding Company scenario may be obligated
to relinquish ownership rights for an uncertain financial future. The entrepreneur is in a
4Exportable Expertise. Insight, April, 2002
5Term taken from Ralph Gakenheimer, Omar Razzaz, Hashim Sarkis, and Maha Yahya. Rebuilding the
Residential Sector of Beirut. 1992.
position of greater leverage, though with more risk, and the government adopts both the
roles of "coordinator and adjudicator" 6 to the entire process.
The existence of REHCOs also has consequences on the power structure external to
the immediate stakeholder circle usually associated with eminent domain. The private real
estate company receives enormous amounts of political leverage and legal power over the
specified area. Rafiq Hariri, the founder of Solidere, elected Prime Minister of Lebanon in
October 1992, is only one example of this increased influence in the public sphere.
The Solidere question also feeds into the larger issues about the privatization of cities.
Given that many developing countries are now turning to the private sector to solve some
of their infrastructural problems, a discussion of the soundness of certain aspects of priva-
tization within the Real Estate Holding Company model is necessary.
Ultimately, the hope is that by studying Solidere's story, we can learn something about
Beirut, something about Lebanon, and even something about urban development in the
Middle East. And, by looking more closely at what has become a very celebrated project
at the government levels, perhaps we can learn a little more about the politics and history
of implementing large urban projects in the region.
To many people, simply looking at the devastation of the city center, the rubble, the
countless refugees, and the garbage piles that existed after the Civil War made Solidere's
existence acceptable. To observers of the "before" and "after" periods, the timely trans-
formation of the Central District from a haunted deserted area to what can be called a
global city center, especially when contrasted with the rest of the Lebanese reconstruction
effort, was nothing less than remarkable. Many Lebanese genuinely felt, and feel, that
"Lebanon need[ed] a man of [Hariri's] stature to resurrect a dead city,"7 and that, as Fadel
al-Shalaq, president of the Council for Development and Reconstruction, and president of
the Hariri Foundation, claimed in an interview, "certain formal procedures need to be sacri-
ficed to solve the major problems which cannot be solved by regular, traditional, democratic
means."
Indeed, Solidere achieved most of its goals swiftly. It created more than 5,000 con-
struction jobs and aimed to establish more than 100,000 permanent jobs in a period of
about twenty years. Buildings were renovated, and tourists and residents alike returned to
6Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 7
7Interview with Abdel-Rahman Solh, Director for Contracts and and Tendering at Solidere, July 2003
the Central District area. The project was so successful that the Solidere Board began an
aggressive advertising campaign promoting "Exportable Urbanism." The Hariri firm was
proud of what it offered, a private initiative solving the government's financial difficulties,
and developing infrastructure on a rigid and fast schedule. The idea of a private Real Es-
tate Holding Company was picked up by the Egyptian Sameer Saweeres, who then planned
the little town of Al-Goona (designed primarily as a resort, but complete with a school,
hospital, and airport) by means of such a firm. The Aqaba region of Jordan has begun
a similar scheme, having entire portions of the new development of the city (planned for
about 200,000 residents) paid for and developed by a packaged private sector initiative.
To many observers, Solidere's fame is well deserved. In their opinion, the company
almost magically transformed Beirut's Central District. Ayman Trawi said of the Solidere
rehabilitation effort 8 :
Gone are the days when feelings of doom gripped the heart while one moved
from the blown away center of Beirut towards its dividing lines, in order to steal
a few camera shots with shaking hands.
Heading towards the city center from all over Lebanon, finally liberated
from the burdens of war, the young people discover the renewed city center with
the excitement and expectation of a marvelous adventure. They walk around
its architectural jewels and modern shops, sit in its caf6s, stroll along its new
marina and visit its modern hotels, thus completing the symphony of elements
of the harmonious whole that has become their city center.
Another observer of the process proclaimed, "tourists of Arab origins and other foreign-
ers alike, gaze in total wonder at the spectacular rebirth of the Lebanese capital. "Switzer-
land of the Middle East," "Gate of the Arabs," "Crossroads of East and West."" The labels
that previously adorned Beirut have reemerged in literature, conversation, and the media,
praising Solidere.
Angus Gavin, head of urban design at Solidere, authored Heart of Beirut: Making the
Master Plan for the Renewal of the Central District where he described the Solidere project
as "the most important undertaking in urban rejuvenation taking place in the world today,"
and as "one of those rare opportunities in city-making and renewal." In an interview last
July he spoke eloquently of the many assets of Solidere's plan, noting its sensitivity to
topography, its judicious mixture of residential, commercial, and institutional amenities,
8Ayman Trawi. Beiruts Memory. Anis Commercial Printing, Beirut, 2003.
and its contextual architectural language.
Today, much of the former glory of the city center has been restored. The Solidere story
has been publicized to the world as one where a private, profit-generating, REHCO was the
miracle solution that rescued the city center from despair at no cost to the public sector.
But, in the midst of tourists, shops, and wide pedestrian sidewalks loom memories of
the city center that once was. Something seems out of place. A phenomenon that Rayaa
Daouk, one of the previous property owners, attempted to describe in our interview. She
said, "the spirit of the center has deteriorated.. .it's heart has been ripped out."
Out of the story publicized to the world was left the genuine strife of the stakeholders
involved in the process. The international media simply ran descriptions of the attributes
and success of the Solidere story. And even today in academia when the concept of the
Real Estate Holding Company is examined, the fact that property rights are overhauled
and redefined in the process is mostly simply relegated to a bullet point under the "cons"
of such development models.
The real question of whether the Solidere model was actually the miracle solution and
the "only response" to the situation, has yet to be adequately explored. An examination
of Solidere's history, focusing on the roots of the company and its strategies, might help
provide us with a more nuanced understanding of the conditions which allowed for the
creation of this firm.
For where on the one hand there is efficiency, on the other there is equity. In stark
contrast to the supporters of Solidere praising the new city center, Rayaa Daouk, a property
owner in the Central District, laments what she calls, "the hold-up of the century."
The underlying concepts of justice seem to be ill thought out for the REHCO develop-
ment mechanism as employed in Lebanon. Taking a more comprehensive view of history
than that offered by proponents of the company leads to very different conclusions about
the overall effectiveness of Solidere. The ethical and legal implications in the case of Solid-
ere, specifically those relating to the question of whether a government ever has the right
to transfer ownership from one private entity to another on such a large scale, are part of
what this thesis aims to examine. This unprecedented move is remarkable, and like the
Hemilians we must ask, "how did this happen?"
Chapter 2
The Civil War and the Destruction
of the City Center
2.1 The Paris of the Middle East
Beirut, Lebanon's capital city, lies on the Mediterranean rim between the mountains and
the sea. From the mid-19th century to the outbreak of the Civil War, Beirut flourished and
experienced almost "uninterrupted"1 growth. As Lebanon's principal coastal city, linked
to Europe across the Mediterranean Sea, and to Eastern trade routes through Damascus,
Beirut had maintained a strategic role for thousands of years as a gateway between East
and West.
Beirut soon came to dominate the financial, cultural, and commercial life of the region.
The city was in an ideal position to exploit the inflow of wealth into the Middle East after
the discovery of oil in the Gulf. Between 1965 and 1975 Beirut's population increased
by about 66% from 331,000 to 551,000. Beirut was also a major cultural center with a
number of distinguished universities attracting students from throughout the Middle East,
while its theaters, institutes, and "caf6 trottoirs" catered to tourists and "the region's
intelligentsia." 2
Tourists from the Orient and Occident alike journeyed to Beirut. The sea and the
mountains provided plentiful recreational facilities, and during the summer months, Beirut,
1Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf. Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central
District. John Wiley and Sons, London, 1996.
2 Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf. Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central
District. John Wiley and Sons, London, 1996.
with its cool Mediterranean breezes, provided relief from the heat and aridity of the rest of
the region.
Before the outbreak of war in 1975, Beirut enjoyed an undisputed role in the region
as a commercial, cultural and financial hub3 . Its Banking Street, in the city center, was
headquarters to financial institutions servicing Lebanon and the Arab world, and its deep-
water port was a conduit for much of the maritime trade to and from the Middle East.
Pre-war Beirut was often referred to as the "Paris of the Middle East." It was famous
for its nightlife, beaches, ski-resorts, banks, and, of course, its city center. The Central
District, known for its Levantine nature, was the heart of this "Paris," and was widely
referred to as "al-Madinah" - an Arabic phrase, meaning simply, "the city."
The city center was host to ancient settlements on the Beirut peninsula for over five
thousand years. The rapid growth of the city followed a radial pattern around the BCD
which thus became its geographic and commercial center. The Central District was a
focal point of employment within the city, where one in three of the workforce in Beirut
and its outskirts were employed in its limits, mainly in commercial establishments, private
businesses, and professional services.
At the turn of the century, neighborhoods within Beirut began to acquire a specific ethnic
or religious identity, with Christians settling to the East of the city center and Muslims to
the West. The center, however, retained its decidedly diversified character. As in many
Levantine cities, the Beirut city center brought together a "thriving urban merchant class" 4
of different religious and ethnic communities.
Some writers have argued that the heart of Beirut was "the most tangible translation and
physical expression" 5 of the Lebanese constitution that reinforced the basis of coexistence
among all Lebanese. A mixed community of 40,000 lived in the city center and it was
considered a microcosm of Lebanon's multifaceted society. Thomas L. Freidman, The New
York Times Foreign Affairs columnist, argued in his work From Beirut to Jerusalem that,
in Beirut, the embodiment of the Levantine ideal was the city center:
3 Richard Sennett, "Introduction," in S. Khalaf and P. Khoury eds., Recovering Beirut: Prospects for
Urban Reconstruction. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993. p. 11
4 Samir Khalaf, "Urban Design and the Recovery of Beirut," in S. Khalaf and P. Khoury eds., Recovering
Beirut: Prospects for Urban Reconstruction. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993, p. 21
5 Samir Khalaf. Beirut Reclaimed. Dar An-Nahar, Beirut, 1993. p. 74
The Levantine spirit of coexistence was both produced in, and reproduced by,
the covered markets and stone-arched alleyways, the red-roofed houses and craft
workshops, the arabesque Ottoman fountains and book-stalls of old downtown
Beirut, woven around Riyadh el-Solh Square. In the Beirut city center seven
thousand shops once stood shoulder to shoulder, with the Maronite cobbler next
to the Druse butcher and the Greek Orthodox money changer next to the Sunni
coffee seller and the Shiite grocer next to the Armenian jeweler. The Beirut
city center was like a huge urban Mixmaster that took the various Lebanese
communities from their mountains and villages and attempted to homogenize
6them into one cosmopolitan nation.
As delineated by its main perimeter roads, the city center extended over an approximate
area of 150 hectares. Respectively, from East to West and from North to South, it had a
length of 1.5 km and a width of 1 km. In 1975 more than 100,000 people lived or worked
in the center which covered a total area of 650,000 square meters. Roads, open spaces and
squares occupied about 50% of the remaining space.
The city center was also a transportation hub where all bus and service-taxi routes
originated and terminated. Trips to different parts of the city or the country more often
than not were routed through the center.
As the center of government, the BCD was prominent in banking, financial services, in-
surance, maritime agencies, and other commercial office and trading functions. The Central
District also accommodated local businesses, community, religious and other public insti-
tutions. The capital's hotels clustered there, and built tall towers to take advantage of sea
views. The souks and fine shops attracted a city-wide population as well as overseas visitors.
In mass media representations and in the "collective imagination" of Beirut's residents, the
BCD represented the entire city; its "fate implicated], metonymically, the entire country"7 .
As such it is impossible to tell the story of its reconstruction from any viewpoint unless the
reader is able to imagine this place and its significance.
With the rapid growth of Beirut, the BCD became overcrowded and excessive strain was
placed on its infrastructure. While the BCD did play an essential role in Beirut, with 80%
of the commercial establishments and offices located there in 1950, this proportion declined
to 42% by 19758. As the city center reached its limits of available space and capacity,
6Thomas L. Friedman. From Beirut to Jerusalem. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1989. p. 2157 Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf. Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central
District. John Wiley and Sons, London, 1996. p. 22
8The population drop in the BCD was not simply a classic case of decentralization. The center was
the convergence point of the various confessional groups. The hostilities during the war drove residents to
mutually exclusive suburban areas
secondary commercial and entertainment areas began to emerge in Hamra, Raouche, Mar
Elias and elsewhere in Greater Beirut. The Central District nevertheless maintained a
clear centrality and dominance over the metropolitan area as the "government, retail, and
regional banking center," the "microcosm of the country's religious affiliations," and the
"focus of the hotel sector and city nightlife"9 .
The Central District did not serve a purely emotional purpose in Beirut, as an inter-
communal meeting place; it was not simply seen as the geographical center of the city
either. Ultimately the BCD was the historic center of one of the eastern Mediterranean's
principal urban settlements and a commercial and business center of metropolitan, national
and global significance10 . The District's old souks and traditional buildings, surrounded by
one of the "world's most flourishing banking centers" and a series of luxury hotels equally
attracted local residents and foreign tourists. Businessmen, shoppers and visitors from all
parts of the city converged daily on the Beirut Central District to go to work, attend a
show at one of the movie theaters, or connect to some other part of the city through the
center.1 1 .
While the BCD very obviously served an essential role in the city, it was only after its
destruction that its five, very serious, functional purposes for the city surfaced and were
spelled out in public dialogue surrounding urban issues. Firstly, the city center was a seat
for various government institutions; it was home to the Parliament, and was the traditional
location for many ministries and government offices". Secondly, the BCD was a host for
office functions and commercial activities; in 1974, 26% of its area was reserved for office
space. Thirdly, the city center was a seat for retail and commercial activity. The many
souks and shopping streets were famous in the Middle East, and the stores were considered
as up-to-date as Parisian or Milanese fashion. Fourthly, the BCD was a host for tourism,
recreational, and cultural uses -located on the seashore, it was the most prestigious location
in Beirut. Lastly, the BCD was home to large residential communities. At the time the war
broke out a third of its area was dedicated to housing. According to estimates prepared
9Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf. Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central
District. John Wiley and Sons, London, 1996. p. 7
l0 Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 16
"World Bank Mission, Lebanon: Reconstruction Assessment Report. Beirut. 1983. p. 139
12 Though originally many government offices and ministries were concentrated in the BCD many gradually
moved out to other district of Beirut and its outskirts leaving the Ministry of Finance, the Serail, the
Parliament and the Beirut Municipality offices in the BCD.
by the "Directeur Generale de l'Urbanism" and published in the Livre Blanc, Beyrouth
1985-2000, one of every forty-two individuals residing in the Greater Beirut area prior to
1975 lived in the BCD, and one of every sixteen individuals residing within the municipal
area of Beirut, lived in the city center.
2.2 The Civil War and the Center
During the war that engulfed Lebanon between 1975 and 1990, no area was ravaged as
brutally as the center of the Lebanese capital. Sixteen years of Civil War left little of
the once vibrant city, with battles gradually bringing economic activity in the city center
to a standstill. The area was no longer visited by shoppers and tourists. Banks, offices,
institutions and trade moved away. The once bustling city center was, at the end of the
war, nothing more than "wasteland"1 3 known only to wild dogs, rats, and snakes. The St.
Georges Hotel and the Holiday Inn, on the edge of the center, frequented by Beirut's rich
and famous before the war, were famous fighting grounds for the different factions and lay
in ruins. Nearly all the permanent inhabitants of the area moved away, and the center was
resided only by squatters. Military barricades were set up and many of the vacant buildings
were barricaded. "The City" was now bordered by sand and stone walls blocking off the
major roads14.
The city center used to be the common space for all Lebanese before the war. During
the war it became a buffer zone, dividing East Beirut from West Beirut. Since the center
was not under the direct influence of any religious subgroup prior to the eruption of the
war, it seemed it was "naturally destined to become their battlefield." The damaged center
provided a space, about 500 meters wide, which for more than fifteen years remained an
emptied-out site marking the "graveyard of national dialogue and reconciliation"' 5 .
As Thomas Friedman claimed in From Beirut to Jerusalem "if there was a no-man's
land during the fifteen months extending from June 1975 until September 1976, it was
represented by the Central District." Organized crime introduced new dimensions of theft
in the "methodical plundering of safe boxes" in several major banks in Riyadh El-Solh (or
1
3 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997. p. 662
1 4 Assem Salaam. Construction and the Public Benefit in the Building and the City. Dar El-Jadeed, Beirut,
1995. pp. 13-15
1
5 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997. p. 666
Bank) Street.
Any visitor to Beirut's Central District in the early 1990s, after cessation of hostilities,
would have witnessed scenes of "destruction, desolation and decay in the midst of a living
city"1 6 . Broken drains overflowed in the streets, many of which were made "impassable
from debris and overgrown vegetation, which supported wildlife." Many areas were still
mined and inaccessible, and buildings caught in the crossfire, along sight lines, grew more
dilapidated.
2.3 "We Need to Rebuild the Center!"
During the war the Green Line, bordering the center, divided eastern Christian Beirut
from western Muslim Beirut, creating a "difficult-to-mend fracture." Questions of iden-
tity became the key issue in the process of reconstruction in post-war Beirut. Where to
reconstruct, what to preserve, and in what way, became very important questions.
Following the end of the war the newly appointed post-war Lebanese Cabinet asked
the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) to draw up plans for rebuilding
Beirut. The "heart of the capital," specified by the cabinet in its public report, was the
Beirut Central District (BCD) considered the "actual birthplace of Beirut," with buildings
dating back to the Byzantine, Mamluk, Ottoman and French Colonial periods. The de-
cision to begin Beirut's reconstruction with the Beirut Central District (BCD) "emerged
as a must-do action for symbolic and socio-economic reasons." Its planned reconstruction
"[was] mandatory as it [was) perceived by all as the symbol of reconstruction for the whole
country."17
Beirut's population had "great expectations"1 8 for the initiative to rebuild the city
center. After all, the Lebanese capital symbolized both the "peaceful coexistence" of the
various denominational groups in the pre-war period and the "massive destruction and
battles of the Civil War." Thus, its reconstruction had a considerable significance not only
for the economic future of the country, but also for its domestic policy. The condition of
the Central District was so much equated with the image of Beirut that, in writing about
the reconstruction of the city center, Angus Gavin, the head of urban design at Solidere,
1 6Samir Khalaf. Beirut Reclaimed. Dar An-Nahar, Beirut, 1993. p. 79
1 Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf. Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central
District. John Wiley and Sons, London, 1996. p. 21
18Elias Hrawi quoted in Le Monde 5th July 1990
titled his work [emphasis added] "Beirut Reborn."
The Lebanese population, claimed Gavin, longed for "a complete return to normalcy in
Lebanon and the reunification of the city of Beirut along the pre 1975 lines, in the sense
that the Central Commercial District would become once more, and geographically at least,
the heart of a bustling metropolis."19
It seemed that the project to rebuild and develop the Central District was destined to
form an essential part of the full-scale reconstruction program in Lebanon. It was in the
hearts and minds of the people a "keystone" of the overall reconstruction plans. There was
a general euphoric feeling that the implementation period would be characterized by an
economic recovery, albeit a gradual one which would "gather momentum" as spending on
the BCD project proceeded.
As early as 1977, discussions concerning the reconstruction of the city center were tak-
ing place in the Parliament and Council of Ministers. It soon became apparent that the
rebuilding initiative would not, by any means, be a straightforward process.
19Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 61
20 Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 96
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Chapter 3
1977-1991: The Beginnings
3.1 The First Plans: 1977-1983
During a lull in the fighting after the horrific events of 1975 and 1976, when Lebanon was
believed to be on the road to recovery, the question of how to deal with the damaged
Central District arose for discussion. Presuming the end of the war to be imminent, the
Lebanese government, with the support of several interested local and FRench planning
agencies, began to consider different proposals for the reconstruction of the city center.
This preliminary planning experience at the start of the Civil War soon made it clear that
the administration was too feeble to address the tasks of reconstruction. In response to the
inadequacy of traditional government units to deal with redevelopment, the Elias Sarkis
regime created the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR).
Established under Decree No. 5 of January 31 't 1977, the CDR enjoyed an administra-
tively independent status and was directly accountable to the Council of Ministers. Sarkis
made sure to equip the CDR with the necessary tools to bypass all routine and normal reg-
ulations encumbering other governmental agencies. Indeed, by the 1990s, the CDR became
one of the key institutions in the construction and redevelopment of the Beirut Central
District. Released from conventional bureaucratic constraints, the agency was expected to
perform its reconstruction tasks with the efficiency that was characteristic of the private
sector in the Lebanese economy. To this end the CDR was conceived of as "an instrument to
assist public institutions,"' to cut through red tape and implement public sector regulations
'George Corm. Reconstruction and the Public Benefit in Post- War Finance and Politics. Dar El-Jadeed,
Beirut, 1995. p. 63
in a more timely and efficient manner. Ultimately its independent role and privileges would
come to play an integral part in the decision to use a private company in the reconstruction
of the city center.
The CDR, like other governmental agencies, worn down by the stresses of constant
fighting, soon became too fragmented to be effective. For almost five years Lebanon was
run by two parallel administrations. Public institutions received instructions from two
distinct political heads. Nevertheless, during this time, two major planning efforts were
made in Beirut and its outskirts. The first was the Master Plan of 1978 prepared for the
Municipality of Beirut by the Aterlier Parisien d'Urbanisme (APUR) and issued under
Article No. 1163 on April 1 5 th 1978. The second was the Urban Master Plan for Beirut and
its outskirts, or the Institut d'Amnagement et d'Urbanisme de l'Ile-de-France (IAURIF)
Plan.
The APUR Plan marked the first serious public sector attempt at rebuilding the city
center and was a culmination of an effort by the CDR and the APUR. As part of this ini-
tiative a committee was created, headed by the engineer Marty El-Namar, and was charged
with overseeing the conclusion of the redevelopment studies. Soon after its completion, the
plan was approved and went partially into effect. The plan's emphasis was on the preser-
vation of historical buildings and revival of commercial activity2 . This first reconstruction
plan was focused on ensuring the complete "reintegration of the center into the rest of the
city's urban fabric" 3 . As Jad Tabet, a leading Lebanese architect and planner, observed,
it aimed to "remold the center of the Lebanese capital into a meeting place for the various
communities," while simultaneously "moderniz[ing] the center in an attempt to solve the
serious problems of functioning and access Beirut faced before the war, while maintaining
the specific image of its site, history, and Mediterranean and "oriental" character"4 .
Since the damage done to Beirut's Central District by 1977 was not extensive, the
1977 plan was able to adopt a more preservatory approach to maintain the city's existing
urban fabric than some of the later plans. The cost of reconstruction, based on public
development reports, was manageable, and it was financially feasible for many independent
property holders to restore their holdings on their own.
2It also implemented some of the recommendations of the 1973 Element pour un Livre Blanc.
3Robert Saliba speaking at Darat al-Punun, Amman on April 19, 2000.
4Jad Tabet, "Towards a Master Plan for Post-War Lebanon" in Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and
Post-War Reconstruction, ed. Samir Khalaf and Philip S. Khoury (Leiden 1993) p. 91
In this plan special attention was given to the government's role in restoring the infras-
tructure, and rebuilding the city center. The city was divided into manageable districts,
each of which had an independent development plan. These proposals would be imple-
mented through various methods, among which was the introduction of a public-private
Real Estate Holding Company (REHCO). The plan proposed that the least damaged areas
of the Central District be rehabilitated by the local property owners themselves. The more
heavily damaged parts would be redeveloped by small-scale real estate corporations. The
shares of such corporations would be distributed according to previously existing legislation
from 1964, which stipulated that real estate owners would hold 75% of the shares and the
government would hold 25%. Under this legislation, however, there was no allowance made
for independent investors, or external private financing, contributing to the redevelopment
5process
Other reconstruction devices included individual reconstruction loans and government
rehabilitation through eminent domain. These methods, all public initiatives, were ratified
by Decree No. 107 on the 3 0 th of June 1977.
The reconstruction plan agreed upon in 1977 was ratified by Law No. 1163 on the 1 5th
April 19786. In December 1978, nearly one year after it was established by the Lebanese
government, the CDR began the implementation of Lebanon's first reconstruction plan.
Given the degree of destruction resulting from the hostilities of 1975-1976, the plan called
for expenditures upwards of LL 22 billion (or an estimated U.S. $2.5 billion) over an 8-
year period. And while the plan went partially into effect, it was interrupted by the re-
commencement of fighting.
Abandoning the reconstruction initiative was as much a result of limited funds as it was
a consequence of the continued fighting. The LL 10.5 billion expected in the form of grants
or loans from the Gulf Arab oil-producing states had been reduced to only a fraction of the
original amount.
Despite the continued hostilities, the plan was revised in 1980 (the idea being that if
fighting was to suddenly cease there would always be an immediate and approved plan on the
table.) Priority was given to basic projects, such as housing, hospitals and infrastructure.
51Dar Al-Handasah Consultants. Reconstruction of the Central Business District: Financial and Economic
Report. Beirut, 1978.
6After a brief adjustment by the Supreme Court, the plan was approved by Law No. 82 on the 15th of
April 1982 without any significant changes.
The new plan did not include a private schedule of expenditure. Rather, it was an "agenda
for necessary action."7 Care was taken to word it so that there was no funding commitment
made as financial requirements might, at any time, increase due to additional damages
caused by new outbreaks of fighting, cost escalation, and other necessary projects that
might arise.
In any case, 1977 was witness to new outbursts of violence as the fighting resumed. The
internal Lebanese scrimmages stopped only for the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978,
and the second Israeli invasion in 1982. The second invasion ended with the temporary
Israeli occupation of West Beirut that summer.
In September 1982, International Peace-keeping Forces entered Beirut, and the Israelis
withdrew from the capital to Southern Lebanon. Once again, in Lebanon's capital city,
calm pervaded and the war appeared to be over.
3.2 Oger-Liban and Dar al-Handasah Plan of 1983
By 1982 Beirut had survived seven years of Civil War and two invasions. The previous
reconstruction plans that had been approved were reconsidered and deemed inappropriate.
Levels of destruction had increased significantly since 1977 and the new government was
pushing a much vaster reconstruction project than its predecessor.
In November 1982, the Lebanese government commissioned a report by Oger-Liban
about the BCD to herald the reconstruction initiative. Oger-Liban was the newly created
Lebanese franchise of the Saudi-based construction company Oger-Saudi, founded in 1978,
under the guidance of a politically savvy Lebanese-Saudi businessman, Rafiq B. Hariri.
Oger-Liban's official commission was limited to the completion of the paper study, per
the government's request, and no more. At that time, neither Oger-Liban, nor the govern-
ment itself for that matter, had the right to accompany the study with any on-the-ground
policies that would actually affect or physically alter the city center.
As part of this effort, however, Oger-Liban, with the tacit endorsement of the Lebanese
government, refurbished a few buildings' fagades as an exemplary reconstruction sample.
This physical interference was not accompanied by any legal or financial interventions, and
the rehabilitation "did not go beyond a face lift" 8 . The firm's actions remained unpublicized,
7 Council for Development and Reconstruction. Reconstruction Project. Beirut, 1978.
8Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
and were soon forgotten amidst the more pressing matters of a tragic Civil War. The
silent acceptance of the intervention, however, served to teach Hariri's Oger-Liban two
important lessons. The first was that, abandoned as the BCD was, avoided by most property
owners, and inhabited only by squatters, construction efforts were not terribly noticeable
or public. The second lesson was that the government was willing to circumvent the regular
bureaucratic paths of authorization for ensuring legality of projects when it came to the
improvement of the Beirut Central District.
The period of calm progressed, and by February 1983 there were strong hopes that
Lebanon was finally on the road towards normality and recovery. The CDR prepared a new
and revised reconstruction plan. This plan took account of the additional and considerable
damages that resulted from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and the
continued fighting in the city center.
As the CDR took on more responsibility, it grew into a larger and more aggressive
role. To encourage the reconstruction initiative, other institutions and measures were put
into place so that in September of 1983 the creation of the Higher Commission of Urban
Planning (HCUP) appeared as a natural progression of events. The HCUP was a public
body established under Decree No. 69 of September 9 th 1983. The commission was charged
with rendering opinions on urban plans and regulations, and the amendment of legislation
concerning urban planning and the construction code.
Between 1983 and 1986, the CDR launched a major study on the metropolitan beirut
area. While the area focused on covered most of Beirut and its outskirts, the BCD was not
included in the reports beyond a brief mention. The study culminated in the publication
of the "Schema Directeur," the first Master Plan for the metropolitan region.
When completed, the CDR plan took people by surprise. The requirements of the
necessary reconstruction, detailed in the report, had grown significantly in terms of financial
and infrastructural needs since 1977.
The sharp depreciation of the Lebanese pound in 1984 did not help matters. Indeed, a
report submitted by the CDR to the Council of Ministers early in 1985, estimated annual
reconstruction requirements for the following 8-9 years at between U.S. $1.3 billion and U.S.
$1.6 billion a year, which put total reconstruction requirements for the period, up to the
end of 1993, at between U.S. $11.78 billion and U.S. $14.4 billion, or between LL 105 billion
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 33
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and LL 128 billion9 .
As part of its report, the CDR explained that based on the government's financial
situation about three-quarters of the funds required for reconstruction needed to be obtained
from external sources. Ideally, 50-60% of this (U.S. $4.9-5.9 billion) would be in the form
of grants, 20-30% (U.S. $1.96-2.94 billion) would be in the form of a long-term soft loan,
and the rest or around U.S. $1-2.9 billion in the form of syndicated loans.
However, these figures were out of the Lebanese government's reach. And even if this
ambitious target of external financing could be realized, which seemed unlikely at the time,
Lebanon would still have the task of meeting around U.S. $3.27 billion of the reconstruction
bill from internal sources. This amounted to U.S. $363 million annually over a 9-year period,
(or around LL 3.23 billion) If, however, the required amount of foreign grants and loans
could not be obtained, it seemed doubtful that domestic funds alone could afford to finance
10the complete reconstruction program
In light of these financial problems, the resumption of fighting in Beirut was not the
only thing preventing the implementation of the reconstruction plan. The redevelopment
studies did, however, advance so that by the end of 1983 the government was able to begin
its effort to reform the infrastructure starting with the Byblos-Phoenicia tunnel. A bidding
process was held, and construction was announced to begin only days before the brief period
of calm ended, and the war began again. The city center rebuilding project remained eerily
unmentioned throughout this time period.
In 1983, as the CDR considered the reconstruction of Beirut outside of the city center,
the Beirut Central District had not been forgotten. Another institution, which had initially
drawn up plans for the area, began to expand its activities. Oger-Liban, without any official
appointment, took up the reconstruction project and independently commissioned a Master
Plan from the Arab consultancy group Dar al-Handasah. Specializing in architecture, engi-
neering, planning, environment and economics, Dar al-Handasah (Shair and Partners) was
the leading international consultancy firm. Founded in 1956, today the firm is the biggest
engineering company in the Middle East, and the eighth largest in the world11 .
Later in 1983, as the Dar al-Handasah plan neared completion, bulldozers entered the
9 Using end-1984 exchange rate of the Lebanese pound versus the dollar.
i0 Freddie C. Baz, "The Macroeconomic Basis of Reconstruction, in Peter Rowe and Hashim Sarkis eds.,
Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City. New York. Prestel.
1998. p. 165
"See http://www.dargroup.com/ for more information
city center. The bulldozers, without any official authorization, began clearing the Central
District of the rubble accumulated by the long years of war. There still existed no official
reconstruction plan, but the bulldozers were not bulldozing randomly, and slowly and me-
thodically "ordered spaces" 12. began to be cleared. While the perpetrators of this cleanup
remained officially unidentified at the time, it was generally agreed that the parties behind
the private REHCO were also behind the clearing13
Incidentally, only after Solidere (in which Hariri is the largest shareholder) was ratified
and the redevelopment project was well underway, did the Hariri Foundation modestly
acknowledge on its website that:
Mr. Al-Hariri more than once mobilized his resources to help war-torn
Lebanon. As the bombs were falling on Beirut in the summer of 1983, Mr.
Al-Hariri instructed his company Oger Liban to send its work crews, bulldozers,
and trucks out to clear the rubble and debris from the littered streets of all the
devastated areas.
Oger-Liban claimed that it was working hard to ensure the public benefit. The rub-
ble and buildings hazardous to public safety were being removed. The center had indeed
sustained damage during the fighting, with just under 20% of its buildings were irrepara-
bly damaged. The company, under Hariri's guidance, however, was "cleaning up" the city
center 14 . The cleanup of the center involved the destruction of some of the district's most
significant surviving buildings and structures. Among the rubble removed were the intact
remains of three of the center's old souks, the Nouriyah, the Sarsaq and the Sagha without
any approval or ratification by official authorities concerned with the reconstruction of the
center. Under the official radar the bulldozers managed to clear a good portion of the Saifi
district of rubble as well as actual buildings. See Figure 3-1, page 36 for a map of the area.
Critics argued that the clearing was based on false pretenses, and in total disregard of the,
still official, 1977 plan for reconstruction, which specifically called for the rehabilitation of
those areas of the center.
During the war the center was deserted and had slowly become a notorious red light
2 Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 34
13 Assem Salam "Le Nouveau plan directeur du center-ville de Beyrouth," in Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salaam,
and Jad Tabet eds. Beyrouth:Constuire l'avenir reconstruire le passi? Dar El-Jadeed, Beirut, 1996.4 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997. p. 667
Figure 3-1: The Beirut Central District as Sketched in Early Plans
district, rarely visited by the original property owners. As such, the clearing was able to
continue without drawing a lot of attention to itself, either from the media, or the owners of
the lots being cleared. This demolition was carried out without the approval, authorization,
or interference of any official or governmental institutions. However, the "cleaning up"
was unable to continue for long. In 1984 another round of fighting forced the cessation of
planning and reconstruction activities, and the active shelling in the Central District caused
even further damage.
In June 1985, while the fighting continued, the Middle East Economic Consultants
prepared another report for Oger-Liban and the CDR. The Middle East Economic Consul-
tants (MEEC), headed by Marwan Iskandar, was a respected, and self-advertised neutral,
research organization that offered independent surveys on market, political and economic
circumstances. The report described the incapacity of the government to undertake the
reconstruction project. It concluded that a private institution, complete with the necessary
funding and institutional capabilities that the government lacked, would be the only means
possible to rehabilitate the center in a meaningful manner.
During lulls in the fighting, the bulldozing in the city center continued largely unnoticed
until 1986 when Oger-Liban completely bypassed regular government channels and proposed
its own plan drawn up by Dar-El-Handassah. Without being commissioned to do so by the
government, and having sponsored the plan out of its own pocket, Oger-Liban presented it
for official approval. The plan produced, however, was very distant to the general planning
traditions of preservation that existed after the war and felt alien to Beirut's population.
The plan recommended the demolition of 80% of the existing buildings in the Central
District (although only 20% were damaged "beyond recovery" by the war). The plan called
for such drastic changes that some critics were driven to say that the project's proponents
seemed to "treat the center as if it was their own property to do with it as they pleased" 15.
Thinking about this plan, Angus Gavin of Solidere said, "Oger-Liban prepared a re-
construction plan for the BCD in 1986 which was also based on notions of infra-structural
modernization and rationalization of the road transportation system as the 1978 plan. Al-
though the plan had not been endorsed by the authorities, it represented an evolution of
the anticipated image and functions of the Central District"16.
The Oger-Liban plan was based on two principal scenario themes1 7 . The first was a
scenario of national centrality, which emphasized the national, and historic, functions of
BCD, to be structured around the Place of Martyrs. The second was an international
fagade scenario, which emphasized the role of BCD as an international and regional center,
and was conceived to develop from the nucleus of "the Bank Street," right in the direction
of "Front de Mer." From earlier plans for the BCD, the 1986 version included a greatly
increased density of development.
After the new round of fighting ended in 1986, further unofficial demolition was carried
out, seemingly by the same parties, which began implementing their unratified, private plan
that called for clearing about 80%, of the remaining structures in the center. See Figure 3-
2, page 38 for more details18 . The violence, however, was once again resumed. The Dar
El-Handassah proposals were soon forgotten about amidst the fighting, and the unofficial
demolition halted. And so the dance between demolition and fighting continued in the city
center, slowly destroying what little remained of the capital's Central District, until lasting
peace was spread in 1990.
1 5 Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi, July 2003
1It is important to point out this early in the story that most official sources treat Oger-Liban and
Solidere as completely separate entities. Therefore in the official historic records of the project, we see no
mention of Solidere until after its ratification in 1992. However, run by the same management, under the
auspices of billionaire Rafiq Hariri, it is safe for us in this analysis to understand the two corporations as
being very closely related.
7 Oger-Liban, Beyrouth, Centre-Ville Reconstruction. May 1986. pp. 4-53.18The black indicates areas that will be preserved, and the white shows the areas that will be torn down
and rebuilt. Image adapted from Nabil Beyhum's Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah.
Figure 3-2: Demolition in the City Center
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Chapter 4
The 1990s: Enter the REHCO
Following the last outburst of violence in 1990, national attention once again focused on
the heavily damaged city center. The Taef Agreement of 1989, signed in the Saudi Arabian
city of Taef, finally ended the Civil War. The agreement established a formula for Lebanese
governance and the eventual withdrawal of Syrian forces. Tragically, Rene Moawad was
assassinated only three weeks after becoming president, and was succeeded by Elias Hrawi,
who was able to keep up with the Taef Agreement's timetable (while managing to avoid
the fate of assassination met by two of his predecessors in the past nine years). The new
Lebanese government, true to the accord, reached out to the various resistance groups with
moderate success. All but Hizbullah, the leading Islamic militia group, agreed to actively
take part in the government's outreach program.
Under the accord's guidance, Hrawi's government immediately took up the issue of
reconstruction. There were, however, serious problems that hindered progress on this front.
4.1 The Problems
The destruction of the Lebanese capital's center had been of such a massive scale that
reconstruction was no longer a matter of simply "restoring the urban fabric" to its previous
condition. Rather, the government chose to think of the reconstruction as providing the
opportunity to rethink the urban structure of the Central District at a strategic level'. This
would involve reassembling land for contemporary scale development, and undertaking the
wholesale rehabilitation of the infrastructure, including roads, water, power supply and
'Elias Hrawi quoted in Le Monde 5th July 1990
telecommunication networks, sewerage and other essential utilities. At the same time, the
CDR noted, the uncontrolled growth of the landfill in the center - the city dump for building
rubble and domestic rubbish through the war years - offered the opportunity for reclamation
of new waterfront lands. This would give a "much-needed breathing space.. .allowing [for]
future expansion of the city center" 2
The redevelopment of the city center would ultimately involve the restoration of 4.4
million square meters of urban space spread over a land area of 1.1 million square meters.
By one estimate, in 1989, more than 40% of the existing buildings in the BCD area were
beyond repair3 . Water, sewerage, electricity, and roads required a complete overhaul. The
total infrastructure costs for the center were estimated to be approximately U.S. $1.5 billion.
This was an exceptionally high price tag for the national government to bear, given the other
pressing infrastructure needs of the country at that time. In fact, the overall predicted
reconstruction costs for the Dar al-Handasah plan in the Central District alone amounted
to about half the national yearly GNP.
The task of redevelopment was daunting. Through discussions in Parliament and the
Council of Ministers, it became clear that the government was incapacitated by a host
of deeply rooted problems hindering the reconstruction process4 . These problems can be
classified into the following categories:
Financial Problems
Lebanon's public debt increased by nearly 52% in 1984 to around LL 32 billion or
nearly 23% more than the estimated GDP for that year. With commercial banks
showing a growing reluctance to subscribe to new treasury bills, much of the increased
public debt was in the form of direct borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon. This
borrowing increased from LL 5.3 billion at the end of 1983, to around LL 11.5 billion
towards the end of 1984. However, domestic government borrowing was considered
an unstable source of funding to foot the reconstruction bill as it has serious negative
macroeconomic and crowding-out effects5.
2 Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf. Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central
District. John Wiley and Sons, London, 1996.
3Council for Development and Reconstruction. Reconstruction Project. Beirut, 1978.
4Interview with Abdel-Rahman Solh, July 2003
5 Freddie C. Baz, "The Macroeconomic Basis of Reconstruction, in Peter Rowe and Hashim Sarkis eds.,
Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City. New York. Prestel.
1998. p. 169
Rental Laws
A further complication arose from the awkward relationship between tenants and
landlords. The rental laws favored renters over owners, and no landlord could ter-
minate a commercial or residential lease without paying the tenant a substantial fee
(almost 50% of the capital value of the leased space). Under the rental laws, property
owners had no incentives to rebuild their property. The cost of redevelopment would
outweigh the revenues accrued from rent. The rental laws remained in effect through-
out the war even for severely damaged buildings. Only if a building was completely
destroyed were they absolved. These rental laws meant that in 1991 after the building
owner had sunk all the costs of redevelopment, the renters would still be paying at
pre-1975 rates. This provided a perverse incentive to redevelopment and it seemed
unlikely private owners would rehabilitate their proprerty under these conditions6 .
Too Many Owners
Along with this fragmentation of property came a fragmentation of ownership. Build-
ings that had originally been owned by a single investor were now, generations later,
owned by myriad grandchildren, each with a "unique perception of what should be
done with the property." Coordination of resources and commitment among all these
varied stakeholders in an effort to rebuild was nearly impossible 7.
Along with the complicated rental laws, this phenomenon fed into the problem of
entangled property rights. Often, hundreds of proprietors, tenants, and lease-holders
laid claim to individual lots. For one such lot in the souks area, some 4750 people
were revealed to hold ownership or tenancy rights in 1975. Their story was made
famous by a television documentary. The documentary showed the inability of the
thousands of owners to coordinate and redevelop the lot. The discussion got so heated
and violent that chairs were thrown, and one of the property owners was injured.
By 1990 there were over 40,000 active owners in the BCD. Some individual buildings
were revealed to have several thousand title-holders. This fragmentation of owner-
ship meant that more than 50% of the existing land parcels in the Central District
6 Certain demolition crews hired out their services to building owners who had damaged buildings, since
in some cases it was more financially feasible to destroy the building entirely, to be free of the old rental
rates, than to rehabilitate and be forced to rent out at pre-war prices.
7 Interview with Abdel-Rahman Solh, July 2003
were less than 250 square meters in size, and therefore below the minimum surface
area necessary for feasible redevelopment. Any development plan that concentrated
on forming a new contemporary functional center would have to contend with this
restriction. The small sizes also made the plots unattractive to potential investors,
and so, again, undermined the incentive to rebuild. Oussama Kabbani, in his work
The Reconstruction of Beirut, called this mess of entangled property rights among
tenants and landlords, "a Gordian knot of claims and counter claims."
International Aid
The 1970s were a period of growth for Lebanon. Before the war, remittances by
Lebanese working in oil-rich countries allowed for balance-of-payments surpluses, and
provided a source of savings for investments. In pre-war years, this flow was enhanced
by Arab investments in Lebanon. The region was fueled by an improvement in oil
revenues and substantial volume increases in exports.
In 1990, however, prospects for the Lebanese in the oil-rich countries seemed un-
promising. The availability of aid to Lebanon necessary for reconstruction works was
"distant and meager" 8 . While in 1978 a major financial and economic evaluation 9 of
prospects for the city center predicted continuing, and accelerating, prosperity in the
Gulf countries, the opposite occurred.
Oil revenues were tight, and with the advent of the Gulf War, Arab attention was
focused on Iraq. So, Lebanon was in fact doubly cursed; as well as having to budget
on limited domestic revenues, international aid sources were dwindling. The situation
in Kuwait easily diverted Arab aid away from the almost two-decade-old Lebanese
predicament.
The major alternative sources of aid were the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. Acceptance of their finances, however, required implementation of
liberalization and privatization policies; conditions to which the Lebanese government
was unwilling to commit.
The availability of official grant assistance, loans on favorable terms, and commodity
assistance (from institutions such as the Islamic Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
8Middle East Economic Consultants. Feasibility Study for Beirut Central District. Beirut. 1985
9Middle East Economic Consultants. Feasibility Study for Beirut Central District. Beirut. 1985
opment (IBRD), United Nations (UN), European Economic Community (EEC), mul-
tilateral Arab agencies, etc.) would, undoubtedly, be a component of a wider package
for "stabilization" in the region. In accepting aid from these sources, Lebanon would
have to accept their interference in domestic politics and economic policies. These
multilateral agencies did not have Lebanon high on their agenda either. Significant
amounts of their funds were to be diverted to aid the recovery of the eastern European
economies.
Apart from encroachment on autonomy, the general experience of reconstruction ini-
tiatives in Lebanon had been that, despite pledges of assistance from the international
community, the amounts of assistance actually received were far less than those origi-
nally promised. The CDR reported in 1985 that less than 40% of the U.S. $3.1 billion
pledged in grants and loans since 1977 was received. Included in the pledged grants
was U.S. $2 billion promised over five years by Arab states in 1979 in what is known
as the "Tunis Pledge," of which only U.S. $0.4 billion was actually received. The
major Arab donors, like other international groups, tended to link their support to a
satisfactory political settlement in Lebanon.
National Economic Problems
The Civil War resulted in huge losses. The human toll was appalling, both in terms of
the lives lost and the potential for leadership foregone. About 170,000 people perished,
twice as many were wounded or disabled, and close to two-thirds of the population
experienced some form of dislocation. By the fall of 1981, U.N. experts estimated
that the country had sustained U.S. $12 to $15 billion in damages. Even today, more
than one third of the population is considered to be below the poverty line as a result
of war and displacement.
Economists predicted that direct loss alone amounted to about U.S. $19 billion. Infla-
tion was running at 92% per annum, depreciation at 82% per annum, and production
was estimated to be down by at least 50% of normal peacetime levels. Between 1982
and 1990, real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased by 50% in volume, and
unemployment levels reached approximately 28%.
At the private sector level, the productive capacity of industry was reduced to 25%
of its potential. About 300,000 dwellings were damaged and 40,000 cars were burned.
Hospital capacity dropped to 30% of its pre-war levels. Material damages were esti-
mated to be U.S. $12 billion, while opportunity costs were predicted to be a minimum
of U.S. $60 billion.
On top of the horrible financial situation, it was doubtful that the government even
possessed the institutional capacity necessary for reconstruction. Public institutions
had deteriorated over the course of the war. Nine-hundred-thousand people or 27%
of the Lebanese population had emigrated during the fighting, resulting in massive
brain-drain10 . The skill set and remaining experience available in the public sector
was limited.
Overall Condition of Property
The major components of the basic infrastructure were destroyed. Less than half of
the 450,000 existing phone lines were functioning, only 35% of the 1,350-megawatt
capacity of power plants was available, 80% of water reserves were polluted, and
all filtering stations of the water-waste treatment facilities were out of service. In
addition, the road infrastructure required total rehabilitation and only half the public
schools were operational.
By 1991, there was destruction beyond salvage of almost two thirds of the urban fabric
and the city's public spaces. The shoreline was polluted and irrevocably changed by
years of uncontrolled dumping of the city's domestic waste, and all that remained in
the center was the rubble of "destroyed buildings and the detritus of war"".
Squatters
A squatter population and displaced families occupied almost every devastated build-
ing in the BCD. This population was estimated to be in excess of 30,000, living in
largely unsafe structures throughout the city center. A substantial relocation pro-
gram was necessary before reconstruction could continue. The government's promise
to support the rehousing project was going to put a significant strain on financial
12
resources
10 Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 176
"Assem Salaam. Construction and the Public Benefit in the Building and the City. Dar El-Jadeed, Beirut,
1995. p. 29
12 Council for Development and Reconstruction. Lebanon - The Rebuilding of a Nation. Arab-British
Trade, December 1 " 1993.
Will the Project Even Work?
Another concern for the government was, even given a full reconstruction plan for
the center, would the redevelopment initiative even work at all? Would the owners
of offices in Beirut and its suburbs, who were forced to relocate from the BCD after
1974-75, be willing to move back to the city center once it was rebuilt and to incur
the expenses involved in such a move? Was redeveloping the area, given the other
pressing governmnet needs, simply an unwarranted risk? 13
Despite these problems, the government was committed to rebuilding the center, and
soon deliberations arose in the Parliament and the Council of Ministers on how to go about
securing a new Central District in the face of all these hardships.
4.2 The Options
Three major options arose out of the numerous discussions in government circles at the end
of the war in 1990.
I. Complete Government Financing
Deliberated in parliament only briefly, this option proposed that the government make
capital available to individual property owners to redevelop their plots through loans.
However, the extreme land fragmentation and entanglement of property rights made
this option unfeasible. The government could not gather together adequate resources
for financing14 , and in any case, did not have the institutional capacity necessary to
support the process. Though this was a popular method in post-war Europe (with
the support of the Marshall plan aid) it was impossible to justify in Lebanon. There
were more pressing social, political and infrastructural needs than rebuilding the city
center.
13 Surveys carried out by the MEEC indicated that around 53% of the offices previously located in the
BCD were willing to return once it was rebuilt, while about 26% indicated an unwillingness to do so and 29%
were undecided. The Council of Ministers issued a general opinion that this did not give a clear indication
that rehabilitating the city center was an acceptable public risk although they recognized the emotional
importance of rebuilding the BCD.
14Council for Development and Reconstruction. Lebanon - The Rebuilding of a Nation. Arab-British
Trade, December 1" 1993.
i5 Council for Development and Reconstruction. Lebanon - The Rebuilding of a Nation. Arab-British
Trade, December 1 st 1993.
II. Government Eminent Domain
This approach suggested that the government put up significant capital to buy out
all the problem areas in the center. This option was unpopular because, apart from
the limited capital available to the government at the time, the institutions and staff
needed to lead a reconstruction effort successfully were absent from the post-war
Lebanese national government.
Moreover, Lebanon, more than most Middle Eastern countries, had a strong history
of low government involvement, and high private sector participation in a free mar-
ket economy. The parliament (composed primarily of private businessmen1 6 ) would
be loathe to any law that increased government power and involvement. Lebanon
was historically one of the more progressive countries in the region. Public debates
were traditionally scornful toward large government involvement and there was strong
public objection to this approach.
III. Real Estate Holding Company1 7
Parliament and the Council of Ministers rhetoric seemed to indicate that there was
"only one remaining option"18. Encouraged by all the studies, and the existence of
private finances, this option involved the creation of a Real Estate Holding Company.
This company, as initially suggested by the MEEC study, would be privately funded
and granted the right of eminent domain over a specified area in the city center.
It was the case, proponents of this plan argued, that the private sector was better
able to tap into international finances, free of the fiscal restraints of the domestic
government. Private firms would also have the available institutional capacity needed
to complete the project.
The plan to redevelop the center, warned urban planners, was ambitious, "at stake
[was] the rebirth of the center of a capital city after its destruction by war." The pattern
of development that it engendered would have to "inform the future and cherish the past."
It was essential that the reconstruction provide a social arena and a means to "reconnect a
16Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
17 Ralph Gakenheimer, Omar Razzaz, Hashim Sarkis, and Maha Yahya. Rebuilding theResidential Sector
of Beirut. Cambridge, 1992.
18 Hrawi in interview in Al-Hayatt, November 2 d 1990
once-divided city." In essence, the solution could not be a half-hearted attempt. Deciding
on an appropriate plan of action was critical.
4.3 The Solution
The idea of a REHCO favored by the third option meant that, as presented before the
Council of Ministers and the Parliament, one private firm would be given the power to
appropriate all lands in the city center area, and become the sole developer. The concept
of a Real Estate Holding Company did have historical precedent. In 1962 the Lebanese
government passed laws to establish the Higher Commission of Urban Planning (HCUP) in
Lebanon. Part of these laws allowed for the possibility of creating a Real Estate Holding
Company to implement urban renewal for specified planning projects as part of a larger
master plan approved by authorities. Over the next five years successive amendments had
been incorporated into the HCUP laws which augmented the administrative and operational
aspects of such companies. In 1977 a law was promulgated to establish a mechanism for
public and private partnerships of this nature. This law provided a framework for the
REHCO project, but would have to be updated to fit contemporary BCD needs.
Under the new law, all properties within this area would be, from the date of formation
of the company until completion, treated as one development block. Included in this were
also public areas, which were converted by the law automatically into private property.
The single real estate company was justified by the extent of the destruction suffered by
the city center. This option's proponents argued that the severe damage to properties and
infrastructure in the BCD, necessitated such a wide-scale construction program that it only
made sense the whole BCD area be entrusted to one single real estate company, and not
divided up into several areas assigned to separate firms. This would give the company a
free hand to smoothly redesign the development blocks and individual lots to complete the
infrastructure works and to freely carry on the remaining land development activities.
The one private REHCO solution, the government claimed, ensured an "absolute equal-
ity of treatment" 19 of all property right holders inside the BCD, irrespective of the status
of the property, or of the use prescribed to it. Any losses incurred in the particular instance
of an individual plot as a result of infrastructure works, or of archaeological finds, could,
19Hrawi in interview in Al-Hayatt, November 2 "d 1990
under this option, be treated as a cost spread out over the entire project.
The Private Sector
Encouraging the government in this venture was the widely "known and respected"2 0 re-
sourcefulness of the private sector in Lebanon for assembling capital and creating "special
inter-institutional agreements." Successive Lebanese governments encouraged free enter-
prise and private initiatives in almost all sectors of society. The government felt it would
not be difficult for this sector to satisfy the public role in the reconstruction initiative.
The private sector had often, in the past, come forward to fill the gaps in traditional
government services caused by the hostilities. When electric power supply was cut, due
to damage caused to the central generating and transmission equipment, entrepreneurs in
Beirut installed generators and sold power to neighborhoods. Private schools for children
were opened to satisfy the demand jump created by the closing of public schools. Private
transit operators, some created by political groups, have also sometimes filled in for the
government. Cellular phones, operated by private firms, have become the fashion since the
deterioration of the public telecommunications system.
Moreover, the private sector had money. There was undoubtedly a substantial reservoir
of private assets owned by Lebanese abroad, which, under the appropriate circumstances
of the restoration of political, social and economic stability and order, could be attracted
to the domestic economy. The Middle East Economic Consultants commented, "Accurate
data on the total amount of Lebanese capital abroad are not available but this total has
been estimated at between $10 billion and $20 billion." Conditions on international markets
in 1985 implied a considerable increase in the value of these assets to a value in excess of
$50 billion.
As Saree Makdisi in his work Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial
Identity in the Age of Solidere observed, "the excitement of the potential of the private sector
solution to solve the redevelopment constraints on the public sector was well received." In
fact, the model was immediately seized upon and suggested for use elsewhere in other areas
and sectors. One highly promoted application was the urban transit system, another was
housing. There was also talk among some Members of Parliament of having Real Estate
20 Samir Khalaf, "Urban Design and the Recovery of Beirut," in S. Khalaf and P. Khoury eds., Recovering
Beirut: Prospects for Urban Reconstruction. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993, p. 25
Holding Companies develop lands outside of the BCD as well. Indeed, it was said that "in
all network infrastructures- water, sewer, power, and tele-communications, there may well
be a role for some form of private contribution, either as long-term builder and/or operator
under public service agreements or in some form of build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) mode.
Such possibilities should be considered under the reconstruction options" 2 1.
In light of these positive reactions, the Council for Development and Reconstruction
quickly decided on the third option -a Real Estate Holding Company to undertake the
project. The strategy would "insulate the reconstruction of the BCD from political polar-
ization and traditional governmental inefficiencies in order to provide proper leadership and
attract funds"2 2
The Real Estate Holding Company suggested for the city center, would at the end of
the day, be a self-financing project, which not only would solve the land tenure problem of
Option I (complete government financing), but would also supply the skills and capacity
needed to implement the reconstruction plan without waiting for the institutional reform
required for the success of Option II (eminent domain).
4.4 How Did the REHCO Get Approved?
The government's decision to use a private REHCO as suggested by Option III was facili-
tated by the fact that the businessman Rafiq Hariri, was offering his services and capital to
launch the Real Estate Holding Company in Lebanon. "Thankfully," 23 Hariri was able to
provide the necessary financial and institutional support through his planning experience
with Oger-Liban. His offer to set up a new company in order to implement the proposal
was well received by the government, and Hariri rose to the role of entrepreneur almost
immediately. Hence it seemed almost natural that the private sector came to satisfy the
role of the public sector when it came to rebuilding the center.
The proposed Option III was very quickly adopted and encouraged by many in the gov-
ernment. Other research into the proposal of a private real estate company also framed it as
the only viable solution 24 . This support was encouraged by the fact that even before serious
2 1Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
2 2Solidere. The Reconstruction of Beirut Central District: The Major Urban Redevelopment Project of
the 1990s. Board: Solidere, Beirut, 1994.
2 3Interview with Abdel-Rahman Solh, July 200324 Middle East Economic Consultants. Feasibility Study for Beirut Central District. Beirut. 1985
discussions about the nature of the law that would be required to permit the establishment
of a completely private company began in the Council of Ministers and Parliament, Hariri
and his men had gathered the necessary funding to launch the project, as well as drawn up
a finalized plan for how such a project might be run. These initial steps were enough to
inspire government confidence2 .
The entire project, and concept, of such a large private real estate company was, however,
entirely unprecedented. It was a painfully new manouver and involved a huge private-to-
private transfer. Such a project would necessitate extensive deliberations in government.
Tracing the events leading up to how the final decision was taken will teach us a lot about
the strategy of Solidere, as well as the development logic of the Lebanese government at
that time.
As the government launched its own investigatory efforts into the REHCO option, pro-
ponents of the private REHCO plan worked hard to progress their agenda.
The first step toward obtaining the political backing necessary for the project took
place late January 1991. On the 2 4 th of January 1991, the Legislative Decree No. 790 was
approved to appoint a new Council for Development and Reconstruction. The decree was
issued to revamp the organization, and have it turn its attention more seriously towards
the city center.
The revamped CDR offered Hariri the perfect opportunity to begin infiltrating those
organizations that were highly involved in the decision making process of the Central District
development. The appointment of Fadel el-Shalaq, the founder of Hariri's Oger-Liban (1982)
and head of the charitable Hariri Foundation (1984), as head of the CDR was a first step
in this direction. As Hashim Sarkis pointed out, in effect what this meant was that "the
main private organization in the building industry [had] taken over the official planning
advisory body. The agency that the government used to control private development [had]
now reversed its role."2 .
During the first six years of its life, the CDR had been careful not to become "a state
within a state." It laid down the general development plan, secured the necessary financing
for major projects, but refrained from getting embroiled in the execution of reconstruction
2 5P. Khoury. "Reconstruction: Implementing Horizon 2000." Lebanon Report, 6 (4):8, 1995.
2 6Hashim Sarkis. "Territorial Claims: Architecture and Post-War Attitudes Toward the Built Environ-
ment" in Samir Khalaf and Philip Khoury, eds. Recovering Beirut, Urban Design and Post- War Reconstruc-
tion. E.J. Brill. 1993. p. 114
projects, except when other government agencies were either too inept or sluggish. Its
primary task was to "act as a reinforcement to the ailing administration, not to replace
it"27 . However, under the auspices of a head with strong ties to Hariri, the CDR, with new
interests at stake, began to assume a much larger interventional role in reconstruction.
The appointment of el-Shalaq was a turning point. This development marked what
can be thought of as the start of the state's abdication of its authority, and any direct
role it might have played in the reconstruction of Beirut's Central District. Saree Makdisi
identified this process as the beginning of a "political-economic discourse we might identify
as Harirism" 2 8 Makdisi's "Harirism" would reach a peak in 1992, when Hariri himself
became the prime minister of Lebanon. At this time, Hariri appointed his legal council
Minister of Justice, and he gave his first-cousin's husband the role of head of the Higher
Appraisal Committee, and assigned him to the Higher Judicial Council. El- Shalaq, still
had a private office in Oger-Liban, and his staff on the CDR were scheduled to move into
new headquarters in the BCD, renovated at a cost of U.S. $5 million, a "gift" 29 from Hariri.
Relocating the CDR to a Hariri-owned building seemed acceptable given that even President
Harawi's official residence in West Beirut is an apartment owned by Hariri 0 . Critics often
argued that "in Europe or the United States, a similar connection would have been regarded
as a potential conflict of interest and a possible source of political embarrassment,"". but
in post-war Lebanon they did not cause a scandal.
Hariri's rise to power and the state's "abdication of its authority" cannot be entirely
attributed to a Hariri master scheme designed to undermine the newly created Lebanese
government. Emerging from war in 1990, Lebanon found itself a "country virtually without
a state." When interpreting Solidere's story then, we must understand that Hariri was
offering a genuine service to the Lebanese public sector by offering to take over the project.
We must be careful to understand that it was not so much a coercive effort by a private
company to steal land away from righteous citizens, but a genuine gap in the democracy
and durability of the newly reinstated post-war government that ultimately allowed the
exchange.
The government only approved the project after extensive deliberations, but was, of
27Robert Saliba speaking at Darat al-Funun, Amman on April 19, 2000.
28Makdisi
29Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi, July 2003
3 0 Interview with Rayaa Daouk, July 2003
3 t Oussama Kabbani. The Reconstruction of Beirut. Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, 1992.
course, influenced by Hariri's strategies. Needing a plan to base its decision on, the govern-
ment naturally turned to the CDR, its public development agency, for advice on this front.
It became clear that the CDR Master Plan for redevelopment would have the largest voice
in swaying the Members of Parliament, and convincing them either of the necessity for a
private REHCO, or warning them against it3 2 .
Soon after el-Shalaq's appointment in October 1990, and at the formal request of the
CDR and the verbal request of Hariri, a new set of master plans for the reconstruction of
central Beirut was issued by Dar al-Handasah. The official transaction noted that Hariri
would be paying for Dar al-Handasah's services himself. Dar al-Handassah appointed former
Minister of Public Works and Transportation, architect Henri Edde, to head the design team
of the project. The plan was finally disclosed to the public in the summer of 1991 for review.
By this time some estimates were suggesting as many as 250,000 property rights claimants
in the district. This number was significantly higher than the original 40,000 listed, since
Lebanese law honors claims not only by actual property owners and their descendants, but
by lessors and their descendants as well.
The Dar al-Handassah report examined the problems of the Central District. The Dar
al-Handasah (Henri Edd6) Plan insisted on a private Real Estate Holding Company, and
recommended a new law to adjust the responsibilities of the CDR and expand them to
include the monitoring of such a firm. The new plan also called for the demolition of
most of the remaining structures in the center in order to facilitate a comprehensive large-
scale development project. The plan had put forward no other solution than a private real
estate company, and despite the growing support for this new plan in certain (public and
private) circles, opposition also grew and culminated in the formation of a protest group
that met to debate the idea of a private REHCO, and to try to generate alternatives to it.
The suggestion of the new law also spurned heated discussions in the Council of Ministers
headed by the Prime Minister, and the 128 member Parliament, which jointly approved
policy.
The plans drawn up by Dar al-Handasah architect Henri Edd6 called for what was
denounced by the opposition as an "outrageous" rebuilding project that would require the
almost total demolition of whatever structures remained in the city centre. Protests about
this plan, the extent of demolition and the launching of a REHCO began in July during the
3 2Interview with Abdel-Rahman Solh, July 2003
public symposiums held by Dar al-Handassah and the CDR. Edde's plan included features
like the creation of an artificial island to house a "World Trade Center" and an eighty-
meter-wide boulevard rivaling the Champs-Elys6es. See Figure 4-1, page 53.
Figure 4-1: An Impression of the New Image for the City Center
Figure 4-2: Wide Boulevards and Tall Buildings
Approximately fifteen academics and planners decided to coordinate efforts in opposition
to the plan. They quickly became famous and were viewed by the public as the "only
credible and independent experts" 33 on the reconstruction effort. After presentation of the
first reconstruction plan, they succeeded in starting a broad public debate about the goals
and contents of reconstruction.
The first thing that the experts criticized was the extensive demolition called for, and the
drastic redesign of the old Central District. The new plan bore absolutely no resemblance
whatsoever to Beirut's old city center, or to the rest of Beirut, for that matter. The
plan, argued one architect, disregarded an adequate structural and functional embedding
of the surrounding quarters34 . and would have made the district an isolated "island of
modernity"35 . In lectures, meetings, books and appearances on television talk shows, the
33Interview with Rayaa Daouk, July 2003
3 4 M. Davie. Discontinuites imposees au coeur de la ville: le project de reconstruction de Beyrouth. Edition
de la Maison des sciences de lhomme dAquitaine, Bordeaux, 1990.
3 5Jad Tabet, Towards a Master Plan for Post-War Lebanon in Recovering Beirut: Urban Design and
Post- War Reconstruction, ed. Samir Khalaf and Philip S. Khoury (Leiden 1993) p. 95
group of academics and planners demanded a modification of the project.
Following the huge public outcry denouncing their scheme, the CDR and Dar al-Handassah
returned to the drawing board where they set to work on a new Master Plan.
The revised plan was widely advertised by Hariri as an "inclusion of the eminent crit-
icism," and the involvement of the "public" in a "private" scheme3 6. The opposition
academics and planners were offered (compensated) opportunities to participate in the
reconstruction project, in what Moghrabi calls an "embedding strategy." Most experts
declined this "corrupting co-operation," 3 7 but nevertheless two high-profile architects were
won over 3 8 . Their approval was highly publicized as the architects' rapport with the public,
as independent and objective critics, was an especially useful advertising tool.
This revamped plan was never fully approved through a public process, before it was
submitted for government approval. However, one of the more serious groups, the "Engi-
neers' Union" studied the proposal, especially from the planning perspective, and presented
a report, ratified by the Trade Union Board, of its findings to the Parliament. It also sent
a version to the CDR and suggested that an independent expert committee be formed, in
addition to Dar al-Handasah and the CDR, to rethink the plan 39 . This report was presented
on the 2 4 th of September 1991 to the government and never received a response.
As the plan was being debated publicly (in unofficial forums), it was building up official
support in Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Laws and decrees were being pushed
that set the framework for the creation of the private REHCO.
Under "influences, and heavy pressures,"40 early afternoon on the 7 th of December
1991, President of the Republic Elias Hrawi and the President of the Council of Ministers
Omar Karami signed Law 117/91 into existence. The law would allow for the creation of a
private company to take over rebuilding the city center. The private firm in mind was to be
initiated by Hariri, and with his background in planning and construction from Oger-Saudi
and Oger-Liban, there was a genuine hope that he would be successful 4 1 .
36George Corm quoted in Al-Hayat, November 1991
37Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992.
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39Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salaam, and Jad Tabet, editors. Beyrouth:Constuire l'avenir reconstruire le
passi? Dar El-Jadeed, Beirut, 1996. p. 18
40Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salaam, and Jad Tabet, editors. Beyrouth:Constuire l'avenir reconstruire le
passi? Dar El-Jadeed, Beirut, 1996. p. 19
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4.5 What the Law Meant and Other Events
The pivotal Law No. 117, provided the legal framework for the structure of such a company,
and was "repeatedly denounced as unconstitutional." 42 The Lebanese authorities enacted
Law No. 117 as a general law, applicable to the development of any and all areas damaged
by war events, although it was conceived of in the context of the BCD, and was applied to
the area soon after its promulgation.
The most important aspect of the law, which must be made clear, was the compulsory
and collective transfer it mandated of properties within the Beirut Central District borders
to the firm. The new company would become the sole owner of all the real estate properties
in the area.
Thinking about this law, Lebanese architect and planner Assem Salaam explained that,
"entrusting Beirut's Central Business District redevelopment to the CDR is a typical exam-
ple of the dangers inherent in the state's abdication of its role in orienting and controlling
one of the most sensitive reconstruction development projects in the country." 43 . The
project, others argued, marked the dissolution of any real distinction between public and
private interests or, more accurately, the law allowed for the colonization of the former by
the latter".
Following the enactment of Law No. 117, and in anticipation of the formation of the
company, the Council of Ministers, by Decree No. 2236 dated 1 9 th February 1992 fixed the
limits of the BCD project zone, and the registry numbers of the real estate properties falling
within this zone. See Figure 3-1, page 36.
During April 1992, after the passing of 117/91, the CDR started demolishing other
remains in the identified BCD zone, again "under the guise" 4 5 of stabilizing the area from
the danger of condemned buildings and preserving public security. The CDR's public and
interventionist actions seemed to suggest that Law No. 117 was the end-all of requirements
for implementation of the Master Plan. However, no plan had as yet been ratified by the
government, and so the CDR in fact was acting beyond the limits of its mandate.
42Al-sharika al-iqaeiyya fi al-itarayn al-dustouri wa al-qanouni [Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah
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43Assem Salam " Le Nouveau plan directeur du center-ville de Beyrouth," in Nabil Beyhum, Assem
Salaam, and Jad Tabet eds. Beyrouth:Constuire l'avenir reconstruire le passi? Dar El-Jadeed, Beirut, 1996.
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4 4 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
45R. Haddad. Prosecutor takes up case against Solidere. Daily Star, 15 December, 1998.
The passing of Law No. 117 is often seen as the point where "Solidere was signed into
existence"46 . If we look through the literature we find comment after comment denouncing
the passing of this law as the culprit. However, nowhere in the law is the name of Solidere
mentioned, or any such company ratified. A firm's incorporation laws are very different
from a law that simply allows for the possibility of a firm of that nature to exist. No private
firm was created as a result of 117/91. It is undeniable that Law 117/91 took Beirut one
step closer toward the creation of this firm, but no such company existed, nor was any
formed or incorporated, as a direct result of this law being signed.
So in the spring of 1992, when further demolition was begun in the city center, on behalf
of the government, many property owners argued that buildings were being demolished
without any legal grounding. Buildings were brought down with high-explosive demolition
charges, but the explosives were stronger than necessary and dynamite and bulldozers were
employed on buildings in such a way that the foundations of neighboring buildings were
also affected. In this way, each building, as it collapsed, damaged beyond repair several
other buildings nearby that were then soon declared hazards to public safety and later
demolished47 .
Observers estimated that as a result of these bouts of demolition, by the time recon-
struction efforts began seriously after the formal ratification of the Dar al-Handasah plan
in 1993, about 80% of the structures in the city center area were damaged beyond repair
(the same proportion of clearing suggested by the 1986 Oger-Liban-Dar al-Handasah plan).
One critic, Assem Salam observed that "more buildings were destroyed by bulldozers than
the war itself" 48. Indeed, only a third had been reduced to such circumstances as a result of
the damage inflicted by war. In other words, ironically, more irreparable damage had been
inflicted on the center by those "who claim[ed] to be interested in salvaging and rebuilding
it" than during the preceding fifteen years of shelling and house-to-house combat4 9 .
This demolition was carried out despite the growing opposition. In the spring of 1992,
for instance, a group of concerned architects was established to formulate alternatives to the,
still unofficial, reconstruction plan. In May, the group organized a conference to debate the
"
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issues of aesthetic, cultural, social, economic, and political significance in the reconstruction
effort, and to call a halt to the demolition50
The conference also called for the necessity of an extensive government debate before
decisions about the reconstruction plan could be made in good conscience. The group urged
that consideration be given to other proposals and to the issues of concern that were being
raised by the public, and by the holders of property rights in the Central District. However,
electoral campaigning, which began the summer of 1992, overshadowed a lot of the public
clamor over the Central District property situation.
As a result of this conference, on the 2 8 th of April a team of engineers interested in
the plan and the city center published a document that came to be known as the "Six
Engineers' Treatise," which encompassed their vision of an alternate plan. This proposal
included design descriptions of a new plan based on the aims of Dar al-Handasah's version,
but employing implementation methods that would achieve the goal with the input of
the public sector as well as the private. The treatise addressed the previous Master Plan
and "topped"5 1 it in that it preserved more of the social and archaeological fabric of the
center, and called for development by a much smaller scale REHCO than that mandated
by Hariri's Master Plan. The treatise upheld the right of the original property owners to
maintain control of their property, and left the door wide open for individual rehabilitation
of plots.
On the 2 2 "d and 2 3 ,d of May 1992, the Civil Research Organization held a symposium
at the Carlton under the heading of "The Beirut of Memory; the Beirut of Sharing; the
Beirut of the Future: The Politics of Reconstruction and the Public Interest"5 2 . The sym-
posium addressed the issue from several different angles, and produced recommendations
under the headings of "administrative," "legal," "social," "architectural," "financial" and
"economic." Out of the symposium came an insistence by its participants that the state
honor its responsibility to ensure that democratic paths were followed in the reconstruction
process, and that an open dialogue be maintained between all interested parties. The sym-
posium also called for the cessation of the demolition that still illegally continued in the
center, the freezing of the Appraisal Committees' work, and called upon the government
5 0Papers collected in Beyrouth
5 1Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
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to publicize the expropriation of land. The "public," concluded the symposium, needed to
approve of the current state of the "politics of reconstruction" 53 before any redevelopment
plan was implemented.
Despite this progression of events, on the 14 th of July 1992 the Council of Ministers,
in a special session, decided on the basic structure for the Lebanese Company for the
Redevelopment and Construction for the city center to be known by its French acronym
Solidere. The Higher Urban Planning Commission, whose function it was to issue opinions
on urban plans, denounced the Master Plan on the 1 7 th of July 1992. The HCUP called
for rethinking the plan from a number of different angles, including the implementation
vehicles. However, the Council of Ministers, in the absence of twenty-three MPs approved
the "Articles of Incorporation" by Decree No. 2537 dated July 2 2 "d 1992.
Only six of the present MPs voted against the plan. When voicing their objections,
MP Saleem Sa'ada quoted a verse from the Qur'an: "And eat not up your property among
yourselves in vanity, nor seek by it to gain the hearing of the judges that ye may knowingly
devour a portion of the property of others wrongfully. 54" MP Elias al-Mashrou simply said
"Massikh," or "Foolish." None of the six MP's who did vote against incorporating Solidere
ever returned to hold office again.
The "Articles of Incorporation," approved by Decree No. 2537, is a legal document that
every firm is required to hold before it can function. The articles are in a sense a private
company's "constitution." These articles state, and describe, the name of the company, its
objective, duration and location of its headquarters, as well as its various organs, and their
respective prerogatives and responsibilities. Solidere's duration was initially fixed at twenty-
five years. This duration, however, has recently been amended and extended to seventy-five
years, in order to enable the company "to fully realize its objectives and to satisfy the
interests of its shareholders" 5 5 . The ratified "Articles of Incorporation," in effect, meant
that Solidere was granted complete rights to be a fully functional and private firm, and
could now legally appropriate any and all land within Beirut's Central District.
At the time of its incorporation, the company did, however, have several instances of
litigation to deal with challenges by the original property right holders. Some of these
5 3 Al-Nahhar 2 4 th May, p. 154Pickthal translation
55Solidere. "Articles of Incorporation:" The Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction
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owners had submitted requests to the Council of State in order to repeal Decree No. 2236
dated 1 9 th February 1992, which highlighted the BCD limits and the number of lots within,
Decree No. 2237 dated 1 9 th February 1992 which appointed the first instance and Higher
Appraisal Committees, and Decree No. 2537 dated 2 2 "d July 1992 which approved the
Solidere's "Articles of Incorporation." These proceedings are still pending judgment.
On the 9 th of July 1992 one of the original property owners in the city center brought
a case before the Lebanese High Court of Justice. Out of this case, and partially as a
response to the huge protests against the tearing down of "national patrimony," emerged a
monumental decision handed down from Judge Azzat Ayoubi that ordered the cessation of
Decree No. 2236, associated with defining the boundaries of Solidere, as well as the cessation
of Decree No. 2237 that included specification of the extent of the company's involvement.
This decision however, was the first and last that was anti-Solidere in nature that came out
of this court. After Hariri came to office in 1992 all decisions made by the Lebanese judicial
system were in Solidere's favor.
In each of the cases brought forth by these owners, the plaintiff received a notice from
Solidere that read:
Although the outcome of such proceedings cannot be predicted with cer-
tainty, legal Council to the Board of Founders advises that the decrees in ques-
tion are in conformity with applicable laws and therefore such proceedings are
unlikely to succeed.
Formally established on the 5 th of May 1994, after its shares were fully subscribed to,
Solidere presented itself as a "healing agency, designed to help central Beirut recover"5 . In
the original literature published by Solidere, the company was promoted as a reconciliatory
institution saving Beirut from a future of underdevelopment. One academic described his
uncomfortable feeling as he reviewed the company's glossy brochures that made "no mention
of the previous history of reconstruction not only because these histories do not exist in
official terms but also because of the company's peculiar and contradictory relationship to
history"5 .
5 6 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
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Pursuant to Law No. 117, ownership of all real estate properties in the BCD, and all
leases and other rights in such properties were compulsorily extinguished and deemed by
operation of law to be contributed in kind to Solidere. All loans, mortgages and other
encumbrances against such properties were discharged by operation of law5 8 , and the city
center was transferred to the private firm.
58 ncidentally, these values were attached to the Class A shares delivered in respect of such properties.
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Chapter 5
1991 Onwards
5.1 After Law No. 117
Our first task in trying to analyze Solidere's creation is to understand the setup of the
company, its obligations and exemptions, as well as its first few years of existence. How
the firm survived its initial years is especially important. Why weren't the public and
the original property holders outraged at this firm? Shouldn't newspaper editorials have
furiously denounced what critics claimed was an undemocratic process? Why didn't this
company elicit massive outcries of protest and rage amongst stakeholders as well as the
general public who might have sooner or later been affected by a similar reconstruction
process? It might have been the case that everyone actually liked and approved of the
project, or it may have been that Solidere's strategies at winning over the public were just
incredibly effective.
A weakened government and vulnerable political structure is primarily what seems to
have allowed the firm to accumulate so much power. While Solidere's incorporation was
progressing, another process of ratification concerning the reconstruction of the city center
was also in progress.
The originator of the idea, Rafiq Hariri, was slowly infiltrating the Lebanese federal
government system. On the 1 3 th of August 1992, while the public's attention was focused
on the upcoming elections (the first elections held since 1973 and in which Hariri was
running), the Council of Ministers took the decision to ratify the Master Plan and it was
approved on the 14 th of October 1992 in the last session of the Council before its recess.
The plan therefore, had no further opportunity for legislative recourse once it was passed.
The state had begun to reconstitute itself shortly after the war, and following the par-
liamentary elections in the summer of 1992 the last transitional government resigned and
was replaced by a new Parliament and a new cabinet under the newly appointed Prime
Minister, the "billionaire engineering tycoon,"' Hariri. The fact that the elections for the
new National Assembly were boycotted by the majority of the population did not, by any
means, reduce the power that Hariri gained when he accepted the position of Prime Minis-
ter2 . Incidentally, Hariri and his counterpart President Hrawi both got their six year term
extended by an additional three years through a change in the constitution.
The ascendancy of the Hariri administration signaled a major turning point. While the
country has always had a free-market economy, the arrival of Hariri -who as an individual
was already a major player in the Lebanese economy, his net wealth the equivalent of the
country's GNP- represented a dramatic intensification of market forces in national economic
and political organization. Robert Fisk, in an article written for The Independent said, "the
very existence of this wealthiest of all prime ministers - Forbes magazine lists him among
the world's 100 richest men - has increased the value of the long-devalued Lebanese pound
and is drawing big investors back to the country"3
In this new formulation of governmental authority it was Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
who quickly assumed most of the power and leadership 4 . A Saudi national, although with
roots in Sidon, to the south of Beirut, Hariri took office in 1992 and quickly became "com-
mitted to the restoration and the maintenance of political stability." He did this, first and
foremost, by becoming the largest shareholder in Solidere, owning 7% of the company.
A great deal of allocative resources were at Hariri's disposal, and were used by him
to extend his power. Through his strong commitment to the reconstruction of Beirut,
emphasized during the Lebanese Civil War by his private company Oger-Liban, and by
his successful efforts to achieve the peace agreement of Taef, Hariri was able to establish
himself as a new political leader and was already considered a potential Prime Minister by
the end of 1991'. He was able to occupy the top position in the important state-run CDR
with one of his employees, and so it became possible for him to implement the beginning
1 "Who Owns Beirut?" Newsweek, January 31 1994.
2K. Salibi. A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered. University of California
Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1988.
3
"Hariri builds on the ruins of Lebanon - The Master of all he surveys" in The Independent on Sunday
23 January 1994
4Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi
5Ghassan Tueni. Beirut our City...A Legacy which Generates Capital. Al-Nahar, Feb 1992.
of the reconstruction according to his own plans. Later, as Prime Minister, he put his men
in all relevant state institutions for the reconstruction, and established an actual decision
6
monopoly
Even before becoming Prime Minister in 1992, two important decisions for reconstruc-
tion had already been made which favored Hariri; getting the law on reconstruction passed
in Parliament, and getting the Council of Ministers to adopt "his" Master Plan. The ap-
pointment of employees and confidants of Hariri to important decision-making positions,
(el-Shalaq in the national CDR for example), were strategic decisions that helped expand
Hariri's influence and power. By offering to carry out the reconstruction through a private
company without any state involvement, Hariri achieved an indirect "transfer of power"
from the government.
In fact, in the terms established by "Harirism," the process of postwar reconstruction
had been one of "astonishing self-enrichment" 7 for the members of the government and their
wide circle of business associates. The new government "not only opened the floodgates of
privatization, its members, as individuals, [took] advantage of the very same market lib-
eralizations that they mandate[d]." 8 At least until the elections of 1996, the parliament
included several opposition members who were critical of the government and its recon-
struction plan and were able to block certain projects. During the 1996 elections, however,
almost all of those oppositional figures lost their seats and "thanks largely to overwhelming
vote rigging"9 were replaced by a complacent parliament made up largely of "businessmen
in pursuit of wealth," including Hariri. The Lebanese parliament today is one of the richest
in the world with thirty-five millionaires and three billionaires.
The government's support of private sector interests grew when Hariri ran for Prime
Minister. Hariri worked hard to insure that Solidere would be in good shape when it started
implementing its reconstruction plans; this included helping the company procure certain
benefits after its incorporation.
In fact, under Article No. 60, of "General Provisions, in Exclusions and Exemptions,"
it was decided that the company would be exempt from the provisions of Article No. 1
in the "Law on the Acquisition by non-Lebanese of Real Estate Rights in Lebanon," and
6H. Edd6. Le Liban dou je viens. Buchet/Chastel, Paris, 1997.
7 Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi
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relieved from needing to obtain the authorization to acquire real estate property. Among
the other significant exemptions were that the buying and selling of Solidere's shares would
be exempt from taxation, and that the firm's profits would be tax free for a period of ten
years.
According to an August 1 0 th 1994 Council of Ministers' decision (based on an agree-
ment made with the CDR), Solidere was to be reimbursed by the State for all infrastructure
costs incurred, including; installing roads, public spaces, gardens, all networks, pavements,
lamp-posts, a power transformer unit, and parking lots. In addition, Solidere's responsi-
bilities in the reclaimed zone would be to treat the refuse dumped in the area over the
years, spread and compact the landfill, establish the sea protection, and install the total
infrastructure, the seaside boulevard, promenades, public parks and two marinas. Solidere
would be compensated for the infrastructure in cash, in lands belonging to the State, in the
right to exploit certain services resulting from the infrastructure, or in reclaimed land.
Weighed against the obligations of the company, to a certain extent, these exemptions
reflected the raw bargaining power of both Soldiere and the Lebanese government. How-
ever, they were also a result of the basic financial incentives necessary to induce a private
corporation to take on the project satisfy its opportunity cost and still make a profit. On
the flip-side, the reconstruction firm did have certain obligations. The "Obligations of the
Company" described in Article No. 61 included the following stipulations, the company was
required to; earmark a certain percentage of the funds received from cash subscriptions for
restoring the buildings10 ; draw up a time schedule for the execution of the project; finance
and ensure the execution of the construction of roads, squares and parks at the expense of
the state; and at the request of the CDR, finance the rehabilitation of the government and
municipal buildings located in the area.
In order to answer the questions we set out to at the start of this chapter we must
take a closer look at the internal structure of the company. On the 5 th of August 1992 the
CDR, as directed by Law No. 117, published an invitation in the Lebanese media to form
the Founding Board of the REHCO in a period scheduled to end on the 1 5 th of September
1992.
The CDR selected financiers from the pool that had applied following an invitation in
the newspapers. The successful candidates were chosen among "persons whose solvency is
l0 Though there was no specification of what the exact percentage should be
established by bank guarantees acceptable to the CDR." The Board of Founders formed on
the 2 3 rd of December 1992, and included one representative from the State (Walid Taked-
dine), six representatives from the property rights owners (including lawyers, legal consul-
tants and representatives of the Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Islamic, and Greek Catholic
Waqf), as well as five representatives from the prospective cash investors. Nasser Chammaa
was the Secretary General of the Board of Founders and the Representative of the Hariri
Group. The representatives selected prompted one critic to say that Solidere was nothing
more than a "collection of private interests and powerful individuals who gathered together
as Solidere's Board of Founders in 1992" .
The Board of Founders was charged with organizing a detailed plan to be submitted for
approval by public authorities, providing a detailed engineering design for the main infras-
tructure works, preparing tender documents, studying the marine works, and projecting a
phasing plan and a feasibility study.
It was also decided that the company would be run by a Board of Directors, whereby
at least two-thirds of the board members would be Lebanese nationals, and shareholders
would be represented on the Board in proportion to their contributions.
A twelve member Board of Directors was formed to manage the firm. The Board would
set the general policy for the conduct of the company's business, conclude any agreements
with the government and private sector, and generally manage the overall structure of the
firm.
The formation of these boards and their subsequent actions is important to discuss
because, by understanding their structure, we are are better able to interpret Solidere's
response to public opinion with respect to the creation of the Master Plan and its imple-
mentation.
5.2 The Master Plan
On October 2 1 't 1993 the CDR completed and endorsed a Detailed Plan for the Project.
The Detailed Plan was approved by the Council of Ministers and issued together with
certain amendments to the Master Plan by Decree No. 4830 dated March 17, 1994. See
Figure 5-1, page 82.
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The original Master Plan had been created and approved with little to no public partici-
pation. Though the CDR and Dar-al-Handassah conducted several informative meetings for
various citizen groups, these were intended as descriptive sessions, rather than gatherings
to solicit input on the design. Critics called upon the CDR to endorse a more progressive
planning attitude through establishing "citizen fora" so the public could participate in the
decision making process. However, this never materialized. In its defense, the CDR pointed
out that the current Master Plan required municipal approval as well as the approval of
al-Tanzeem al-Madani (The Planning Directorate) before it could be submitted to the cab-
inet for official endorsement. Hence, the CDR argued, the plan would be modified when it
passed through these reviews, and the public would in that sense be represented.
However, in post-war Lebanon, the municipality of Beirut was hardly functioning, and
had no president. Out of the twenty-four members on its board, only four were still alive, and
no new members had as yet been appointed. The CDR's claim that their plan underwent
public scrutiny was therefore invalid. Moreover, the conditions under which the original
Master Plan had been approved also included very little public input.
One of the last acts of the previous government, shortly after the elections and before
it resigned and was replaced by the Hariri cabinet, in fact, was the formal approval of Dar
al-Handasah's new Master Plan on the 1 5 th of October 1992.
It was in an atmosphere of "national anxiety and concern" with the outcome of the
September elections, and with no public participation in decision making, that the Master
Plan for Beirut was disclosed.
Ultimately, the Master Plan came to be established without the consultation of any of
the appropriate public organizations (Municipality of Beirut, Town Planning Authorities,
Municipal Council) and without input from the general public, who did not participate in
its conception nor a "debate over its merits"1 .
Though outside of official forums, there was still a large public outcry against the Master
Plan presented. In response to these objections, Solidere resorted to an interesting "lesser
of two evils tactic." The firm reminded the public of the various criticisms associated with
the previous "Dar al-Handasah Plan," as Solidere referred to the old Master Plan (with
the twin towers that upset everybody). See Figure 4-1, page 53. The firm dwelt on the
point that the ideas of this earlier plan were revised in the new and improved Detailed
1 2 H. Edd6. Le Liban d'ou je viens. Buchet/Chastel, Paris, 1997. p. 132
Plan presented for approval. Solidere's current Master Plan ratified by the government,
according to the company, "highlight[ed) the intended reintegration of the Central District
within the greater Beirut metropolitan area." Unlike the original Dar al-Handasah plan,
Solidere's proposal would also include the planned preservation of certain buildings in the
historic core, particularly in the, relatively small, area from the Grand Serail to Martyrs'
Square.
Under the guidance of Harvard educated Oussama Kabbani, Solidere's Master Plan
called for the creation of "a lively and attractive urban core in Beirut, balancing office
space, residential area, commercial and retail zones, parks, promenades, beach facilities and
two yacht clubs." In contrast with the 1991 Dar al-Handasah plan which, some critics have
commented, looks "deliberately like a red-herring" i3 , this approach seemed to mitigate the
masses. The new Solidere plan, inspired praise, and exclamations that "the Central District
would never have been rebuilt in such a timely and effective manner without the intervention
of the private firm"' 4 .
The Master Plan divided up the overall land area in the city center into "public" and
"development area" lands. "Public" land was made up of roads and open space. The "de-
velopment area" comprised of sites including retained buildings and vacant land. The total
land area of the Central District, including 61 hectares of reclaimed land, was approximately
180 hectares. The total built-up area capacity of the Central District was set by the Master
Plan at 4.69 million square meters, of which 1.45 million was reclaimed land.
To achieve its objectives, the company had put together a detailed Business Plan cover-
ing all areas of activity for Phase One of the project extending from 1996 through 1999. This
phase, centered on the development of the traditional BCD, operated at both the macro
level, in terms of identified objectives concerning economic and development activity, and
at the micro level, setting out the individual projects and targets intended to achieve these
objectives. Phase Two of the project, beginning in the year 2000, centered upon expanding
the development to the peripheral areas of the BCD and onto the reclaimed land.
Angus Gavin, head of Urban Design at Solidere, made it clear, in our interview, that
he believes that while Solidere's roots may be cause for concern and suspicion, companies
can change in objective and intent. He believes that when it came time for Solidere to
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propose the Master Plan, its intentions were clean, and it only wanted what was best for
the city center. "During the development of the Master Plan the emphasis changed from
that of a "grand plan," superimposed on the city center through a designer's vision, "as
if from above," to an approach which "stemmed from the existing physical context, as if
from below." It became a plan which grew out of the "site's historical context, its inherent
physical opportunities and its links with the city as a whole." The past was, in effect,
"informing the future."
In terms of Real Estate Development, in the fields of rehabilitation and restoration,
Solidere would also develop preserved buildings which had not been renovated by their
former owners. The company would also develop part of the available land and sell the rest
to other real estate developers. About 571,000 square meters would be suitable for new
development in the traditional BCD and 260,000 square meters in the reclaimed area would
later be added to this.
Throughout this entire period, while the Master Plans were being debated and approved
in government, the property right owners had still not been compensated. Furthermore,
their complaints could only be heard through a Solidere-led appeals process, as the regular
judicial system would not hear cases concerning compensation issues. The government had
effectively handed over responsibility of appeal to the private corporation. In fact, public
sector involvement in the Central District project as a whole was relatively limited.
The government had in essence simply issued the law that allowed the formation of
Solidere. It had, within this context, specified the boundaries of the center and building
outlines. The government had also formed an Appraisal Committee, as well as the guidelines
for the basic structure of the REHCO, but was not involved in the actual details of the
reimbursement process, or granting "due process" to opposing property owners.
5.3 The Appraisal Process
The Appraisal committees were formed of one judge, two engineers, one real estate appraisal
expert and one economist. The committees were commissioned to give their professional
and objective opinions on land-values within the Central District'.
150ne economist, for instance, announced that, in his opinion, the actual present value of the land was
zero, since there was no transaction, or sale, of land possible in the area until it had undergone massive
reconstruction, indicating that the land therefore had no value.
The primary Appraisal Committee level included a judge of the tenth degree as president,
and committee members were required to have five years of work experience. The secondary,
Higher Appraisal Committee, included a judge of the fifth degree, and members had ten
years of professional experience.
As required by Decree No. 2237, the Appraisal Committees started their work by pub-
lishing an announcement in the Official Gazette and three local newspapers inviting all
property right holders in the BCD, for a period of three months, to submit the real estate
numbers of their respective properties, as well as requests, pleas, written remarks, support-
ing documents, and to provide an address to which notices could be served. During this
time, the Board of Founders would determine which real estate properties could be returned
to their owners1 6 .
The committees were charged with determining the overall value of the respective prop-
erties. The determination was subject to review by a Higher Committee. Distribution
Committees were entrusted with splitting the determined value of each property between
the various right holders i.e. landlords and tenants. Each beneficiary would receive a number
of shares in the new company equivalent to the appraised value of his land. The commit-
tees acted like courts and applied procedural rules that enabled all property right holders
to submit their demands and documents. All decisions taken by the committee could be
appealed before the Higher Appraisal Committee, and reconsidered. However, even if the
Higher Committee issued an unfavorable decision, the ratification laws of Solidere decreed
that the case could not then be appealed in the regular Lebanese court system through any
ordinary or exceptional means of recourse for any reason, including abuse of power. The
REHCO bylaws (supported by legislation) made it clear that "the compensation decision
of the superior committees is final and cannot be further contested under the law".
The argument for disallowing further recourse was that, since the evaluation and com-
pensation decisions passed through two separate expert committees, even if a property
owner were to appeal the decision to a higher court, that court would resort to the same
sources of expertise for consultation anyway and so the procedure would be ineffectual.
These committees were empowered with the legislative authority of regular courts of law
16The provision applied to buildings that were; still standing, in a condition that did not preclude their
intended use, and were real estate properties not covered by the reorganization according to the plan and
guiding layout of the Central District.
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that seemed to some observers "unsuitable" for their procedural nature1 8 . Moreover, since
no further appeal was allowed, there was a fear that the government was abandoning its
role as a public defender - a fear that would exacerbate the mistrust already felt towards
public authorities.
Lawyer Mohammed Moghrabi, the Hemilians' legal counsel, first entered the scene as a
private citizen, concerned with the turn that Lebanese law was taking when judges agreed
to sit on the Appraisal Committees. As head of the Lebanese Lawyer's Association, he
denounced the actions of these committees and argued against them. Later in his role as
the Hemilian's lawyer, he expanded his argument. While the committees were supposed
to act like courts, and had judges on their board, Moghrabi pointed out that they were
distinct in two ways:
1. The committees based their judgment on a literal interpretation not the intended
comprehensive meaning or the "spirit" of the law.
2. The judges were not placed on the committee in their official judicial position, but in
a much vaguer role as "civilian experts." Because of their assignment in this context,
they did not have to abide by honor laws that govern judges' decisions and behavior
in a courtroom.
On February 2 5 th 1993, the Appraisal Committees submitted their appraisals of the real
estate properties to the Higher Appraisal Committee. The total appraised value amounted
to U.S. $1074 million. At the request of the Board of Founders of Solidere, the Middle
East Economic Consultants (MEEC), whose General Manager was Marwan Iskandar, cor-
roborated the appraisal of the property. The Higher Appraisal Committee published the
results in the local press and invited property right holders to submit their objections and
observations on the appraised value within a period of three months which ended on the
2 5 th of May 1993.
On October 2 2 "d 1993, the Board of Founders adopted a first list of 159 redeemable
lots at a value of U.S. $370 million. Property right holders recuperating their real estate
properties were obliged to surrender a corresponding amount of shares acquired in respect
of these properties and ordered to pay to the Company 10 - 12% of the property value as
appraised by the Higher Appraisal Committee; $250,000 in the case of the Hemilians.
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This percentage was considered a contribution from the recuperating parties to the
rehabilitation expenses of the displaced persons in the areas concerned 19 . The right of
recuperation would be exercised in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in
Article No. 63 of the "Articles of Incorporation." Under this article, the Board of Founders,
rather than the government, was liable for setting the criteria under which land was judged
appropriate for expropriation or not, and which plots would be recuperable.
Under Lebanese general company law, a corporation can only be formed if its capital
is fully subscribed to and the shares pertaining to each subscriber have been determined,
identified and issued. The application of these rules would have prevented the incorpo-
ration of the company until all the rights of the previous owners and tenants had been
irrevocably fixed and determined and all the shares of the company had been allocated to
each individual right holder. Even today, the shares have not been completely distributed.
Waiting until completion of the Appraisal and Distribution Committees' work would how-
ever, have resulted in major delays of the project. After the final appraisal value was issued,
the company had only six months to solicit the necessary shares and funds, otherwise its
incorporation would be legally void.
5.4 Shares and Their Subscribers
At its incorporation Solidere had been authorized to fund itself in two separate ways, by
issuing two types of shares; Type A and Type B. The company would receive cash sub-
scriptions in the form of Type B shares that could be sold on the market. These would
be balanced out by the actual wealth of the firm which would come from the appropriated
land. These land owners would be compensated by receiving Type A shares from the firm
matched to the amount their property was worth.
Together these two shares were valued at U.S. $1.82 billion. The Type A shares, initially
appraised at U.S. $1.17 billion, were issued to the holders of expropriated property in the
Central District in proportion to the relative value of their property claims. Type B shares
could not exceed 50% of the firm's total capital. On the 2 1 " of September 1993, and in
accordance with Article No. 6 of the "Articles of Incorporation," the CDR determined the
value of the cash capital to be equal to U.S. $650 million to be raised through the sale of 6.5
19 Solidere. The Reconstruction of Beirut Central District: The Major Urban Redevelopment Project of
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million Type B shares valued at U.S. $100 each to interested investors. Because the official
Beirut Stock Exchange, damaged during the war, was still not set up, the property owners
given shares were only able to be exchanged on the company's own privately created stock
exchange. The share owners still retained all the regular rights and privileges associated
with owning shares in a Public Limited Company2 0
Solidere and the government argued that only by translating owners and tenants rights
into share values was it possible to solve the coordination problem between the various
right holders. Plots could be redeveloped more easily by moving from "a multitude of small
owners unable to agree, to one entity with a dual interest, the interest of the shareholders,
and the national interest." All conflicting interests between owners and tenants would be
solved by the Distribution Committee.
This aspect of the company was extolled as a significant innovation and constituted the
main difference between the new structure of the company and the old structure of real
estate companies as defined in Article No. 21 of the Town Planning Law. While this article
originally limited the ownership of shares to the property right holders and the state, the
new structure enacted by Law No. 117, provided for an association between such property
right holders and cash investors.
In order to avoid the formation of a monopoly or allow the company to be controlled
by large financial groups, no shareholder was entitled to own, more than 10% of the capital
of the company. Any breach of this rule was sanctioned by "criminal penalties and by the
absolute nullification of the act"2 1 . The shares of the company were immediately listed
on the Stock Exchange, by exception to the general law, which requires that a company
20These included:
1. The right to receive dividends in accordance with the resolutions of the General Meeting
2. The right to take part and deliberate in the General Meetings and vote with a number of votes equal
to the number of shares held.
3. The right to receive a part of the Company's assets, upon its liquidation, in proportion to the number
of shares held by him, subject in all cases to the Law on the Acquisition by Non-Lebanese Citizens
of Real Estate Rights in Lebanon.
4. The right to benefit from all resolutions passed by the General Meeting granting the owner of the
share or any class thereof any special advantage in conformity with the provisions hereof.
5. The right to the owners of shares issued in representation of contributions in kind to use them by
priority as partial or full settlement of the price of real estate properties or sections of real estate
properties or other rights thereof purchased from the Company. Such settlement shall take place at
the market value of the shares.
2 1Solidere. The Reconstruction of Beirut Central District: The Major Urban Redevelopment Project of
the 1990s. Board: Solidere, Beirut, 1994.
operate for three years before listing, and forbids the negotiation of in-kind shares until
two years after the date of formation of the company. The company was also granted the
unconditional right to acquire up to 10% of its shares and to keep them for 18 months.
Solidere was successful in raising U.S. $650 million in cash capital through its Initial
Public Offering. The first sale of land in July 1995 was reported by Al-Hayat, the Arab
daily newspaper at U.S. $950 per built-up square meter, (at an area of 4.5 million, we can
roughly estimate Solidere's overall worth to be at: U.S. $4.275 billion) 22 The original value
of the company however, was set at $1.17 billion. But why would Solidere purposefully
undervalue itself?
In accordance with Chapter VIII of Article No. 3 of Law No. 117, the Company was
required to set up a schedule detailing the projects' phases of execution and to file it with
the appropriate government authorities within a period of six months from the date of its
incorporation.
This meant that after the appraisal period was completed and the overall price of the
city center was worked out, the company had six months to find the cash subscribers to
provide the necessary liquidity and balance the land value. In other words, if the overall
appraisal of the total value was low, then the company would have little trouble acquiring
the required value in six months. If the appraisal value was high, then the company would
have more trouble. The government, however, had no alternate plan for reconstruction, and
without the REHCO "all hope would be abandoned" for rebuilding the center2 3 .
Because no official stock exchange existed, there was a concern that the shares might not
be adequately subscribed to. To encourage potential investors, tax exemptions and lenient
land regulations were offered as incentives. The law exempted Solidere from Lebanese
Income and Capital Gains tax for a period of ten years from its incorporation. Shareholders
were also exempted from the Lebanese Withholding Tax on Dividends and Capital Gains
Tax for the same period.
On June 2 3 rd 1994, a secondary market allowing for trade in Solidere shares became
operational. This market was under the supervision of the Bank of Lebanon and organized
by the Soci6t6 Financiere du Liban, an organization comprising forty-six Lebanese banks.
But the worries of undersubscription were unnecessary, and within a few weeks, until
2 2 Al-Hayat 4 th July 19952 3 H. Schmid. The Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in the Context of Political Geography. Arab World
Geographer, 5 Spring(4):232248, 2002.
its closing in January 1994, the stock offering had been oversubscribed by 142%, U.S. $962
million offered by twenty thousand subscribers.
5.5 Solidere's Strategies for Widespread Acceptance
Many critics asked, "where is the government in all of this, and what role is it playing?"
The government thus far had merely provided a necessary bureaucratic step in the approval
process rather than an actual involved and monitoring body. The reconstruction of the
Beirut Central District could in this way be defined primarily as one between a "promo-
tional approach advocated by the private sector," and a "remedial-bureaucratic approach
advocating public sector intervention"24 . While Hariri had hardly made any public claims
so far, now that Solidere was ratified, the burden of approval had moved from the legislature
to the public arena.
As in the U.S., Lebanon's government is divided into; executive, judicial and legislative.
The executive branch is run by the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister.
The legislature is made up of a 128 member Parliament. The Judiciary is based on the
French system. The Judicial Tribunals deal in civic and penal law, and the "Consel d'Etat"
for administrative questions. Now that government ratification of the Solidere Project was
complete, the battle moved from the legislative to the judiciary and executive.
The executive and administrative branches are more directly accountable to the public.
Even though the judicial branch may be out of the sphere of influence of the ordinary
person, the prime minister and president are elected in Lebanon, and so are accountable
to the voters. The President being answerable to the Christian Maronites, and the Prime
Minister to the Sunni Muslims.
Solidere and Hariri devoted much energy to swaying public opinion and trying to gain
control of the executive domain. Foremost as a mechanism was the media. So far, apart
from a couple of nasty editorials, the media had been mostly on Hariri and Solidere's
side. As Makdisi pointed out, "the media and the public have generally reduced Lebanon's
post-war reconstruction to Beirut's reconstruction, which in turn has been reduced to the
reconstruction of the Beirut Central District, which has been attributed to one person, the
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Lebanese businessman and Prime Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri"2 .
Imagery, especially that concerning the "image of Beirut," was very important. Coun-
tering Hariri's image of Solidere as the rescuer of the city, the opposition, representing the
former owners and tenants of the city center, intellectuals and town planners, had its own
characterization of the project and how it affected Beirut. When looking at the property
owners handbook for instance, it asks "What good is a capital city with its heart ripped
out?" See Figure 5-2, page 83.
For Hariri, the image was one of the "Hong Kong of the Mediterranean," a revival
of the theme of "Paris of the Middle East" but in a new world. The clash of these two
images triggered a very heated public debate, described as "the first public debate since the
beginning of the war, and the first on urban matters in Lebanon's history"2 6 .
The marketing efforts employed by Solidere aimed at making their project seem like the
sole viable alternative to reconstructing Beirut. Opponents to the project were portrayed
as opposed to rebuilding Beirut in general, and showing "favoritism to destruction."
In Ayman Trawi's introduction to his recent picture book of the city center, the oppo-
sition to this project are strongly denounced:
History repeated itself. This time, it did at the hands of Mr. Rafiq Hariri.
Unfortunately, it repeated itself under virulent criticism and slandering, remi-
niscent of the violent hate campaign mounted against Baron Haussman during
the execution of his development and reconstruction project of Paris.
Voices of dissent were regularly heard in the Beirut of the last decade as in
the Paris of the 19th century. Loudly rejecting the development and reconstruc-
tion project behind slogans leading to wars and total stagnation in thinking,
planning, productivity and achievement, they halted completely the renewal
process. Under the banner of patriotism, they attacked its architectural, cul-
tural and legal aspects, thus trying to keep Beirut in the age of darkness, its
squares desolately empty and the threat of civil strife looming in its horizon.
The struggle over the reconstruction of Beirut's city center, negotiated through the
media was a process whereby different protagonists tried to convince the public of their
position through "strategic truths" and "geographical imaginations"2 .
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In one Lebanese advertisement 28 the headline read, "Fair and Square: We're Proud to
be Solidere." "Public opinion" was not just restricted to Lebanon; these images, especially
Hariri's, transcended borders. World public opinion, was important to a developing country
reliant on foreign governments and international institutions for loans. In the face of active
protests by the landowners, Solidere's massive advertising campaign not only plastered
huge posters all over Beirut and the rest of Lebanon, but also took out advertisements in
foreign newspapers and magazines. There were large-scale mailings of glossy information
booklets, and maps. (This campaign had actually begun before Solidere officially came
into existence, although the advertisements were technically sponsored by Solidere's Board
of Founders.) The New York Times ad reads "We've invested in the future of an ancient
city,"2 9 and in the Financial Times it reads "In Lebanon everyone knows we must rebuild
Beirut's city center. We know how." 3 0 Foreign investment had lowest priority on the list
of share subscribers3 1 , it was not money that Hariri was after with this campaign; rather
it was the support of international governments and organizations. The persuasion would
prevent these watch-dogs from criticizing too strongly any abuse of private property they
saw.
It was not just advertisements either. The Solidere project attracted entire features on
itself in countless different publications globally. Among the more flattering articles was
the Financial Times' twelve-hundred word article Glimmer of Confidence which featured,
"Mark Nicholson on the hopes of Lebanon's Prime Minister to rebuild the "Paris of the
Orient"".3 2
Gradually Solidere and Hariri succeeded in exercising political and economic pressure
on the formerly open and multi-layered media landscape. Newspapers and TV stations that
reported critically about Solidere were threatened with the withdrawal of advertisements.
The audio-visual law of 1996, which drastically reduced the number of TV stations in
Lebanon, was especially important because it prevented the opposition from gaining access
28Carte Blanche in Arab Ad 12 December 1993,
29New York Times 2 2 nd November 1993 p. C1130Financial Times, 9 July 1993 p14
31Stocks could only be sold and purchased by certain individuals in the following order of priority; the
original holders of the property rights, which were mostly Lebanese, but could be of any nationality; Lebanese
citizens and companies; the Lebanese state and public institutions; and finally persons of Lebanese origin,
as well as the citizens and companies of other Arab countries. Non-Arabs, unless they were originally
property holders are not permitted to buy shares (though because of special exemptions to strict Lebanese
laws regulating the ownership of land by foreigners, they would be allowed to purchase real estate from the
company once land and buildings were placed on the market by Solidere.)
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to the reporting. Three TV stations with a critical attitude towards Solidere were forced
to close. The result was that the most important media became less free and independent
in their reporting.
As tourists and Beirutis returned to the city center, the popularity of Solidere, and
the acceptance of the "Hong Kong" image soared in popularity. Part of this acceptance
in the public discourse was due to the financial resources of Solidere and the increasingly
(government) controlled media, as well as to the widespread acceptance of this image within
the Lebanese post-war society. Maybe after sixteen years of Civil War, the Lebanese were
ready to cling to a "euphoric" modern image that would once again make them proud of
their country. Hariri played up the idea of a "new blossoming international center of finance
and commerce",3 4 relying heavily on photographic contrasts between the old ruined center
of the 1960s and 1970s, and the refurbished center.
The opposition, for their part, tried to promote alternative ideas for the reconstruction
by using Beirut's traditional image as the "Paris of the Middle East." Thus the opposition,
in their discourse, referred instead to an already established image by focusing on the ideas of
peaceful coexistence and economic prosperity that symbolized pre-war Beirut. The original
property right holders tried to combine their demands for preservation and recuperation
with the image of a Beirut that lived in the population's nostalgia in order to connect
the concept of expropriation with a destruction of this image. Their marketing campaign
focused on portraying the reconstruction as an eradication of Beirut's history3 5 . Each side
thus used the media to propagate their images and story and incite the public.
Solidere designed impressive (and exaggerated)3 6 illustrations of the future city cen-
ter, with gorgeous Manhattan skylines, grass, trees and no traffic. The company advertised
through radio, cinema, television and newspapers. The protagonists of the opposition could
hardly counter this expensive advertising campaign of Solidere because of their restricted
financial situation and weaker institutional structure. Nevertheless, they managed to or-
ganize several public-relation activities, such as press conferences, newspaper articles, and
leaflets.
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Of course it is misleading to simply say "the opposition." Though sometimes joined
in their efforts and advertising initiatives, the opposition for the project is actually split
into two distinct types. The first was opposition (formed of many distinct groups) that
objected to the Master Plan on a purely aesthetic, environmental, intellectual or historical
precedent, like the Organization of Protecting Environmental Spaces and Old Buildings,
and the Assembly of Banks. The second were those that objected to the existence of the
company and its appropriation of private land on an ideological level.
The opposition formed by these separate constituents was by no means a unified block.
Some, like the Assembly of Banks, were more powerful than others, for example the artists
concerned about reduced public space in the new city center. The strategy employed by
Solidere, was one of "divide and conquer." Each constituent tackled separately could be
won over, and certain strategic exchanges could guarantee the company political support.
At times the opposition groups even came up in a head-to-head conflict. The Historical
and Archeological societies wished to preserve the nature of the original city center, and
so were lobbying for lower densities. The initial Master Plan had set the floor-area-ration
(FAR) factor to 4.2. The opposition to Solidere argued that it should not exceed 3 to
preserve the features of the old Central District. Solidere, with approval from the Council
of Ministers, increased this factor to 5. The increased FAR created severe reservations on
the part of the engineering group responsible for implementing the Master Plan, so much
so that the head of the team Henry Edd4, credited with being the lead architect for the
city center project, submitted a letter of resignation in protest. However, according to
Oussama Kabbani, Solidere's Town Planning Manager, the Council of Minister's rationale
was acceptable because, "it was unfair to drag people into a partnership where the FAR
[is] 3.7." It would seem to make economic sense that the original property owners support
Solidere in this matter, rather than the opposition groups advocating a lower index. A
higher FAR means higher profitability. The original property owners were shareholders in
the firm, and so had incentives to further its economic success, and so a higher FAR.
From Public Opinion to Public Benefit
What is amazing about this story is that, in less than two years, the Parliament had ratified
a law for the creation of a private REHCO. Following this and in a rapid succession of events,
37 Unless of course they were so opposed to the venture as to disregard their investment in the project.
Solidere was established. On the 1 9 th of February 1992, the Council of Ministers determined
the limits of the BCD project zone. On the 2 2 "d of July 1992 the Council of Ministers
approved the "Articles of Incorporation, and by mid-October 1992 the Council of Ministers
approved the BCD Master Plan. By the end of December 1992 the CDR completed its
formation of the Board of Founders. On November 1 't 1993 the Board of Founders issued
a cash subscription, and the CDR and Board of Founders then called for the Statutory
General Meeting. The Council of Ministers appointed Preliminary and Higher Appraisal
Committees, followed by the appointment of a Distribution Committee on 1 8 th June 1993.
By the 2 6 th of August 1993 the Appraisal and Distribution Committees had completed their
final appraisal. By September 1993 the CDR had completed the determination of the cash
capital. Solidere was incorporated on May 1 5 th 1994.
The feeling of mistrust created by this rush of events was not short-lived, certain stake-
holders felt that Solidere was trampling over local interests. The company's ahistorical
approach to planning the Central District, left many embittered.
Solidere is currently the largest publicly quoted company in Lebanon. Since its final
incorporation, Solidere has put itself to work and started to implement its basic mission in
accordance with the Master Plan.
But, winning over "public" opinion is interesting in the case of a private firm. The firm,
first and foremost, is concerned for its own shareholders. The next chapter will explore the
idea of Solidere and public benefit in the context of secular property law.
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Figure 5-1: A Detailed Map of the Master Plan for the Beirut Central District
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Figure 5-2: Opposition Brochure: "Pity the Nation Whose Heart is Ripped Out and Does
Not Revolt"
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Chapter 6
Secular Property Rights
The St. Georges Hotel was a legendary resort in Beirut. The hotel was frequented by Kim
Philby, Paul Getty and Elizabeth Taylor, and The New York Times once described it as,
"just too fabulous." Today the St. Georges "remains something of a symbol of what Beirut
became." The last guests "fled away in bulletproof limousines" during the infamous "War
of the Hotels" in late 1976, when militias commandeered waterfront hotels, and St. Georges
went up in flames. After the war, when Solidere entered the scene, a battle developed over
the famous St. Georges yacht club.
Although the waterfront adjacent to the hotel fell outside Solidere's land as circum-
scribed by the government, the company built a U.S. $230 million seawall encircling it (to
block off the 60-foot waves that batter the coast every hundred years). Moreover, the devel-
oper announced that Prince Walid bin Talal, the Saudi businessman, had expressed interest
in building a Four-Seasons hotel facing the 500-yacht basin.
Fadi Khoury was enraged at Solidere's proposal. Since its construction in 1929 the St.
Georges had had some form of water access. The marina plans stalled as the legal battle
began, however in the winter of 2001 the government evicted all 50 boats moored by the
Hotel and declared the basin to be Solidere's.
A Solidere spokesman, commenting on the situation publicly, said, "we are developing
here many projects, which we believe are more interesting on a national level than this
one hotel. Many investors were reluctant to go on as long as the marina problem was not
solved" 1 .
'Interview in the Daily Star, September 1992
Khoury now spends most of his days in an unfinished annex. Across the street on the
St. Georges' roof is a camera that pans across the new marina, and streams a picture onto
the screen on Khoury's desk. Every so often he manipulates the control stick to zoom in on
a Solidere construction crew. "If we weren't watching, one day they might fill in the whole
marina just to get some more land," he says. "Without water access," he continues sadly,
"St. Georges may not have much of a future" 2
Today the hotel remains undeveloped, and a huge tarp covers its front, with a picture
of the lively St. Georges' of the past, and large writing that reads in Arabic, "St. Georges
Hotel - should this be allowed?" The question of "what should be allowed" in terms of
property rights is explored in this chapter.
So far we have seen the creation of a private REHCO designed to reconstruct Beirut's
Central District. The real questions arise when examining the ripple effect that this project
had on property rights in future Lebanese projects and other similar initiatives in the Middle
East.
The justification for passing Law No. 117 boiled down to two main reasons; the financial
state of the government meant that it was unable to undertake the work, and the fragmented
and complicated ownership of property in the city center meant that reconstruction would
not be easy if left to individual owners.
Ultimately, we are left to evaluate the summary solution to the reconstruction issue,
the completely private Real Estate Holding Company, Solidere, "a congregation of property
right owners, and cash investors, coupled with the support of the state"3 . There are, of
course, several different ways we could approach the evaluation of the Solidere project as a
development model. I will focus on analyzing the legal aspects of the development model
here.
We must keep in mind that when we talk about whether the Solidere process was "legal"
it is more than simply asking whether or not the firm was within its rights to appropriate
the land. Part of the "legal" process involves procedural rights, and so includes a more
historical perspective than evaluating the firm based on a simple reading of the law.
2Neil MacFarquhar. Beirut Journal: In the Once Fabled City, Real Estate Battles Rage. New York
Times, April 19, 2001.
3Oussama Kabbani. The Reconstruction of Beirut. Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, 1992.
6.1 Private Property
The right to private property is often considered a natural, or inalienable human right.
Property rights are not natural in the sense that individuals are born with them, but rather
that the "force"4 of these rights can be recognized as valid by moral and rational people
apart from the provisions of any positive law5 . Property is not a two-way relationship
between a person and a thing, rather the legal relations involved should be thought of as a
relationship between people.
Transfer of property from private to public use has found different rationalizations in
different contexts. In the United States, for example, the right of property is broken down;
the right to own property is distinguished from the right to develop or build on landed prop-
erty. A similar situation of property transfer from one private owner to another constitutes
a major problem (think of the urban renewal movement in the U.S. after 1949). In the
American context, the controversy of transferring landed property from one private owner
to another is legally endorsed by the argument that "the concept of public use is not to be
confined to the notions of public ownership of property and public access to property"6.
The concept of property is the idea of a system of rules governing access to, and control
of, material resources. There are three basic principles of property ownership, that should,
in a state that values principles of private property, be available to the same individual7 .
They are the power of disposition, or being able to sell your property; the power of use,
being able to employ your property as needed; and the power of exploitation, or using your
land to its fullest advantage. Within this relationship, a private landowner would expect
that he had a claim right against other private owners to protect his land. This right is
only trumped by the eminent domain powers of government.
Two aspects of the Solidere operation had a direct bearing on the understanding of
property rights as described above8 . The first was the compulsory participation of owners
and occupants in the REHCO, and the withdrawal of their right of occupation, or the right
to return to their premises. Those who still legally resided in the center would be obliged
4Jeremy Waldron. The Right to Private Property. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1990. p. 195 Locke or Bentham
6Jeremy Waldron. The Right to Private Property. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 19907 Ann E. Mayer, editor. Property, Social Structure and Law in the Modern Middle East. State University
of New York Press, New York, 1985. p. 35
8 Ann E. Mayer, editor. Property, Social Structure and Law in the Modern Middle East. State University
of New York Press, New York, 1985. p. 131
to vacate their dwellings. The second feature was the removal of the physical boundaries
between property lots and their combination into a single unit.
Property Rights in Lebanon
Property rights in Lebanon and the Middle East, for the purposes of this chapter at least,
can be seen as split into secular property rights, and religious property rights. Property in
the region is often thought of as the "means by which people gain power, not only at the
local level, but at the national and international levels as well" . Within the analysis of
secular property rights, it is interesting to keep four separate idioms of the way in which
property law is used in mind; as an idiom of social relations; as a means of control and
centralization; as a means to gain personal power and achieve mobility; and as a means of
social engineering10 . Historically Lebanon has been a country that has seldom seen self-rule,
and traditionally colonialism and subsequent nation-building attempts have used property
as a means of control and centralization, molding and adapting property concepts for their
own benefit.
Conceptions of property rights in Lebanon are, as described by Samir Khalaf in Lebanon's
Predicament, a "paradox." The country is torn between valuing individual private property
rights, and upholding traditional notions of communal land holding within families and reli-
gious groups. The Ottoman Empire rule, and then the French, imprinted on this previously
stateless society a deep-rooted fear of foreign powers, outside of the system, infringing on
personal, and tribal, property holdings. After independence, as was the case with most
post-colonial countries, the Lebanese clung very tightly to their domestic ownership. The
newly established Lebanese state not only remained very suspicious of any foreigners trying
to buy land in the country, but was also careful itself not to extend too far into the holdings
of its population.
The way land is used, controlled, and distributed in a society under conditions of "an
excessive degree of individualism at the personal level and the near absence of government
intervention at the state level," was described by Samir Khalaf as being a key factor nec-
essary for analysis when reviewing large projects in Lebanon. Lebanese values, he argued,
9Hammoudi, Abdellah. "Substance and Relation: Water Rights and Water Distribution in the Dra
Valley." in Ann E. Mayer, editor. Property, Social Structure and Law in the Modern Middle East. State
University of New York Press, New York, 1985. p. 131
'
0 adapted from Ann E. Mayer, editor. Property, Social Structure and Law in the Modern Middle East.
State University of New York Press, New York, 1985.
have tended to emphasize individualism and nonintervention, and find it hard to cope with
the growing need for urban planning in their society, which has no tradition of state plan-
ning. This situation, he claimed, was further complicated by political pressures originating
outside of Lebanon that also undermined the ability of the Lebanese government to plan
effectively for the urban environment. Successive migrations of Palestinian and Lebanese
refugees resulting from the Israeli expansion and the bombardment of Southern Lebanon
have congested the urban areas. In addition, the influx of capital from the Saudi Ara-
bian peninsula has resulted in soaring land values. These external factors have undermined
the Lebanese government's ability to implement large-scale urban planning projects to re-
solve the current crises. In fact, since the 1930s Lebanese planning initiatives have been
characterized by "audacious planning and executive ineffectiveness"".
When compared to adjacent Arab regimes, the laissez-faire system in Lebanon stands
out for its liberal traditions. In mobilizing and managing its human and economic resources,
successive governments in Lebanon have pursued policies that encourage private initiatives
and free enterprise in virtually all sectors. This "rampant liberalism" manifests in "exces-
sive degrees of individualism" at the personal level and the "near absence of government
intervention" at the state level12 . Urban planning has thus had a "relatively antagonis-
tic" relationship with Lebanese society13 . By its nature, planning has sometimes involved
restrictions on certain freedoms, but the Lebanese have in general always "resisted such
restrictions" and continued to "perceive any plan as an unwarranted infringement on the
private use of property." It becomes "pertinent within such a context" to explore how such
seemingly incompatible traditions - norms associated with laissez-faire, freedom, and non-
intervention, and those necessitated by the growing need for planning, coordination, and
control - have been reconciled in Lebanon14 .
In the early 1930s, public officials in Beirut began to be concerned with the physical
development of the city. Lebanon was under the French Mandate, and all the early plans
were inspired and undertaken by French experts. Teams of specialists were assembled to
prepare the guidelines to direct the future growth of Beirut. "Arrayed against the planners"
"Samir Khalaf. Beirut Reclaimed. Dar An-Nahar, Beirut, 1993.2 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
* Ann E. Mayer, editor. Property, Social Structure and Law in the Modern Middle East. State University
of New York Press, New York, 1985.
4 Samir Khalaf. Beirut Reclaimed. Dar An-Nahar, Beirut, 1993.
were local interest groups and politicians, who saw the plans as a threat to private property
rights.
1932, 1944 and 1950, all saw various city plans drawn up for Lebanon, but never ratified.
The General Master Plan which was put together from 1951 to 1954, was the only one to
have received official approval. This plan focused primarily on constructing a network of
roads with no provisions made for zoning, industrial location, tourism and so on. And it
involved nothing that would infringe on private property rights.
The Lebanese government had very little direct involvement in planning initiatives. It
seemed from past plans that the population was very averse to the concept of expropriation.
This history is important to keep in mind when looking at the Solidere project. The
distaste for large government projects is clear, which would dispose the public towards an
option like Solidere over an eminent domain option. However, there is a question of whether
this hostility would emerge towards any project that would infringe on individual property
rights, be it a private or public venture. Looking at the history of property rights law, it
does not seem to be the case that the Solidere project emerged naturally from the public's
historical consciousness of these rights.
The Ideals of Modern Property Law
Article No. 15 of the Lebanese Constitution specifies that private property is protected by
law, and expropriation is impermissible except in cases where the public benefit is assured,
and in those cases where adequate compensation is offered. In the case of secular law,
we must examine the rigorousness of the project when it comes to satisfying these two
conditions.
Expropriation of land is usually defined as the taking or modification of an individual's
property rights, generally through eminent domain. Eminent domain is the government act
of converting privately owned land into public land, subject to reasonable compensation.
Projects all over the world such as highways, or dams, have involved the expropriation of
land in order to be complete the initiative and secure a broader public good.
Articles No. 19 and 22 of Kanoon Tanzeem al-Madani, the General Laws of Urban
Planning, define the parameters under which the government is allowed to appropriate
15Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 220
private property. Article No. 19 states that the appropriation of land is only "allowed
for the immediate use of the public administration to implement its urban redevelopment
plan." Article No. 22 explains that the possibility of compensating property owners and
legal tenants with shares is only allowed when at least an equal public-private partnership is
in place. Lebanese trade law relinquishes government control over shareholding companies
completely. Decisions in private companies are made by board members and voted on by
shareholders. Lebanese trade law is to be upheld in the case of Solidere, and private investor
rights protected. This indicates that there can be little to no government involvement or
the possibility of a public-private partnership with Solidere.
The CDR, the government's planning organization, commissioned a French Constitu-
tional Law expert to analyze the constitutionality of the REHCO law. The final report
claimed that the Law No. 117 itself did not conflict with the Lebanese Constitution, how-
ever "it is the potential abuse of its implementation could result in constitutional as well
as legal conflicts." This expert opinion did not, however, prevent fierce opposition in the
courts, where the opposition argued Solidere was undermining the public benefit.
6.2 The Ideals of Secular Property Law and Expropriation
The Public Benefit Ideal
There is no adequate and systematic definition for "public benefit" in Lebanese law. "Pub-
lic use" for which governments can exercise the rights of eminent domain includes "public
safety, public health, morality, peace and quite, law and order and even esthetic consider-
ations." Ideally, public benefit, would not be a subjective term, however, since there is no
systematic legal definition of "public benefit" by legislative and judicial bodies, we must
take the term to mean what we believe to be its intended "spirit".
Generally, we take something that is "in the public benefit" to be a good thing, and
most reasonably minded people would say that it is acceptable for private rights to be
sacrificed (not often, and with full compensation of course) in order to help the greater
good of society. We most often see the public expropriation of land in order to build roads,
or for public transportation projects. Generally this is not an easy process, and the owners
of the expropriated property are often up in arms protesting the abduction of their private
holdings. In the case where the government issues a decree of eminent domain, the parties
affected can take the government to court in order to preserve their titles.
Exercising the right of eminent domain is never easy. Private property rights are con-
sidered inalienable. Honoring these rights is essential to the stability of future investment
and the smooth running of the capitalist economy. Given this is the case, and that in the
Solidere project the degree of financial compensation was considered inadequate, it must
have been the case that the private firm was doing something extraordinarily beneficial to
the public. There were really four main complications, unique to the Solidere case, that the
firm had to deal with in order to expropriate land:
1. The expropriation was being done by a private and not a public entity.
2. Lebanon has a history of strict independence and financial autonomy that values
private property highly.
3. Expropriation, even in the case of eminent domain, is difficult and the burden of proof
is on the expropriator to prove it is in the public benefit.
4. The eminent domain procedure, though in existence for a long time in Lebanese law,
has rarely been used (once in Riyadh Solh Street in BCD in the early 1940s). It
is considered unjust towards the property owners in depriving them of commercial
improvement of their property16 . Even the government goes through long processes
and deliberations before it approves the expropriation right, and it seems that it would
be even harder for a private firm to convince the Parliament and Council of Ministers
of its ability to work for the public benefit.
Since Lebanese law is based on French law, the French constitution is often referred to,
and this will be the starting point of analyzing whether the firm is actually working towards
the "public benefit"' 7 .
Whether or not the Solidere project was a "good" idea depends a lot on how "publicly"
it used the land, over and above the individual property owners who, it is assumed, work
towards their own private benefit. The justification for Solidere's existence was, after all,
that it would increase general welfare, or work towards furthering the public benefit.
l'Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi, July 2003
17 Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992. p. 29
The arguments that were brought up in the legal cases are outlined below. The discussion
will focus on the issues at stake rather than the detailed laws referred to. Since this type
of development model has become mainstream in its usage across the Middle East, I think
that there is something to learn about the project by looking at these arguments, if only in
an analytic way.
6.3 Solidere and the Public Benefit
Solidere's representatives and its supporters made their case as follows:
International Downtown Revitalization
In the past 20 years, with a growing and shared international experience in urban regen-
eration and inner-city revitalization, we have seen a "strong revival in urban values and a
rediscovery of the commercial, cultural, and residential benefits of the inner city." There
has been a "sensible rationalization" of the types of uses that need direct access to Central
District institutions and markets and that can absorb the relatively higher central area land
values. But the traditional downtown -offering a broad mix of uses, "embellished by the
patina of history and providing a social arena for the whole city" -is back. Renewing city
centers, and focusing on the virtues of downtowns has become a recent fashion amongst city
planners. Angus Gavin of Solidere, commenting on Beirut's project in relation to the rest
of the world, said, "planners, economists and developers have recognized that cities cannot
function as diffuse communications systems - they need centers."
Nowhere was the need for a center more apparent than in Beirut, where there was
an almost tangible sense that the was city missing its heart. This was expressed in the
pervading feeling of the need to "fill a vacuum" through a strong development interest in
the Central District, commercial pressures to invest, and in the desire of businesses and
retail traders to return to the city center. Since the war, the city had remained socially and
psychologically split. Through a reconstruction project it would be brought back together
to achieve its full role and identity of a vigorous and lively Central District.
Rebuilding the Center in Record Time
Nothing speaks as well for Solidere's contribution to Beirut as pictures can. Comparing
before and after images, it is easy for the reader to see the incredible transformation that
occurred. The extent of rehabilitation carried out by the firm speaks for itself. See Figure 6-
1, page 95.
Solidere's city center project had lofty goals. Apart from rebuilding the city center,
its spillover effects aimed to increase production in most of the economic sectors in Beirut
and Lebanon. The increased demand for both skilled and unskilled labor provided 5,000
temporary, and 100,000 permanent, extra jobs. The project would generate a flow of capital
to Lebanon in parallel with the expected reduction in the budget deficit, which would, in
turn, help improve the exchange value of the Lebanese pound.
The Solidere initiative would help the reactivation of the financial market and the stock
exchange, have important positive effects on public expectations and consolidate confidence
in the future of Lebanon's economy.
The project's speediness ensured that by 1999 1.2 million square meters would be com-
pleted, an additional 2.1 by 2008, and the final 1.1 million square meters by 2018. Even
if the government had sufficient finances for reconstruction it was unlikely that the public
sector would be able to complete the project so efficiently. Given the great psychological
value the center held for Beirut and Lebanon, its reconstruction would have sent the clearest
message that the war was indeed over, and Beirut was well on the road to recovery.
Figure 6-1: Ayman Trawi's Before and After Pictures
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People Love the New Center
The city center drew tourists back to Lebanon. Beautiful images of ports, new residential
neighborhoods, and booming business replaced the pot-hold building pictures that had
traditionally represented Beirut's image in International media. See Figure 6-2, page 96.
Figure 6-2: Pot-holed Building
As Ayman Trawi put it:
Good fortune was bestowed on Beirut the day it found its caretaker who
uplifted the heart of the city from under the then existing rubble of death,
destruction and oblivion, and brought back its torn landmarks, distressed towers
and desolate alleyways to a new life of beautifully restored buildings and newly
erected ones, wide avenues and bright streets.
An outcome of central area reconstruction would be to re-establish the city center as the
neutral arena for all the country's diversified communities. The Central District - at the
geographic heart of the metropolitan area, with access to the airport and port, forming the
traditional center of government, hotels, banking and shopping - could readopt its natural
role as the city's meeting point. The numerous ethnic and religious communities, polarized
during the war, that remained to a large extent disengaged, might be reconnected through
this project.
Set Standards for Other Projects
In his work, Gavin also proudly exclaimed, "through the renewal of their city center, the
citizens of Beirut will be able to reclaim a public domain that sets standards to be matched
elsewhere."
When reflecting on his experience with such companies as Solidere in the past, Angus
Gavin remembers his time working as a planner with the London Docklands Corporation.
The London Docklands, most famous for Canary Wharf, redeveloped a part of London out-
side of the traditional confines of the city's "Square Mile." The development was based on a
vision for London as a European financial hub. The project was seen as having "successfully
established a new Financial District" 18. The true benefit of the project, claimed Gavin, ex-
tended beyond this. The high quality working environment produced a competitive presence
in the City of London, and the government which had previously been neglecting working
conditions within the "Square Mile," now realized that its conservationist approach needed
to be reformed, and began to allow large floorplate buildings to be built within the area.
Gavin explained, "the influence on the marketplace and on the projects of other developers
led to a 20% increase in prime office space in London at a time of intense competition be-
tween European cities for market leadership in international banking and financial services.
This single visionary project did a lot to maintain London's role as a leading financial center
within Europe." This sort of competitive relationship with the government might also be
the case for Solidere. Certain inefficient policies may be reformed, now that the government
has a higher standard to work against to maintain revenue from certain ventures.
Gavin calls the project the start of a "Brave New World" emphasizing change and
innovativeness. It is not far fetched to think that the reconstituted city center could play an
important role "in the modernization of Lebanon's regulatory and institutional framework
for urban development"19 . The Central District became a model project for the testing
and development of new norms and standards, planning controls and practices. These did
"much for the modernization of the development and construction industries in Lebanon"
and were a "likely precondition to securing major overseas investment in projects"20
The city center project, as the first large scale initiative in Lebanon, not only set the
18Interview with Angus Gavin, July 2003
19Angus Gavin and Ramez Maluf. Beirut Reborn: The Restoration and Development of the Central
District. John Wiley and Sons, London, 1996.
2 0 Interview with Angus Gavin, July 2003
standard and helped create investment interest, it also helped establish the much needed
institutional infrastructure for reconstruction after the war. Many construction-related
standards and codes of practice began to be developed through the National Commission
for Norms and Standards, established in 1994, specifically to coordinate a process of normal-
ization for the whole country. Solidere quickly became an active contributor to the National
Commission, and played a formative role in the development of a number of codes and stan-
dards, including the fire safety code, site safety regulations and standards of accessibility
for the disabled.
Angus Gavin, the head of Urban Design at Solidere, explained his perspective on Solidere
as a private company acting in the public benefit, by giving a rather interesting argument.
The public benefit, said Gavin, is (or should be) a response to public demand. If the public
demands a new road, then it is in the public benefit to build a road. The best indicator of
"public benefit" is therefore "public demand," and the best indicator of "public demand" is
the market. In a private and competitive market, at the efficiency point of market clearing,
and in order to maximize profits, a firm must cater to the needs of its consumers. What
better way to understand public demand then, than by having a private firm, geared towards
this end, in charge of the process?
Indeed, Gavin may have been be describing one of the rationales behind the increasing
privatization of cities. Unfortunately, in the case of Solidere, at any rate, it is not enough to
claim that the market is the best indicator of public benefit. The market reflects demand;
strictly defined as willingness and ability to pay for a certain good. But, the rationale
for government market regulation is to provide compensation in cases of market failure.
Whether in the case of a monopoly, (a potential fear in the case of Solidere), which may
not be responsive enough to market needs, or in the case where a certain group will be
marginalized and excluded from partaking in the public benefit provided by a private cor-
poration, the government is needed. Starting at this point of analysis, we can begin to
respond to the rationale Solidere itself uses about public benefit as follows.
6.4 Solidere and the Private Benefit
While many opponents of the project agreed that Solidere did rebuild the city center and
had certain benefits attached to it, they claimed that these benefits might have been accrued
by other means with fewer of Solidere's disadvantages.
What it Means to be A Private Company
The primary difference between a private company expropriating land for the public benefit,
and the government carrying out the same process, is that the definition of success in each
case is different. Even though Solidere's overall aim was to rebuild the city center, its
annual reports allude to another phenomenon that does not exist in the public sector. This
phenomenon is the one thing that every private firm desires; profits.
In its brochures, encouraging potential investors, Solidere reports projected an internal
rate of return of between 15.0% to 20.7% from 1994 to 2018. This figure was above the
breakeven point of most public projects. While the end result is a rebuilt center, private
profits certainly detract from the "publicness" of the venture.
The most troubling aspect of privatization for critics and landowners seemed to be the
"blatant conflict of interest"2 1 between the public officials and the CDR executives that
had vested interests in privatizing the project since they also represented potential private
investors.
On Public Space
Aside from the financial aspects of private firms and their effects on what we consider to be
the "public benefit" there was also the question of geography when it came to the Solidere
project. Hashim Sarkis, of Harvard's GSD, asked, "How do we define public space, now
that the state is no longer the agency keen on promoting public life, but a group of private
entrepreneurs wanting urban life to promote their business?" 22
Private security guards stand around malls, sometimes prohibiting vagabonds, or shoe-
less pedestrians from entering the facility. It is not hard to imagine a similar experience in
the city center. Surrounded by armed soldiers and policemen, the Central District might
well turn into a private haven, accessible only to certain parties or businessmen. Consider-
ing the fuss made over the Central District's psychological impact on the population, and
its power and ability to unite the two warring factions as the geographical and emotional
2 1 Interveiw with Ovadis Hemilian, July 200322Hashim Sarkis. "Territorial Claims: Architecture and Post-War Attitudes Toward the Built Environ-
ment" in Samir Khalaf and Philip Khoury, eds. Recovering Beirut, Urban Design and Post- War Reconstruc-
tion. E.J. Brill. 1993. p. 118
heart to the city, placing it under the jurisdiction of a potentially exclusionary private force
seems somewhat ironic.
In fact, if as argued by public officials, the Central District resembled the very heart and
soul of Beirut, then handing it over to a private company would represent the "withering
away of the state"2 . Already in bad shape after the Civil War, the Lebanese government,
by conceding so much to a private corporation, only succeeded in deteriorating its image as
public protector further.
For Ghandour Atallah, the challenge that urban design and planning faced in the after-
math of the Civil War was largely political: "the citizens [had] yet to regain their city and
the power to reshape it." To Atallah, the compromising symptoms were familiar; shrink-
ing public space, encroaching privatization, and boundaries designed for the isolation of
privileged enclaves -hardly features of a "public" project.
Solidere as a Monopoly
Critics argued that employing one REHCO for the entire Central District put somewhat
of a monopoly on "public interest." The government's involvement in the company was
limited to approving the basic structure of the REHCO; approving the expanse of land to
be reclaimed; and specifying the area to be expropriated.
The "fate of Lebanon may now be in the hands of a private real estate company"
lamented one newspaper editorial24 . The budget of Solidere was about half of the national
yearly GNP. If Solidere at one point were to fall under financial difficulty (say due to a cash
flow problem) it is unlikely that the government could act to save the enterprise.
What a Private Company means for the Memories of Beirut's City Center
Solidere's Master Plan proposed the demolition of 80% of the town center and to increase
its density fourfold. Effectively, many critics of the venture argued, a "fatal blow" 25 had
been dealt to the "memory" of this two-thousand year old city, only to be replaced by a
"mirage" of a new city, one better suited to "the oil-rich Arab countries," with a wealth of
2 3 M. Davie. Discontinuites imposees au coeur de la ville: le project de reconstruction de Beyrouth. Edition
de la Maison des sciences de lhomme dAquitaine, Bordeaux, 1990.
2 4 Op-ed in Al-Nahhar 2 1't December 1991
2 5 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
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Figure 6-3: The New City Center
new buildings, perhaps, but a "dearth of architectural traditions" 26.
The eviction of the existing population would "eliminate the social fabric," while the
dissolution of the "medieval patterns" of property within the city would "decimate the
physical fabric." The town center would become "a dead city, an empty field open to the
speculative ambitions of developers"27.
To pretend to protect this memory, argued preservatory groups, by maintaining a few
monuments while "obliterating the context onto which they were inscribed" would only
lessen their true worth28
2 6Oussama Kabbani. The Reconstruction of Beirut. Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, 1992.27N. Beyhum. The Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans for Beirut. Beirut Review,
4:4362, 1992.
28AL-Hayat interview with the Director of the Order of Engineers and Architects, July 1992
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Can you have "Public Benefit" with no government involved?
There were several steps the government could have taken to maintain a certain level of
authority and secure a more involved role in the project. The most obvious of these measures
were more stringent restrictions placed on the private REHCO.
The affected property rights holders argued that the decree produced by the Council
of Ministers which outlined the conditions of expropriation in the Central District was not
within the realm of "public interest." Article No. 63 of this decree, in the company's bylaws,
left the responsibility of deciding which buildings and plots were to be expropriated to the
decision of Solidere's Board of Founders. In other words, the company itself (a private
entity) was allowed the discretion of defining which areas it would expropriate. In doing so
it was also inadvertently defining what the public benefit or interest was in the city center.
And by allowing the firm to draw the boundaries of public interest, what the government
was actually granting the firm was increased bargaining power over the different opposition
groups.
Since the firm could in effect decide which properties to include and exclude from the
boundaries, it could play one group off another. For example, the street known as "Bank
Street," was left untouched and was strategically excluded from Solidere's area of influence.
This meant that the banks' initial objections and their unification with the other con-
stituents in opposition to Solidere was weakened when the firm was able to, as a bargaining
chip, agree to disclude the Bank Street from its project. In return, for this exclusion, the
firm received the banks' timely support as the national elections approached.
This strategy of "dividing and conquering" meant that if the government were to decide
to intervene in Solidere's operations and prevent any aspect of the project, it would face
opposition from certain politically influential parties that Solidere had cut deals with.
Handing over so much power to a private firm, could not possibly bode well for the state.
It led to such feelings as, "a general uncomfort," about "the way the reconstruction process
is being taken care of"29. Makdisi complained that "what few people in Lebanon seem to
realize is that Solidere is not going to rebuild the downtown area: it is going to oversee
[emphasis added] the rebuilding of the downtown area." Solidere undertook research and
consulting on its own in order to establish a "defacto plan." The government seemed to
29Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997
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have withdrawn all stakes from the process leaving decision making power in the hands
of the Solidere advocates3 0 . In fact, apart from the infrastructure, the company would
limit itself to, at most, about a third of the construction of actual buildings. Solidere
ultimately had four main principal functions; to supervise the execution of the government-
authorized reconstruction plan; to finance and rebuild the infrastructure; to rehabilitate
certain buildings and structures and the development of the rest of the real estate; and to
manage and sell these properties, buildings, and other facilities.
Makdisi in his work on Solidere observed:
What Solidere and Harirism seem to represent is precisely the withering away
of the state, whatever one might have called a public sphere or civil society, and
their final and decisive colonization by capital. And perhaps it is for this reason
that the company avoids any discussion of Lebanese national identity except in
terms of visual pastiche.
Confusion of Public-Private Interests
In Les Cahiers de l'Orient, the urban sociologist Nabil Beyhum argued that the Solidere
project represented the embodiment of the "confusion" of public and private interests sym-
bolized by the arrival in power of Hariri and his cabinet3 l. Hariri had in effect, through
Solidere, created a "colonization of the public by private interests."
Property owners like Constantine Doumani complained that, the government seemed to
be catering to the company's needs by granting it excessive leniency. Even more upsetting
to Solidere opponents was that the government, in its haste to ensure the creation of the
firm, gave only very vague outlines as to the purpose and responsibility of the company.
For instance the law noted that the REHCO was obliged to dedicate a certain percentage
of its total revenue collected from share subscriptions to the rehabilitation of the center.
This mandate was also noted in the company's bylaws. However, neither the law nor the
bylaws specified was how big this percentage should be. So one could potentially imagine
a situation whereby the company was granted expropriation rights, and acquired the land,
and then proceeded to spend absolutely nothing (i.e. zero percent) on the rehabilitation of
the center and still be within its legal rights.
30Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi, July 2003
31Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992.
103
Duality in the City Center
While the Solidere booklets emphasized the former class mixture of the city center and
promised to restore the diversity by incorporating mixed-income residential developments
into the overall project, Beyhum suggested that what is far more likely to happen is the
appearance of a dual city in Beirut, with the boundary lines of the Solidere project marking
the limit:
The duality between the city center and the rest of the capital will be rein-
forced in the minds of ordinary people because images of luxury will continue to
bombard the popular imagination in surrounding quarters. The inauguration of
the first buildings will increase the signs of uncontrolled wealth that are insult-
ing to the rest of the population. The logic of this real estate promotion will
dominate one area of the city, while deterioration will probably become more
strongly felt in other areas.
The entire Lebanese reconstruction project, headed by Solidere, had been focused and
discussed in the "narrowest possible terms" so that the rest of Beirut and Lebanon seemed
to "fade away and become vague externalities to the plan" to rebuild the city center. At a
meeting held by the property owners last August, one owner claimed that in "its arrogance,"
Solidere felt it could "cover over the rest of the city" with its BCD project. In fact, one of
Solidere's logos is simply the word Beirut in Arabic, as though the "company's fiefdom" is
representative of the rest of the city to the point of excluding it. See Figure 6-4, page 105.
In Beirut, as Beyhum, Sarkis and other point out, there were fears that a new city
center would spring up in a few years that would have "little to do with surrounding areas
of the city or even the rest of the country." In fact, there would, according to critics of the
Solidere plan, be many more dividing lines - and not just between east and west Beirut, but
between the new Central District and the surrounding areas of the city. One such example
was the old Martyrs' Square, which once served to bring the rest of the city together, but
was to be effectively supplanted by a wide "boulevard" running a twelve-hundred meters or
so from Fouad Chehab Avenue to the port.
Through its exclusionary nature, the entire project threatened to become a "massive
white elephant" like the Canary Wharf urban development scheme in the London Dock-
lands3 . Castells argues that the duality of the city can "be seen as the urban expression of
3 2Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
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Figure 6-4: A Solidere Logo - The Arabic Text for "Beirut"
the process of increasing differentiation of labor in two equally dynamic sectors within the
growing economy: the information-based formal economy, and the downgraded labor-based
informal economy." So that, as he says, "the dual city opposes, in traditional sociologi-
cal terms, the cosmopolitanism of the new informational producers to the localism of the
segmented sectors of restructured labor" 33. This means, as Castell suggests, that there
is an ever-proliferating distinction between the global "space of flows" and more locally
understood senses of place.
The "sense of place" that Beirut once possessed, and Solidere endeavored to preserve
with the reconstruction of an "ancient city for the future" was actually threatening to turn
the city center into an "island of rich."
In Beirut, a group of intellectuals made their voices clearly heard arguing that the social
and economic mixture that was prevalent in the BCD before the war would be replaced by,
"a homogeneous group of high income locals, yuppies, tourists and well-off expatriates" 34.
Very clearly in the Dar al-Handasah scheme, the middle-class and mercantile society of the
pre-war BCD would be replaced "and suppressed" by a new "financial class and by the
"35
upper service sector of the economy"
Losing Architectural Heritage
As Solidere rebuilt the center the preservation of the architectural heritage of Beirut became
doubtful since many of the buildings, according to its plans would have to be destroyed
33 Manuel Castells. The Rise of the Network Society. Blackwell. 2000. pp. 225-227
3 4 Oussama Kabbani. The Reconstruction of Beirut. Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, 1992.
3 5Samir Khalaf. Beirut Reclaimed. Dar An-Nahar, Beirut, 1993.
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and rebuilt (especially in the Bab Idriss area where a 34,000 underground car garage was
planned).
With the old fabric of the Beirut Central District devastated (80% wiped out), it is
difficult to understand how identity can be restored. As psychologist Eric Erikson observed,
"when the landscape goes, it destroys the past for those who are left: people have no sense
of belonging anywhere." Samir Khalaf also noted that people "lose the sense of control over
their lives, their freedom and independence, their mooring to place and locality and, more
damaging, a sense of who they are."
A Weak Government
Constantine Doumani, one of the original property owners, insisted that Solidere's existence
was what began the era of corruption and weakening of the state. The company certainly
added to the confusion of the rights and responsibilities between the public and private
sector.
The CDR was accused in late 1999 by Mohammed Moghrabi of paying more than LL5
billion in "bribes" on Solidere's behalf to judges who assessed the value of the city center
property. At a news conference at the Alexandre Hotel in Achrafieh, Moghrabi announced,
"none of these illegal payments, which squandered public money, were listed in CDR's
budget. This means that they were not legitimate payments"3 6 . The bribes were never
a subject of investigation by the Hariri administration. After Salim Hoss' government
assumed power in December 1998, the CDR filed a lawsuit against Solidere for failing
to reimburse the government for payments to the judges. Seven committees headed by
judges had accepted payments, each receiving between U.S. $350,000 between 1993 and
1997 according to Moghrabi (a sum many times over larger than judges' salaries which is
at a mere $500 a month.) The committees, accused property owners, actually went so far
as to "prepare forged inspection reports"3 7 .
The lawsuit filed by CDR's lawyer, Antoine Qilmos, who also heads Lebanon's Bar
Association, petitioned Beirut's lower court, which handles financial lawsuits, for an order
forcing Solidere to pay the CDR over LL5 billion plus interest which had been accruing since
1993. However, explained Moghrabi, the illegal payments to judges continued until January
36 "Angry Property Owners Accuse Solidere of Bribing Judges, Zayan Khalil," Daily Star October 15th
1999
3 7Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi, July 2003
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1999 when Nabil Jisr, former CDR president left office. Moghrabi continued, "this CDR
lawsuit verified the suspicions of many lawyers who doubted the integrity of judges who
handled cases against Solidere. In all of them Solidere either won quickly, or the cases were
postponed indefinitely." Moghrabi called upon CDR's new president Mahmoud Othman
to publish a list detailing the payments to judges and other members of the Appraisal
Committees. He pointed out that from 1997 to December 1999 remained a two year period
which the CDR did not request compensation for in the lawsuit 3 8.
Eventually, as the lawsuits progressed, the Chief of Court, Iskandar Fayyad, who was
among the judges that received money, and whose rulings were all in the favor of Solidere,
disqualified himself, as the issue was publicized and discussed in the media. Shaking his
head as he remembers the events, Moghrabi commented, "it was like a scene in an Al
Capone movie." The Solidere project had, he and others believed, "planted the seed of
corruption in the Lebanese judicial system" 3 9 .
6.5 Compensation
The first aspect of a legal expropriation of lands was, as mentioned, that the expropriation
only be allowed when necessary for furthering the "public interest." The second part was
that the property right holders, or the original owners, be compensated fairly, and at market
rates, either in cash or equivalent land for their sacrifice.
For as Article No. 15 in the Lebanese constitution explains, expropriation of land is
only acceptable when it is done to fulfill the public interest and the original owners are
reimbursed fairly. The public interest should be determined under a legal context that
preserves the rights of all parties involved in the venture. "The crime of Solidere" 40 was
that according to the Article No. 63 of its by-laws, the Board of Founders was liable for
setting the criteria under which land is judged appropriate for expropriation or not, a power
traditionally limited to public institutions.
Solidere, in its domain over the city center, actually expropriated both private and public
lands, both of which have separate ramifications and will be examined here.
38Moghrabi was recently jailed for denouncing the judicial system in Lebanon
3 9 Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi, July 2003
4 0 Opposition pamphlet
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Private-Private Compensation
The most significant deviation away from what one would consider a "normal" case of
eminent domain, apart from the expropriator being from the private, not public sector,
was that the compensation, instead of being given in its traditional cash form, was instead
distributed as shares in the company.
The distribution of these shares, gave rise to angry feelings. Despite the fact that
Solidere claimed shares were issued before land was expropriated this did little to mollify
the angry feelings felt by the original property rights holders. Over and over in interviews
with the original property right holders, they explained that while the shares were issued by
the firm, in order to receive them they were required to sign a waiver form, giving up any
claims to their property. More importantly however, the shares were "issued" (i.e. their
overall value decided upon) though not distributed well before any of the disputes over the
land, whether in the Appraisal Committee or otherwise, were settled.
Solidere's use of shares rather than cash for the property was not unfounded. The
rationale for offering shares was three-fold:
1. The company intended to offer a form of compensation that would vary with the
market, so that as land prices improved the compensation that landowners received
would also improve. Even if property was undervalued initially, the company argued,
repayment by shares meant that the compensation offered would eventually match
the "true value" of the property.
2. Solidere had little cash available, and compensation through shares was a logistical
necessity.
3. Offering shares was an easy way to dissolve the complex relationship between owners
and renters that continues to cloud the development potential of plots all over the
city.
Since one of the common controversies surrounding expropriation is what price the
property right holders should receive for the land, the current market value price, or the
price of land after the improvements (say a road) have been added, the idea of shares may,
at a first glance, seem like a good one. By giving over variable shares to the landowners,
the problem of pricing is taken care of. The Solidere lawyers pointed out, when arguing
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the case before the judicial tribunals that not only would this variability constitute a fair
method of pricing, they also had precedent.
To begin, Solidere argued that nowhere in the Lebanese constitution does it say that
the compensation for expropriating lands had to be in cash. The REHCO felt perfectly
justified in offering compensation in the form of company stock as a liquid comparison. The
opposition was quick to point out that two main differences between cash and stocks did,
however, remain. Shares are not fixed values, they are variable, and to a large extent,
their worth depends on factors specific to the firm itself.
The precedent for this form of compensation was a case taken from France 42 where
the French government offered bonds with floating rates instead of cash compensation. Le
Conceil d'Etat approved this decision in the case of the nationalization of certain firms
but indicated the necessity of a fixed form of compensation in most cases. The analogy
that Solidere's lawyers drew between the two cases was not well received by the opposition
lawyers. In the French example, government bonds were offered as collateral against shares
issued by nationalized firms. There was no such collateral offered by the Lebanese govern-
ment on behalf of Solidere, and even when share prices fell, no alternative compensation
for the property owners existed.
Secondly, the opposition teams argued, France was stable and government bonds were
very unlikely to default; post-war Lebanon was incomparable.
Also taken as an example by Solidere was the Lebanese government's "consolidation
and dividing" form of rehabilitation, where it was not abnormal to give a property owner
another piece of property, or another building in exchange for the one expropriated. The
use of this example as an adequate response to the landowners decry of the "non-cash"
method of compensation was described by Mohammed Moghrabi as "laughable."
For one, the compensation by land, or alternative building was fixed, whereas compen-
sation by shares was variable. Secondly, and more importantly, cash or land payments
were autonomous, meaning that after the compensation there was no further involvement
required from the property owner. In the case of shares, in order to maximize the potential
compensation and protect their investment, stockholders would have to attend meetings
and vote on company policy.
4 1 Interview with Mohammed Moghrabi, July 2003
4 2 This is an acceptable practice in Lebanese courts since the law and constitution is derived from the
French code.
109
Variability in Compensation
As previously described, Solidere consisted of two types of shares identical in voting and
transfer rights, differing only in their relative weighage. The property owners were given
Type A shares, which were mandated by law to form at least 50% of the company. Type B
shares were given to the cash investors.
Perhaps the easiest way to analyze the compensation provided is to follow the process
of what happened when a property owner received a notice of expropriation. Mr. and Mrs.
Omar Daouk were large property owners in the city center district. While vacationing in the
South-of-France one summer, the couple received a call from their lawyer; your properties
in the "madinah" are being destroyed! Upon returning to Beirut the couple soon realized
that many of their buildings had already been condemned and demolished. Only a week
later the couple was in hospital; Omar Daouk had suffered a heart attack. The Daouks
were told that they would be compensated for the price of their land, after the Appraisal
Committee had passed judgment on the amount, and that the compensation would be in
the form of shares in the firm, rather than cash.
The REHCO provided two Appraisal Committees. One to do the initial valuations, and
the second to hear complaints and objections about the first. Property owners were not
granted the opportunity to object to the expropriation through normal judiciary channels.
The methods of appraisal used by the Committees were not divulged to the public. Not
only were these committees handpicked by Solidere (both the initial and appeal committees)
but also, it was in the company's self interest to undervalue the land. The firm only had to
raise the cash equivalent of the appraised land value. So, considering that the subscription
period could only last for six months, and there were doubts that the firm would find a
sufficient number of investors. Having a lower appraisal value was in the firm's own benefit.
The Appraisal Committees were criticized for being granted what some considered sacred
judicial rights. This absolute power, was something the firm's critics were sure it would
exploit. It was rumored in newspapers, and declared fact in property holder meetings,
that the Committees manufactured minutes of meetings, purported surveys and claimed
inspections of the sites that never took place. Mrs. Daouk pointed out that not only did
many property owners feel that this was a violation of their constitutional rights, but also it
seemed a denial of due process, since the decisions of Solidere Appraisal Committees could
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not be appealed.
The sum provided by the Appraisal Committees was of course nowhere near the value
the Daouks had in mind (and in fact totaled only 5% of actual market-value that their
independent appraisal had arrived at)43 . In addition to this, the couple would only be
compensated in the form of shares. They would only receive the shares after signing a
waiver that they agreed to the company's existence and purpose, and would not seek further
compensation for the expropriated lands. To many poorer landowners, explained Rayaa
Daouk, this policy was "rather coercive." Many of these property holders needed the
funding that the company provided, after their source of income, possibly in the form of
rent 44 , had been cut-off. Poorer property right holders could not afford to enter into the
long legal battle presented, and anyway, said Mrs. Daouk, "they would not be heard in the
regular court's anyway. Solidere's Higher Appraisal Committees had a monopoly over any
appeals" 4 5
The Daouks however, were "familiar with the games common to Lebanese politics."
They worked hard towards opposing what they and others viewed as an undemocratic and
unfair process. Omar Daouk weakened by the stress, suffered successive heart attacks, and
unfortunately passed away less than a year into the battle. His very capable wife Rayaa
Daouk took over. To this day she has refused to receive compensation for the land in the
form of shares. "There's no point," she argues, "not only am I opposed to receiving shares
in compensation on principle, but also, today there would be absolutely no point."
The risk and delay associated with shares, meant that Type A shareholders were unsure
of when they would receive a reasonable payoff for their property and what magnitude it
would be. To this end, argued the property owners, the compensation was unfair because
so much of a firm's success depended on conditions outside of the shareholders' sphere of
influence, like the macroeconomic situation and the business cycle.
Certainly, from the issuance price of $1046, the shares continued to drop in value. In
4 3Interview with Rayaa Daouk, July 2003
44Renters had been paying rent consistently throughout the war as not to give up their renter rights; and
so the rent protection guaranteed to them by law
45Interview with Rayaa Daouk, July 2003
"Though the initial stock issuance price was $100, it is to be interpreted as $10 for practical purposes, as
in 1996 Solidere split share value from $100 to $10. The General Assembly of Solidere, which convened on
June 29, in both ordinary and extraordinary sessions, decided, upon a suggestion by the company's Board of
Directors, to amend the article which deals with the par value of the shares to split the value. It also decided
to amend the article that refers to the legal quorum requirements on a third call for a meeting so that the
quorum is automatically established by those present, given that quorum had still not been achieved by the
December 1994 in the heat of investment optimism after the start of the firm, shares had
appreciated in value by about 50%, they have since decreased in value significantly. See
Figure 6-5. By 2003, the shares had reached a low of about U.S. $4.16 for Type A shares,
and U.S. $4.93 for Type B shares from an initial value of $10.
12
101-
B-
6-
195 190 1907 198 199 2000 2001 2002
Yea
Figure 6-5: Solidere's Stock Prices
At this low point when shares were being offered and met with no interest, fifty-six
landlords and tenants in the old city attempted to sue Solidere and Hariri before the Com-
mercial Tribunal of Beirut. These property holders sought a judgment declaring Solidere
legally non-existent due to irreparable violations in the process of its incorporation. As part
of their complaint, the group criticized the reimbursement procedures. They argued that by
compensating shareholders with stock, the government (through Solidere) was forcing the
landowners into a business arrangement, a circumstance that both secular and Islamic law
condemn. The action also sought a declaration that the transfer of rights from the tenants
and landlords be declared null and void. The action received no response and remained
unresolved.
third meeting when deciding on the issue of splitting the shares.
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Not Simply Financial Compensation
The compensation provided by Solidere was also not strictly financial. Part of the compen-
sation was monetary in the form of stock, however being a shareholder in Solidere meant
participation in the running of the company. Shareholders had voting privileges and could
decide on how the firm was run. In other words, the property owners still held partial own-
ership of their original property, but were obliged to participate in the firm's shareholder
meetings to realize this control. This control was also diluted since any one shareholder did
not have exclusive voting power. Moreover, under Commercial Law, even shareholders do
not have access to the firm's most private information, and that is due to security reasons.
This meant that the BCD property owner would be dragged into a risky business venture
he might have been apprehensive towards.
Moreover, there was considerable risk associated with the Soldiere stock. The Lebanese
stock-exchange had still not reopened after the war, and shares were being traded through
a company run exchange. This might undermine the commercial value of these shares.
Non-Property Holders Get Compensated Too
The property right holders argued that since there were cash investors in the firm that also
received shares, it was not the case that the entire benefit of the increase in value (after the
rehabilitation of infrastructure in the center) went towards the original property owners. In
fact, in almost a 1:1 ratio, the Type B cash shareholders were compensated just as much
as the Type A property shareholders. Since the added value of the reconstruction would
be split amongst all shareholders, an increase in the price of the stock actually meant that
there would be a shift in wealth away from the original property owners.
Public-Private Compensation
Within the guidelines of the Solidere project, there was also a transfer of public land to the
private firm. The government gave up its right to 25% of the land, buildings and taxes for
the next ten years. In exchange, Solidere took over responsibility for the rehabilitation of
the infrastructure at the expense of the government to be paid for by the treasury, or to be
exchanged for reclaimed lands in the Central District.
The only stipulation on the expropriated lands was that the absolute area of public
land such as streets, roads, and buildings be maintained. What is interesting is that each
of the Lebanese laws, including Article No. 15 of the constitution, that deals with these
matters, stipulates that the monetary value of the public lands be identical when such an
agreement is made, not that the physical size be preserved. The percentage commitment
required of Solidere did not mention the characteristics of the new public lands. President
Frangois Mitterand noted, "the government has not the right to sell a fraction of the national
patrimony for less than what it is worth," but under this arrangement, Solidere could
potentially return much lower valued land to the government.
Solidere was exempted from tax payments for a period of ten years. All profits made
by shareholders from capital or dividend gain were also tax-free for that period. Critics of
these exemptions have wondered why, when the Lebanese government was in such desperate
need of revenues and support, it would allow for the establishment of a firm that would
not pay taxes, causing an overall loss of revenue of, as estimated by George Corm at U.S.
$0.5-1 billion per year. Reading the story through an economic context, this is of course
not shocking. It is important to remember that since the company was a private initiative,
and the venture at the very least needed to provide an economic profit that outweighed its
opportunity cost in order to be attentive to investors.
Clause 3, Item 7 of the "Rights and Obligations" section of the law stated that Solidere
was obligated to finance and construct the roads and public squares and parks as approved
by the Master Plan for the benefit and at the expense of the government, based on a contract
between the company and the CDR. Paragraph 4 stated that "the Real Estate Company is
obliged to finance and construct, for the benefit and at the expense of the government, all
infrastructure including water, sewer and electrical installations, sidewalks, street lighting,
parking, telecommunication and other public utilities in the planned areas." So far, it
looked like Solidere was simply acting as an "infrastructure contractor" to the government,
a legally binding role in terms of reimbursement, which as specified in Paragraph 5 of the
law, were either cash payments or ownership of reclaimed land. This "turnkey" operation
47made some parties "uneasy" as there was no maximum price that both parties agreed on .
The government was given a passive role and obliged to reimburse the full cost of the works
as described by Solidere, unable to influence whatever price the company specified.
4 7Nabil Beyhum. Imar Beirut wal-Fursah al-Dhaiah [The Reconstruction of Beirut and the Lost Oppor-
tunity]. Rami al-Khal, Beirut, 1992.
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Why Didn't The Property Owners Succeed in Their Argu-
ments?
It seemed that the property owners, based on the legality of their arguments, and their
lawyers' advice, stood a decent chance against the company in court. However, they won
very few victories. Why was this the case?
The expropriated owners and tenants in the city center had indeed formed the most
motivated group of critics and protagonists. Their number totaled about 120,000, and
although not all of the expropriated owners opposed the Solidere project, many did band
together in a larger organization called the "Beirut Commercial District Property Right-
Owners Association." Apart from the categoric rejection of the reconstruction project, the
main goal of this organization was the retraction of the expropriations or at least securing
an improvement to the inadequate compensation.
But the attempts of these expropriated groups to fight the project in the courts failed.
Their success in influencing public opinion was also rather limited as the committees found it
hard to work, with their limited budgets, against the financially well-off real estate company
and its much larger and better staffed public relations department.
Meetings, demonstrations, leaflet campaigns, discussions with political and religious
leaders as well as press conferences were organized. However, the committees of the ex-
propriated people could only mobilize a small fraction of the total number of owners and
tenants on the city center so that their public actions failed to take the masses to the streets.
In the end, the committees of the expropriated right holders were defeated by the superior
strategies of Solidere. Despite all their activities and the ongoing bi-weekly meetings to
discuss options and campaigns, the firm remained politically distinguished. In addition to
media campaigning, and the "divide and conquer" strategy, Solidere's "embedding strategy"
was especially effective.
Some of the tenants were successfully "bought out" from the committees, with the
result that some committees dissolved completely. Some spokesmen of the committees were
threatened, for example, with an investigation for suspected tax evasion. Single committee
members no longer spoke out publicly against the reconstruction project. In addition,
Solidere staged the foundation of a counter-committee of former owners and tenants, which
had close links to Solidere. Maher Daouk, the cousin of Omar Daouk - the president of the
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opposition committee of expropriated people - was the heavily symbolic chairman of this
counter-committee and later a member of Solidere's Board of Directors.
Many of the court proceedings initiated by the opposition committees were either im-
mediately refused or delayed for years. Hariri was also accused of bribery and of using a
strong influence on the special courts which were set up for Solidere matters. The validity
of the reproaches became apparent when, after the change of government in 1998, some of
the frozen proceedings were suddenly reopened.
Until 1998, Hariri was able to take, directly or indirectly, all the important decisions
regarding the reconstruction of Beirut's city center. With the implementation of the Master
Plan, the process of reconstruction through the REHCO became almost irreversible. More-
over, in the struggle between the images of future-Beirut put forth by each side, the vision
of a "Hong Kong of the Mediterranean" still had the upper hand.
While Hariri was successful in employing certain strategies in the BCD project, when
used in the context of religious land in the city center, though successful in the city center,
the tactics left behind extremely embittered constituents, that would come back to haunt
him in future projects.
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Chapter 7
Islamic Property Rights
The Civil War in Beirut was primarily a religious one. The city was split along the Green
Line. East-Beirut was the stronghold for Christians, and West-Beirut for Muslims. The
post-war government was setup with the reduction of the religious tensions in mind. Until
1990 the seats in Parliament were divided on a six-to-five ratio of Christians to Muslims.
In the new government the ratio was changed to one-to-one. The end-of-war pact also
allocated public offices along religious lines, with the top three positions in the ruling troika
distributed as follows:
o the President is a Maronite Christian;
o the Prime Minister is a Sunni Muslim, and
o the President of the National Assembly is a Shi'a Muslim
Religious tensions were still high after the war. Each group fought to ensure that their
rights were preserved and their needs attended to when it came to the rebuilding process.
As the keystone project for the post-war government, all eyes turned to the Beirut Central
District. As the first main reconstruction initiative, it would set the precedent for the
redevelopment process and government involvement with private property owners.
Islamic law is distinct from secular law when it comes to dealing with property rights
issues. The Solidere project not only had to contend with the property rights dissatisfactions
of private secular owners, it also faced opposition from those wishing to uphold religious law
which protected property in the center. More specifically, many of the opposition leaders
claimed that the Solidere project was a serious violation of the Islamic Waqf. The absence
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of what the Islamic community felt was their rightful due process left lasting effects. The
trust they had for their government was compromised1 . Many Sunni Muslims, said one of
the life-long Beirut residents I interviewed in the city center, felt, "betrayed by Hariri," he
was supposed to be, "our guy," but, "didn't stand up for us"2 .
7.1 The Concept of Waqf
The use of REHCOs in large urban projects always requires some form of preparation at
the legislative level. While this may not necessarily (though it was in the case of Beirut)
be in the form of new laws or decrees, whatever changes made do influence the way land
tenure and development are managed. Property laws in the Middle East are derived from
Ottoman legislation. There are distinctions between mulk or private property, miri or public
property, musha or unclaimed land, and waqf or religious property, which the ratification
of a real estate company would affect.
There are two kinds of waqf, public and private. The difference is mainly a managerial
one. The public waqfs are managed by a public institution, whereas private waqfs are mainly
governed by a committee representing the beneficiary.
Waqf is not the ownership of land, but rather a trust. If the land is being used towards
the public interest, and it is classified as waqf, then its function and value are preserved.
This public interest is not limited to public institutions. Land that is self-declared as waqf
by private entities, even if profit-generating, is still acceptable and protected under this
ideal. In other words, a waqf is a special type of property defined in Islamic Jurisprudence
as, "maintaining the original property and liquidating the revenues." When a property is
endowed, it is no longer controlled by its owner and he is prevented from disposing of it for
purposes other than those it was originally endowed for.
Waqf land is difficult to convert into shares as it cannot be sold and can only be trans-
ferred if the shari'a (or Islamic law) approves. When invoked, the Waqf trust prohibits the
transfer of ownership and the use of the land without the owner's expressed permission if
the land is private, or the Mosque's consent if the land is public. By allowing a private
company to appropriate land from the center without first reaching a compromise with the
'Interview with Abdel-Rahman Solh, July 2003
2Interview June 30th, Beirut
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waqf, the Lebanese government was recklessly violating a sacred law3
In response to this, Hizbullah4 , the Lebanese Shiite resistance movement, issued a fatwa
following complaints by the Central District landowners who were being forced to sell prop-
erties to Solidere, denouncing the project.
7.2 Waqf and the City Center
Law holds a sacred spot in Islamic philosophy, "law is not conceived as separate from
other social institutions in the Middle East, but as intertwined with the affairs of everyday
life" 5. Due to the relevance of Islamic law within the city center, the idea of Waqf rose
in importance as Solidere announced its plans. The center was well endowed it was with
religious land preserved by the Mosque, as well as private lands protected by waqf. In the
Central District Master Plan, waqfs were not incorporated into the stock but were assigned
a transitory status. See Figure 7-1.
Figure 7-1: Religious Institutes Beirut Central District
Much like it dealt with the opposition of the financiers on "Bank Street," Solidere
generally gained the favor of the public religious institutes such as Mosques by preserving
their right to waqf or, with their consent, relocating them to an acceptable position.
The private waqfs however, suffered as they were neither acknowledged nor upheld by
the firm. And, it was this disregard for the sacredness of the religious trust, that spurned
the heated debate and controversy that was to plague Hariri as he tried to implement new
3Hizbulah newspaper interview in Al-Nahhar, August 1992
4Hizbullah translated into English literally means "Party of God"
5 Muhammad Mundhir Qahf, al-Waqf al-Islami : tatawwuruh, idaratuh, tanmiyatuh. Dar Al-Fikr. 2000.
p. 2
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reconstruction projects around Beirut.
As explained above, a private waqf is as serious and legitimate as a public waqf. By
trading off preservation of the public waqfs with the religious institutes, i.e. Mosques in
the city center, Solidere was able to detract attention away from its undermining of private
Islamic rights. The large religious institutes (in the form of Mosques), relieved to have won
the battle to preserve their land at all, backed Solidere in exchange for their exemptions.
This violation of Islamic property rights was silently protested but nonetheless accepted
by the 750,000 Muslims in the capital6 . However, the anger with the violation was re-
membered and became much more vocal, especially by the more outspoken Islamic groups,
as would become very apparent in the implementation of the Elyssar project in Southern
Beirut.
7.3 The Elyssar Project
Robert Saliba, a Lebanese planner and historian, observed, in a lecture he gave on Middle
Eastern planning in Amman, that generally it has been very difficult to successfully imple-
ment planning models in Beirut. To Saliba, there has been a profound reluctance among
Beirutis to accept planning models in the different periods of the city's modern history.
This has resulted in a situation of "planning chaos" in Lebanon7.
This phenomenon becomes even more apparent when we take into account the lack of
respect given to religious law in the implementation of Solidere, and the limited extent to
which democratic participation was included in the project. This BCD situation increased
mistrust of the government and anxiety amongst stakeholders. People stopped believing in
the credibility of the democratic process, and started moving towards a more violent and
resistant approach in the form of "guns rather than dialogue," as becomes apparent in the
Elyssar Project 8 .
The Elyssar Project was an initiative in Southern Beirut, where an area was specified to
be redeveloped through a private REHCO in a similar fashion to the city center. "Southern
Suburb" is a direct translation of Dahiya Janubiyya which, since the early 1980s, has been
6The total population of the capital is 1.5 million, Solh interview
7Robert Saliba speaking at Darat al-Funun, Amman on April 19, 2000.
8 Mona Harb "Transforming the Site of Dereliction into the Urban Culture of Modernity: Beirut's south-
ern Suburb and Elyssar Project" in Hashim Sarkis and Peter Rowe. Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the
Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City. Prestel, New York, 1998.
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the Arabic designation for the area.
Saliba described the Solidere project in Beirut's Central District as an example of, "Cor-
porate Planning;" where one real estate company was fully responsible for rehabilitation
and redevelopment works. Looking at the Elyssar project, however, Saliba labels it as an
example of "radical planning," though it was originally destined to the same fate as the city
center, with a private company (headed by Hariri) ready to come in and rebuild the area.
So what happened and how does it compare to the Solidere example?
Essentially it seems as if the lesson taught by the disregard of waqf in the city center,
especially for Sunni Muslims, were that conventional methods of appealing against injustice
through the judicial or legislative system was not an effective way of preserving "democratic
rights" in Lebanon9 . Rather "non-democratic" means, or more violent methods outside of
the system were the more effective tool as revealed by Elyssar.
The Elyssar Project was a plan designed by Hariri for the southern outskirts of the
capital in what was known as the "city's most degraded urban fabric" 10. The area has
been settled by squatters since 1958 and inflated with refugees during the sixteen year
Civil War. It was largely due to Rafiq Hariri's public image as "someone obsessively and
exclusively interested in the rehabilitation of downtown Beirut""1 that the Elyssar Project
was launched in 1992. The legal framework for the Elyssar project sprung from the same
legislation established in 1991 for the BCD. The project was conceived as an infrastructure
rehabilitation work and by 1994 had evolved into a real estate company legitimized by the
same law which established Solidere1 2
The southern suburb was also known as being "Hizbullah's suburb" where "poor Shi'ites"
lived. Beirut's Southern suburb was a "space that several players want[ed] to control, each
working more or less autonomously from the public sphere," each also having their own
strategy, and ideology (whether religious or social), as well as constituency. Working in the
fields of education, culture, social services and sanitation, the area was dominated by the
9Mona Harb "Transforming the Site of Dereliction into the Urban Culture of Modernity: Beirut's south-
ern Suburb and Elyssar Project" in Hashim Sarkis and Peter Rowe. Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the
Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City. Prestel, New York, 1998.
10 Robert Saliba speaking at Darat al-Funun, Amman on April 19, 2000.
"Mona Harb "Transforming the Site of Dereliction into the Urban Culture of Modernity: Beirut's south-
ern Suburb and Elyssar Project" in Hashim Sarkis and Peter Rowe. Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the
Construction andReconstruction of a Modern City. Prestel, New York, 1998.
"Incidentally, the name "Elyssar" is borrowed from the story of the Phoenician Queen Elyssar who
escaped Tyre to found the city of Carthage. However, during a discussion of the project amongst Shi'ite
leaders Nabih Berri (Amal's leader, and also Parliamentary speaker of the House) said, "Elysar is from Tyre
not from Sidon," alluding to the fact that he is from Tyre while Rafiq Hariri is originally from Sidon.
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two main Islamic parties. The first was Hizbullah, and the second is Amal, another political
and paramilitary organization.
Because of this territorial setup, attempts to handle its renovation though a foreign
and imposed entity were met with "diehard opposition" by the residents of the area, who
objected to the method of development through privatization and land expropriation. Amal
and Hizbullah immediately challenged and contested its formation as a private company.
After the project was suggested in official circles as one that would help, "the valuable
property adjacent to the southern seashore of Beirut.. .realize its full development potential,"
there was an immediate outcry from the community that characterized the project as being
a form of "coastal cleansing" involving the "forcible demolition of illegal settlements to
make room for different users and social groups"is
Having witnessed the situation in the Beirut Central District, where landowners' rights
were bypassed as the larger project trudged on, the parties in the southern suburb were
skeptical. Fadallah, the "spiritual mentor for Lebanon's Shi'ites" had issued a decree fol-
lowing complaints from Beirut landowners that they were being forced to sell properties to
Solidere. Even if the landowners refused to participate, they claimed, they lost their land
and got nothing. Hizbullah had also issued a fatwa denouncing the project. This fatwa
discussed the waqf issue as well as reiterating that, under Islamic law, commercial dealings
must satisfy both the buyer and the seller.
The Central District project had taught the Islamic parties however, that negotiation
and reliance on straight dialogue was ineffective. The Mosques had "sold out" their con-
stituents in the negotiations in return for the preservation of their own land.
In the face of "impending expropriation" it became the main interest of Christian and
Muslim foundations to maintain a "symbolic representation of their religion in the city
center of Beirut, in addition to the Mosques and Church buildings"' 4 . From an economic
perspective the religious foundations were interested in maintaining the highest rental in-
comes possible of their properties, which in the past had gone towards supporting charitable
institutions. As a result of inflation during the war however, it became in these groups' best
interest to terminate the lease agreements. Because of their potential power (having strong
13 Mona Harb Transforming the Site of Dereliction into the Urban Culture of Modernity: Beirut s south-
ern Suburb and Elyssar Project in Hashim Sarkis and Peter Rowe. Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the
Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City. Prestel, New York, 1998.
14H. Schmid. The Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in the Context of Political Geography. Arab World
Geographer, 5 Spring(4):232-248, 2002.
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socio-economic support from their constituencies) these religious groups could not be easily
ignored during reconstruction. Some of the land owned by these foundations was considered,
at least for the Muslims, to be inalienable, protected by waqf. During reconstruction of the
BCD, the scattered and fragmented estates of the awqaf presented a huge obstacle. Instead
of expropriating the Islamic Awqaf, a "reallocation of land"15 was carried out, whereby the
smaller plots owned by the Mosque were combined. By agreeing to congregate lands (and
so secure higher rents) for these religious institutions, Solidere effectively bought off their
support.
The Mosques did not corroborate Hizbullah's fatwa, and they remained silent when
private lands were expropriated. When it came to these private rights, the government
had completely bypassed the religious indications, and replaced them with secular property
law sensibilities. Religious courts and proceedings were completely circumvented in the
expropriation process, and constituents witnessed the Mosque siding with the firm and
refusing to uphold their Islamic property rights.
Hariri had worked hard to undermine active support for private waqf among respective
religious foundations. Better compensation was offered to religious foundations than regular
landowners. Religious foundations were also offered larger plots of land in compensation
rather than shares. Positions on the company's Board of Directors were also offered to
influential religious leaders. Building contracts were offered to Greek-orthodox or Maronite
families who had strong influences on religious decision-makers in their denomination.
While the Mosques were the ultimate religious authority in the center to be dealt with,
all the Lebanese Islamic groups were witness to this process and issued fatwas denouncing
it. The more militant groups, though with limited power in the Central District, had a lot
more backing in the Southern Suburb. During the Civil War, many Shi'ite refugees from
Southern Lebanon and the eastern parts of Beirut had found accommodation mainly in the
western "Muslim" part. After the ceasefire, more buildings near the demarcation line were
taken over by this group. Supported by the Shi'ite parties, Hizbullah and Amal, this group
was relatively powerful. (Hizbullah at that time was widely popular among both Christians
and Muslims for fighting the Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon).
The problem of refugees was another bargaining chip for Solidere, that gave it a little
5 H. Schmid. The Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in the Context of Political Geography. Arab World
Geographer, 5 Spring(4):232-248, 2002.
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bit of leverage with Hizbullah and Amal as well as the Mosques. If offered compensation,
and alternative accommodations for the refugee families, the parties might be persuaded
to forgive the waqf violation. Solidere's plan forged ahead with the idea that religious land
would be expropriated in the center of Beirut. The refugees were compensated significantly,
so much so that Solidere spent almost half of its cash capital to resolve the problem. While
the official rate for the compensation of refugee families was fixed between U.S. $8,000 and
U.S. $12,000, in the city center it rose as high as U.S. $100,000, as Solidere attempted to
buy off the religious opposition.
When the same project of a REHCO was suggested for the southern suburb, the picture
was different. There was no pressing issue, as the refugees in the center that could be used
as a trade-off. The Southern Suburb residents were witness to Hariri's strategies in the
center, and their result. The residents' response to prevent a similar expropriation of land
was a lot more violent. This idea of "guns not democracy" proved to be effective. Law
No. 246 of 1993 which created the framework for planning the Southern Suburb was soon
rethought.
The ensuing power struggle resulted in some significant modification whereby the com-
pany was transformed into a public establishment with the state, in effect, becoming the
major actor in the reorganization of the project. It was decided that rehabilitation would
be carried out by the owners and residents without the involvement of a third party. The
project would consider legalizing and granting property rights to the many illegal residents
in the area. Amal and Hizbullah gained their own representatives on Elyssar's board. Work
in Elyssar has been going for about three years now, though progressing only slowly due to
factional and intercommunal struggles.
While the Elyssar project did work out to the benefit of the population involved, it
caused religious tensions and violence that would have been better avoided in Lebanon.
Hariri has lost the trust and backing of these religious groups in government projects,
which may have cost him a lot more than just exempting the waqf land from expropriation
initially in the center.
The idea that religious law outside of the traditional secular legal functions could be
ignored was also a dangerous precedent to set in post-war Lebanon, where tensions between
different religious groups still ran high. The notion of secular law taking precedence over
other systems of property rights, whether Islamic law, or tribal law, without adequate
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dialogue between the government and the stakeholders involved, was a dangerous precedent
to set for the REHCO development model. The Solidere model of development, while
foreign to Lebanese values, does not however, exclude the possibility of entertaining open
and democratic discussions between different public and private groups. In the next chapter
we will abstract from Solidere to look at a larger development model, and by doing so we
can analyze the aspects of such firms that either engage or hinder democratic processes,
especially when it comes to balancing the beliefs of each.
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Chapter 8
The Solidere Model of
Development
8.1 Solidere as a REHCO in Beirut
In the case of Beirut, there were three main problem areas to be solved in order to ensure
the reconstruction of the city center. The first related to town planning and architectural
problems. The question was how to redevelop the city center, given the small plot sizes,
and the sporadic distribution of the remaining structures. Coming up with a vision for
the Central District with little to no government administrative capacity to deal with the
problem was difficult.
The second major area of concern was with financial problems. The location and sources
of financing were limited. The high cost of construction and rehabilitation, both of buildings
and of infrastructure placed an unreasonable burden on the government. The landowners
had no sufficient funds to rebuild their properties, and with the rental laws that existed,
there was no private incentive to redevelop. The state also had so many other high priority
projects that it could not allocate the required funds to rebuild the BCD.
The third problem area involved the legal issues that arose during the period of parlia-
mentary debates surrounding redevelopment. The general structure of the reconstruction
project had to be determined and ratified. The ownership of the land was inhibiting re-
development, and so the appropriation-debate emerged, and out of this discussion evolved
the real estate company Solidere, that would appropriate the land and fund the project
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completely.
Solidere's functions can be boiled down into three main activities; financing and ensuring
the execution, operation and management of the infrastructure; real estate development;
and property management.
8.2 Abstracting to a Model
Oussama Kabbani urges us to think of Lebanon's post-war reconstruction as a "process" of
rehabilitating the country and repairing divisions rather than simply rehabilitating infras-
tructure and buildings. Kabbani hoped that the process, would "promote and enhance the
constitutionally guarded principles of democracy and free-market economy as the political
and economic basis of reconstruction."
In Beirut however, the populations affected by the government decision to employ a
private Real Estate Holding Company felt increasingly disenfranchised. Property owners
felt betrayed by their government and courts that "stood silently by as [they] were robbed
blind" 2 . Groups like Hizbullah began to believe that the only way to communicate with the
government to protect themselves was through violence rather than democratic dialogue.
The Lebanese government's insistence that Solidere was a last resort solution, and the
only way that the city center would be rebuilt, was doubted by many. Rayaa Daouk, one of
the original property holders explained that the "subversive actions" of the company were
interpreted as proof that its existence was questionable.
Internationally however, the model was applauded. The international image of Beirut
slowly transformed from a run-down and devastated city, to a modern capital-welcoming
business, with shiny new infrastructure and gleaming office buildings.
The concept of the private REHCO model was "exported" and used in countless other
instances. In Jordan and Riyadh the initiatives were headed by Millennium (Rafiq Hariri's
original company in Saudi Arabia). Because of its widespread use, this model of development
deserves to be explored a little so that we have a framework against which to evaluate the
Beirut project.
The approach towards reconstruction has tended to endorse privatization as its "eco-
'Hashim Sarkis and Peter Rowe. Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of
a Modern City. Prestel, New York, 1998.
2Interview with Rayaa Daouk, July 2003
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nomic engine" and governmental centrality and urban modernization as its "main cata-
lysts" 3 . The history of a privatized approach to development has never been as extreme
as in Lebanon 4 , although the extent of privatization should not be taken to imply that all
REHCO development projects have such limited government intervention.
In the case of Beirut, it was hoped that Solidere would provide an alternative way to
finance and manage the city center reconstruction effort. The project involved negotiations
with the original capital owners and ultimately the company needed to pass a test of public
confidence in order to survive. A weak government made Solidere's ratification process
easier, and Solidere worked hard on a large advertising campaign that seems to have inspired
a good deal of public support. The public sector was so disengaged from the reconstruction
process that even the transfer of infrastructure back under government jurisdiction was held
up as the CDR claimed it was unprepared to deal with the management of these systems.
Solidere to this day retains management of all of the infrastructure.
It seems in the case of Lebanon that the REHCO was needed because the government
lacked the funding to undertake the project, the property was extremely fragmented, and
the area needed to be reshuffled in order to attract investors. (The idea of consolidation
to provide an initial jump start is not unusual. In Japan, for instance, it is common to
have a group of owners organize their assets and redevelop a project as one chunk.) The
matter of how to deal with getting a necessary framework in place to protect the rights
of those involved in the face of a leviathan private firm is an important one to consider.
How do you ensure that the company will not simply be seeking to maximize its profits for
instance? Abstracting from Solidere's history to a development model becomes significant
when thinking of how a similar project structure is being used all over the Middle East.
8.3 The Real Estate Holding Company
Real Estate Holding Companies 5 can be thought of as companies which acquire lands either
through direct purchase from owners or through entering in a partnership with them to
3 "Money for Reconstruction." The Economist, January 15 1994.4Comparable predecessors include the London Docklands and La Defence in Paris, however, both those
projects had significantly larger government involvement, both financial and advisory and were bound by
much stricter laws and held to firmly set measures of success. In both those cases also, the methods of
appropriation were conducted by the government, and the methods of compensation were less questionable.5Based on an article by Ralph Gakenheimer, Omar Razzaz, Hashim Sarkis, Maha Yahya, 1992, Rebuilding
the Residential Sector of Beirut
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develop a certain area. By this process large areas of land are owned by a single party
after historically having been distributed among large numbers of owners. REHCOs are
generally used for large-scale land assembly and redevelopment of large urban localities.
These companies involve various forms of collaboration between the private and public
sectors in terms of funding and management. The public-private partnerships can vary
from an even mix to a fully private initiative, as is the case with Solidere. Some of the
urban renewal ventures in the United States during the fifties and some of the post-war
reconstruction organizations in Europe resemble these companies. In the case of some
urban renewal efforts, the justification has been based on the assumption that private
capital would not find the investment attractive unless the development size and scope was
increased and certain extra benefits were included in the package.
The conditions in which REHCOs are used vary. The reasons for their formation are
numerous and depend on the economic, political and even social status of their host. Most
commonly, the public sector thinks to employ a REHCO when there is a large-scale project
to be completed. In many, but not all, situations, the government is unable to complete
this reconstruction itself due to a lack of financial, political, or administrative capabilities
to carry out its rehabilitation goals. The project may be beyond the government's ability to
complete. In other cases, land-use patterns may be wholly unsatisfactory and parcel sizes
below an accepted minimum required for redevelopment. In these cases companies may be
formed by owners themselves with the intent of overcoming some development obstacles
and with the desire to construct large-scale projects which would not otherwise have been
built due to limited land sizes within the traditional development fabric.
The REHCO requires initial government support to provide it with the legislative frame-
work. This seems only natural since the scale of these developments alone, involving huge
investments and large land areas, may necessitate changes in regulations of property transfer
and rights. Government involvement is also necessary because at times the REHCO can be
so big that it impacts larger economic development in the economy. In the case of Beirut's
Central District, the physical design and the procedure of implementation, set a precedent
in terms of its scale, architecture, public-private sector collaboration, and legal structure.
The impact of the project on the process of reconstruction was bound to be strong given
the number of jobs produced, and the increased activity in the city that it would create.
The ratification calls for substantial effort on the government's part, and so REHCOs
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tend only to be formed when there is serious government support for the project. It also
seems to be the case that the REHCO must constantly have the highest level of governmental
support in order to ensure its smooth operation at all times. When Solidere began losing
out on this support in 1998, with the advent of the Hoss administration, its operations
slowed down and became difficult to handle.
REHCO Adavantages and Disadvantages
Establishing Real Estate Holding Companies has special advantages to those responsible
for development and who hope to facilitate and expedite the development process through
these firms.
The easy assembly of lands is one of the main advantages. The company provides a very
simple mechanism for assembling small parcels which tends to be one of the more serious
obstacles major developers face. Since the development project is so big, and the properties
are owned by a single body, economies of scale alone help encourage development potential.
There is also reason to believe that the large REHCO will provide support for the
national economy by working outside of the direct development framework and providing
services and utilities to the areas which they develop. Within the scenario of initiating a
REHCO, is also the occasion to provide an investment opportunity for former landowners
of the renewed area and for local capital in general.
There are also, some supporters claim, advantages to the owners themselves. Smaller
owners in redevelopment zones may find it difficult, either due to limited area or limited
access, to exploit their properties full potential. REHCOs may provide these owners with
a better chance of investing their financial resources.
However, there are also drawbacks to using REHCOs.
The MIT Report on Rebuilding the Residential Sector of Beirut REHCO warns:
There are a group of passive factors to which we should be attentive when
establishing land development companies. The most important precaution is to
make sure that the formation of such companies does not change, from being a
tool to achieve the development, to be an objective by itself. As such companies
will, then, be considered as one of the major economic powers for the liquidity
they have. Ideas will then be created to utilize such funds to bring profit to the
company by all means possible which eventually will lead to negligence of the
main purposes for which the company has been established.
The formation of Real Estate Holding Companies often aims at realizing developmental
objectives that are difficult to attain by ordinary means. They should never be the objective
themselves (as may be argued was the case in Beirut, where from 1973 active steps were
taken to eliminate all other possible options and establish Solidere as the only viable means
of development), rather they should be thought of as the tool for development. If ever
authorities start thinking about such a company as the objective then that is a clear abuse
of the role of such a firm, and fears of market failure due to monopoly arise. In the case of
Solidere it seems the company actively, by bulldozing the city center initially, set itself up
as the "inevitable solution," in a rather self-fulfilling prophecy mechanism. The government
ultimately, while approving the Solidere plan had no realistic alternative as a backup if the
venture were to fail.
Among the more dangerous aspects of using a REHCO, is the possibility that what one
is actually advocating is the formation of a monopoly, that will take unitary control over a
certain area. The market failures associated with monopolies are ones which the responsible
public authority should take care to avoid.
Especially in the case of a weakened government structure, the REHCO can effectively
hijack the governments objectivity and autonomy. For example, by having Hariri's men
(such as el-Shalaq) in both the private and public faces of the project, a conflict of interest
was created, and the government policing of the project was limited.
The effect on the traditional urban fabric, is also an issue of importance. REHCOs often
find themselves developing sites of "traditional urban fabric." When the properties are
assembled, planning is carried out to be consistent with the "new economic considerations"
which may affect the entire area. Maintaining the "personality of the city"6 requires "a
good understanding of the urban and architectural characteristics" 7 of a zone.
This was especially a concern in Beirut, where it seemed that the company ignored
the characteristics of the center, as a meeting place between different classes and races
in Lebanon, and instead only concerned itself with building a development attractive to
large global corporations. Not only is this concern important in order to preserve the
organic nature of cities, but also to recognize and honor the diversity of different groups.
In the case of Beirut, the original property holders felt that their constitutional rights were
'An idea advocated by Kevin Lynch in the Image of the City
7 Ralph Gakenheimer, Omar Razzaz, Hashim Sarkis, and Maha Yahya. Rebuilding theResidential Sector
of Beirut. Cambridge, 1992.
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undermined by the government because they were neither allowed their "day-in-court" nor
did they feel that the company or the government actually listened to their complaints,
and responded sensitively to them. Even within the firm itself, there was little space for
individual decision making. The original property owners did not have a powerful voice each
being one shareholder amongst thousands. While the structure of a REHCO is considered
to be positive in that it facilitates decision taking, it does, however degrade the value of
individual decisions.
Of course, the new development means upgrading the economic standard of the desig-
nated area. This will, in most cases, lead to higher rents both in commercial spaces and in
housing prices. The composition of inhabitants, stores and offices will be affected and so
depending on the original goals of the development this may or not be a good thing and
maybe exploited by the firms. For instance, in the case of Solidere the effect this would
have on the refugee community gave the firm a powerful bargaining chip.
Although the formation of Real Estate Holding Companies generally requires substantial
government support, there are some serious obstacles that are encountered in their forma-
tion, that deserve further generalization from the case of Beirut, when we are considering
REHCOs as model for development.
The aspect of these companies that initiates the most controversy is the formula used
for the transfer of ownership of lands to the firms -is it ever possible to convince owners that
their compensation in company shares is equivalent to the value of the land? Certainly the
extent to which this becomes an issue can be ascribed to the laws applicable in the country,
8the nature of distribution of properties and personalities of owners
The claim for a company which legitimizes the right to appropriate lands from private
owners is the fact that the firm will be working to further "public interest." Issues such
as the resale of land by the company after the development is completed however, may
contradict the initial conditions of "public interest" under which the rights of appropriation
were granted. Before embarking on such an initiative (as did not occur in the case of Beirut)
a foundation for a rigorous definition of "public interest" including the perceptions of the
original property owners, as well as the general public is necessary.
Especially in Islamic cities, due to the existence of a separate and complete set of
8Ralph Gakenheimer, Omar Razzaz, Hashim Sarkis, and Maha Yahya. Rebuilding the Residential Sector
of Beirut. Cambridge, 1992.
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Islamic laws, it is important that the formation of a REHCO recognize religious shari'a as
a separate significant entity. By refusing to attempt to preserve or uphold the laws of these
institutions, the government and the firm are making a conscious decision to ostracize and
disengage a group from the development process9 . (In this sense an initiative to encourage
research into proposals of new patterns of development more consistent with Islamic shari'a
objectives as well as being "compatible with the modern development requirements" would
be worthwhile.)
It is also important in these cases not to underestimate the significance of psychological
and social obstacles. There is a genuine fear in many developments that the firm has coerced
the government to sell the rights of its citizens. Property owners, as is apparent in the case of
Beirut, feel betrayed by the model. The REHCO Master Plan itself may also be ostracized
and only thought of as an "island for the rich" or an unnatural imposition on an otherwise
organic city. Owning one's land and the ability to make unilateral decisions concerning it,
is not equal to owning shares in a firm and being offered a vote on the magnitude of your
shares to make decisions on the complete holdings of the company.
How to balance the benefits of efficiency and competence of a REHCO against the rights
of original property owners to develop and profit their own land is the key issue. While it
may not be possible to find a balance that pleases everybody, certain mitigatory measures do
exist that might have made the Solidere project more inclusive of democratic participation
and sensitive to the different systems of property rights held by its constituents.
91t is also the case that waqfs, especially in the areas of traditional developmental composition, form one
of the obstacles in the face of assembling lands. This is not due to the nature of the waqf itself, but because
of the negligence which many waqfs are suffering from. This is due to bad management of the administrators
appointed or because of the distribution of the revenues of a certain waqf among large numbers of heirs
through generations until such revenues became too little to any of them to deserve the effort of follow-up.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The researcher Heiko Schmid calls the Solidere story an example of "strategic truth" at
work. Indeed, the project is characterized by two very different opinions. Ayman Trawil
reflecting on the city center, said:
If the experience of Hausssmann-Paris is repeating itself in that of Hariri-
Beirut, it would be only wise for the Lebanese intelligentsia to realize early on the
benefits of Mr. Hariri's efforts in the renaissance of Beirut. He offered the city
an excellent opportunity of rejuvenation, revival and ultimately, rebirth. Today,
it shines bright on the Mediterranean coast, a reminder of past achievements
and the entailing great civilizations that followed. Mr. Hariri has successfully
put into action the entirety of his vision elaborated in the early eighties and
which he fought hard to accomplish.
Whereas when Samir Khalaf explored the impact of the project, he suggested that:
Private interest and self-gain are being promoted at the expense of the public
good.. .the bourgeois values of commercialism and materialism have become so
rooted in Lebanese society that almost every relationship is reduced to a cash
nexus. In Beirut members of the bourgeoisie have amassed considerable wealth,
primarily from real estate transactions - ones which have often lined the pockets
of public officials as well.
The Solidere project was aiming to build what the government promised would be, the
"Second Republic of Lebanon." A "culture of reconstruction," was established through
this development. This culture, however, was unsatisfactory to many people. The original
'Ayman Trawi. Beirut's Memory. Anis Commercial Printing, Beirut, 2003.
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property right holders felt their democratic rights of due process had been compromised.
Many Muslim owners felt that their religious rights had been undermined, and that the new
government did not give a high enough regard to Islamic Jurisprudence.
Angus Gavin, head of Urban Planning at Solidere, argued, in an interview last summer,
that while Solidere's establishment may not have been based on the most solid of inclusive
and yielding policies, we must not remain so static in our interpretation to take that as our
understanding of the firm today.
Angus Gavin believes, "building cities doesn't work unless you do things people want."
Last August he urged me to disregard the rocky start of the firm, and to only look at the
benefits and public service the firm provides today.
It is hard, however, knowing the history of the company, not to ask whether it was
actually necessary. The firm is not protected from history. Hariri is known as the "man of
reconstruction," and the project was the keystone venture in rebuilding in Lebanon. The
Solidere initiative altered how people saw their government, and so the ramifications of the
firm must be examined in this context.
As Saree Makdisi put it, "if one can speak of a discourse called Harirism, it would center
on but not be limited to Lebanon's multibillionaire prime minister," who in the name of
economic stability has "brought a previously undreamt-of intensification of profit seeking
to the Lebanese economy; in which the apparatuses of the state have not so much been
dismantled or circumvented" as they have been put to use for private interests, including
those of Hariri himself. For example, the recent passage of law enabling the greater com-
mercial exploitation of the previously highly regulated national coastline2 . Shortly after
the law was passed, came the announcement of a private development project called Port
Hariri, which would center on the construction of Beirut's only remaining public beach, of a
private hotel and yacht club complex, adjoining it is a road that was only recently renamed
Boulevard Rafiq Hariri.3
Harirism represents a "will to privatize virtually everything, from television stations to
garbage collecting to educational institutions to construction projects to state property and
institutions to real estate to the national airline" to, the center of Beirut. At the edge of
2Also included in this privatization project are plans for the possible privatization of the national airline,
(contingent on negotiations between leading politicians) or to the plans to reduce the number of television
stations from sixty to five.
3 As-Safir, 20 December 1994, p. 1
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the Solidere project, there are a number of posters showing scenes of a happy and successful
"reconstructed" Beirut; the slogan reads, "Beirut is Yours: Ask about It." However, to
many people, "excluded" from the benefits of reconstruction this can appear only "as a
meaningless phrase, if not an actual insult"4.
On February 1 6 th 1996, a family of squatters was killed when their building was brought
down by a Solidere demolition crew (with the squatters still inside). Many people's "worst
fears were confirmed"5 . It seemed that in the new and gentrified Central District, there
would be no space for the destitute and "undesirable" migrants. As Beyhum argued, this
project represents nothing less than a "system of class segregation," whereby the future
city center of Beirut will be cut off and isolated from the rest of the city and the country
precisely in class terms6 . The potential of sectarian reintegration here was also hampered
by the "gentrification" and the "alienating effects it might have on the lower classes," those
that were more severely segregated on sectarian grounds during the war.
In February 1996, a military curfew was imposed on Beirut to prevent a strike and
demonstrations planned by the General Labor Confederation to protest the government's
rejection of their call for an increase in the monthly minimum wage. Prime Minister Hariri
declared, "we will not allow the government to be toppled from the street." To this end,
Lebanon has witnessed both an increase in the activities of "repressive state apparatuses"
as well as "an increase in the state's role in those forms of public planning" that - as
opposed to health care, education, and low-income housing - "are calculated either to yield
immediate private profits" or to improve the infrastructural conditions for the generation
of private profits. This does not entail merely the confusion of public and private interest.
It is, rather, the "colonization" of the former by the latter. State and private projects can
no longer be distinguished, not because this is a strong state that is organizing a command
economy but because "capital has become the state".
One of the dangers of having a politically unsupported development project is that
once the regime changes, support for the project wavers, and where does that leave the
4 Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
5 Based on Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of
Solidere. Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
6N. Beyhum. The Crisis of Urban Culture: The Three Reconstruction Plans for Beirut. Beirut Review,
4:4362, 1992
7 Negri, following Marx defines this as the total subsumption of society and the state into capital - Twenty
Theses on Marx: Interpretation of the Class Situation Today
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property holders? But Solidere had gained enough momentum that even the election of a
new Lebanese President and a new Prime Minister in the fall of 1998 could not stop the
initiative. Yet some things had changed. Various confidants of Hariri were removed from
public institutions and some of the law-suits against Solidere that had been frozen were
reopened after the change of government8 . However, the new Minister of Finance, George
Corm, one of the former critics, who had previously very strongly denounced the idea has
switched sides. As Minister of Finance he required a "positive image of the reconstruction
project" in order to attract foreign investors, since the failure of the project would be a
"catastrophe for the economically unstable Lebanon."
But the project had already lost some of its impetus9 . Construction permits were
given out more restrictively than in the past and Solidere had to contend with unfavorable
economic conditions in the Middle East and in the global economy. The economic crisis in
Asia in the summer of 1998 led to the withdrawal of some Far Eastern investors from the
project. In 1999 a "new and difficult phase seemed to be imminent." The infrastructure
works had come to an end, but had used up most of the firm's cash, which had to be
replenished through land sales.
Another change of government and the reappointment of Hariri as Prime Minister af-
ter winning the election in the summer of 2000 brought an end at least to the domestic
difficulties for Solidere. However, some of the economic difficulties remained. Had Solid-
ere secured public support outside of direct government power, regime changes might not
have had such drastic effects on the functioning of the firm. George Corm, the Lebanese
economist and Minister of Finance, put it best when he said, "Clearly, it is the Lebanese
population, resident or emigrant, that is the missing element from the actual process of
reconstruction 10.
The hiccoughs in support for these projects between regime changes is worsened by the
fact that the project has not established any long-lasting, community-level decision making.
Instead, the functions and controls of the central government have increased as a result of
the economic success of certain development schemes. There has not been any effort to
develop effective community leadership in areas affected by these projects.
8R. Haddad. Prosecutor takes up case against Solidere. Daily Star, 15 December, 1998.
9Based on H. Schmid. The Reconstruction of Downtown Beirut in the Context of Political Geography.
Arab World Geographer, 5 Spring(4):232-248, 2002.
'
0 George Corm. Reconstruction and the Public Benefit in Post- War Finance and Politics. Dar El-Jadeed,
Beirut, 1995. p. 96
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The failure of these development projects to meet their social goals is attributed by
Johnson and Lintner to lack of recognition by national and foreign development planners
of the pluralistic nature of law and of property concepts in the Middle East. They believe
that many of the conflicts that occurred as a result of these area development schemes could
have been avoided if planners had taken into account traditional legal institutions. In order
that law can be a more effective instrument of social change, these scholars recommend that
development planners give full recognition to the pluralistic legal context of Middle Eastern
societies, identifying both traditional and national rights to key resources and encouraging
the participation of local community members in development plans in order to mitigate
their impact.
This goes beyond mitigating policies like offering more adequate compensation. In order
for the REHCO to be a convincing model of development they must be sustained by genuine
public support, rather than on strategic influences alone. Solidere was able to survive the
ratification process by using approaches like "embedding strategies" and "dividing and
conquering." This strategic response to the situation is not, however, one which will foster
community leadership and help to heal community divisions.
Beirut, especially in view of the reconstruction project, has been called a "laboratory
for the current and future elaborations of global capitalism"1 1 . After the war, Lebanon
found itself in a state of deteriorated public order, dilapidated government apparatuses,
and washed out civic organizations. However, today the process of privatization is already
at a more advanced stage in Lebanon than it is elsewhere in the rest of the Middle East.
As Assem Salam1 2 points out, "clearly, privatization should never be a choice when the
administration is weak and its institutions are ailing. Instead, priorities should be directed
at the reinforcement of those state institutions capable of playing their role in formulat-
ing development policies, exercising control, and supervising successful implementations."
Only when the state is sufficiently capable of fulfilling its role at monitoring and mediating
should the private sector be invited to contribute and invest in the reconstruction effort.
This condition would prevent situations like the encampment of private interests in public
institutions (like al-Shalaq's appointment in the CDR).
"Saree Makdisi. Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidere.
Critical Inquiry, 23(3), 1997.
1
2 Assem Salam "Le Nouveau plan directeur du center-ville de Beyrouth," in Nabil Beyhum, Assem Salaam,
and Jad Tabet eds. Beyrouth:Constuire l'avenir reconstruire le passi? Dar El-Jadeed, Beirut, 1996. p. 132
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In the case of Beirut, emerging from a violent and tragic Civil War, more attention might
have been given to coordinating a "culture of reconstruction" that was more sensitive to
the needs of the public, despite the extra inefficiencies that might have been added.
Once we understand the strategies used by Solidere, the real question becomes, is there
any way to achieve a real balance. Can we have large urban projects fueled by REHCOs,
without too severely compromising the property rights of the stakeholders involved. Ulti-
mately, even if the basic public institutional support is available, the issue boils down to
three key questions; what the rights of individual property owners should be under such
circumstances; what forms of compensation are appropriate if the government lacks ade-
quate funding; and what the formula for community participation should be under such
circumstances.
Abstracting from the case of Beirut, the issue remains of how much authority the col-
lectivity should have over land after a disaster. To what extent is it acceptable for a
government to mandate the use of land after a disaster? Post-World War II experiences
have seen situations of eminent domain and compulsory rebuilding measures. Even if we
accept that land must be rebuilt, the question of when a reconstruction vehicle such as
Solidere is appropriate at all still remains. Solidere's massive power may be a feature of
REHCOs that is constrained to a weakened post-war government. A more stable regime,
with deep-rooted institutional support may have been better able to control and monitor
the firm. The political climate of the host country must be determined before such REHCOs
can be used in other situations.
Before such institutions are employed as mainstream development models in the Middle
East, further research into their effects on the balance between secular and Islamic legal
systems, the handling of marginalized groups, and under what legal and administrative
government conditions it is safe to resort to such a venture, is necessary.
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